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U.N. Security Council adopts resolution (SC Res. 2100) establishing peacekeeping force in Mali

Saturday, April 27th, 2013

(developing story)

The United Nations Security Council adopted on April 25 Resolution 2100 establishing a U.N. peackeeping force in Mali, effective July 1, 2013. The Security Council’s Press Release (SC/10987) summariezes the resolution and the statements of the delegates, and also contains the text of the resolution. The Press release, except for the resolution (reproduced in full beow), follows:

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Security Council
6952nd Meeting (AM)

Security Council Establishes Peacekeeping Force for Mali Effective 1 July, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2100 (2013)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Will Have Up to 11,200 Troops, 1,440 Police, Take over for African-Led Mission (AFISMA)

The Security Council today unanimously approved the creation of a 12,600 member peacekeeping force in the West African nation of Mali, strongly condemning the January offensive by armed groups towards the south and stressing that terrorism could only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach to isolate the terrorist threat.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by 1 July 2013, and thereby transfer the functions of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) — set up by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in September — to the new entity. The Secretary-General was requested to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into its activities and to appoint a Special Representative for Mali and Head of Mission to assume overall authority for the coordination of United Nations activities.

By the terms of resolution 2100 (2013), MINUSMA would comprise up to 11,200 military personnel, including reserve battalions able to deploy rapidly within the country, as required, and 1,440 police personnel. The Council called on Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment.

In terms of mandate, the Council authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means, in support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize key population centres, especially in the north, deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas. It would support Mali’s transitional authorities to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country, and support both national and international efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector.

By other terms, French troops were authorized to use all necessary means to intervene in support of MINUSMA when under “imminent and serious threat” and upon the request of the Secretary-General, with the Council deciding to review that role within six months of its commencement.

The seven-part mandate also included responsibilities to support the implementation of Mali’s transitional road map — adopted in January to restore democracy and stability — as well as for the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel, and promotion and protection of human rights. In the area of national and international justice, MINUSMA would support the efforts of the transitional authorities to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, taking into account their referral of the situation in Mali since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court.

Demanding that all rebel armed groups set aside their arms and cease hostilities immediately, the Council urged all such parties who had cut all ties with terrorist groups — such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Ansar Eddine — and who recognized, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, to engage “expeditiously” in an inclusive negotiation process, facilitated by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Mali once appointed.

Further by the text, the Council urged transitional authorities to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections “as soon as technically possible”, welcoming the commitment to organize presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative polls on 21 July 2013.

After adoption, the representative of the Russian Federation said he had voted in favour of the text, mindful of stepping up assistance to overcome a complex crisis in Mali. The main responsibility for resolving existing problems lay with Malians. The Mission’s tasks must aim exclusively at providing assistance. Following the Council’s approval of the intervention brigade for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), today’s decision was “of alarm”, as what had once been considered an exception, was now a standing practice — one with unpredictable consequences for the safety of United Nations personnel and the Mission’s legal status.

He went on to say that the Secretary-General’s report underscored the need for a clear division between peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement activities, and that MINUSMA did not provide for offensive operations. In the resolution’s preamble, the unacceptability of such actions was reaffirmed. Blue helmets should not be used to arrest those accused of having carried out war crimes. It was clear that a military solution did not exist and that the Mission must be backed by tangible political processes.

Tiéman Hubert Coulibaly, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Mali, said today’s adoption was an important step in efforts to stem activities of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Mujahideen and other groups, as well as ensure peace and stability throughout the territory. The resolution would transfer functions from the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the new United Nations Stabilization Mission.

For its part, Mali was fully prepared to welcome the Mission, which could stabilize main urban centres in the north, restore State authority, protect civilians, and promote and protect human rights and humanitarian assistance. Thanks to AFISMA, the Malian security forces and others, progress had been made in taking back main cities in the north and centre of the country. Small cells of armed rebels continued to threaten Mali’s stability and territorial integrity, as well as stability in the region. He welcomed the international commitment to deter the return of armed groups. Those groups must lay down their arms, cease hostilities, and recognize Mali’s territorial integrity.

He went on to stress that there could be no sustainable development without peace and stability, appealing for better coordination of the international response to Mali’s short-, medium- and long-term needs, especially in the areas of security, governance and humanitarian action. He hoped that the International Conference of Donors, on 15 May, would help achieve results, urging international and regional organizations to join the “wave of solidarity”.

For its part, the transitional Government was implementing the road map by taking steps for the holding of fair, free, transparent elections and the start of an inter-Malian dialogue, he said, which included the creation of a Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission comprised of 30 commissioners representing the country’s diversity. He reiterated the pledge to cooperate with the Council and play its role in the implementation of the resolution, thanking France, in particular, for helping Mali end the terrorist offensive, as well as ECOWAS, the European Union, the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and all bilateral and multilateral partners, and neighbouring countries for their help in dealing with the crisis.

Tété António, Permanent Observer for the African Union, spoke on behalf of Pierre Buyoya, African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel Region, recalling that the African Union and ECOWAS had been focused on the crisis in Mali from the start. Efforts now would focus on assisting Malian authorities in restoring its national unity, territorial integrity and constitutional order in a peaceful climate marked by national reconciliation.

To do that, the two organizations had outlined a strategy, he said, comprised of a political process and, if necessary, military action. The dialogue process was based on the belief that every possible peaceful way must be used before resorting to military action. It was incumbent on the African Union to take steps for possible military intervention. The attack on Konna in January provided a reason to support such an approach, as it undermined dialogue efforts ongoing with some armed groups. As such, it was normal to back an initiative for transforming AFISMA into a United Nations mission. He was pleased that some of his concerns regarding the draft version had been taken into account in the final version.

Against that backdrop, he urged that the central political roles of the African Union and ECOWAS be recognized in their cooperation with the United Nations Mission. They would keep a strong presence in Bamako. In addition, he hoped that consultations — which had been a hallmark of all joint actions taken thus far — would continue, inter alia, in taking major decisions, the selection of military and civilian leaders, and in the coordination between MINUSMA, French forces and the Malian army through the appointment of liaison officers. The transformation of AFISMA was an example of the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations, which he hoped would lead to a lasting solution to the crisis Mali.

The meeting began at 10:13 a.m. and adjourned at 10:33 a.m.

Full Text of Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2100 (2013) reads as follows:

25 United Nations S/RES/2100 (2013)
Security Council Distr.: General
25 April 2013
12-24771 (E)
*1224771*
Resolution 2100 (2013)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting, on
25 April 2013

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2085 (2012), its
Presidential Statements of 26 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/7) and 4 April 2012
(S/PRST/2012/9) as well as its Press Statements of 22 March 2012, 9 April 2012,
18 June 2012, 10 August 2012, 21 September 2012, 11 December 2012 and 10 January 2013 on Mali,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial
integrity of Mali,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the
parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Condemning strongly the offensive launched on 10 January 2013 by terrorist,
extremist and armed groups towards the south of Mali and stressing that terrorism
can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the
active participation and collaboration of all States, and regional and international
organizations to impede, impair, and isolate the terrorist threat, and reaffirming that terrorism could not and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization,

Welcoming the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the
transitional authorities of Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist and
armed groups towards the south of Mali and commending the efforts to restore the
territorial integrity of Mali by the Malian Defence and Security Forces, with the
support of French forces and the troops of the African-led International Support
Mission in Mali (AFISMA),

Stressing the need to work expeditiously toward the restoration of democratic governance and constitutional order, including through the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections and emphasizing the importance for the transitional authorities of Mali to move swiftly in a process of inclusive dialogue and active engagement with Malian political groups, including those who have previously advocated independence, are prepared to cease hostilities, have cut off all ties with terrorist organizations and who recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and
humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region and over the insecurity which hinders
humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of armed groups, terrorist and
criminal networks, and their activities, the presence of landmines as well as the
continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens
the peace, security, and stability of States in this region,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure
the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety of civilians receiving
assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Mali and
stressing the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of
need,

Condemning strongly all abuses and violations of human rights and violations
of international humanitarian law, including those involving extrajudicial
executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and sexual and gender-based violence,
forced amputations, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children,
attacks against schools and hospitals, forced displacements, and destruction of
cultural and historical heritage, committed in Mali by any group or individuals,
noting, especially, widespread abuses of human rights by terrorist, extremist and
armed groups in the north of Mali, condemning strongly the reports of retaliatory
attacks, including those based on ethnicity and those allegedly perpetrated by
members of the Malian Defence and Security Forces against civilians, and calling
upon all parties to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with
their obligations under applicable international law,
Reiterating, in this regard, that all perpetrators of such acts must be held
accountable and that some of such acts referred to in the paragraph above may
amount to crimes under the Rome Statute and taking note that the transitional
authorities of Mali referred the situation in Mali since January 2012 to the
International Criminal Court on 13 July 2012 and that the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court opened, on 16 January 2013, an investigation into
alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012,

Taking note of the listing of Ansar Eddine and its leader Iyad Ag Ghali,
recalling the listing of Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and
the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), on the Al-Qaida
sanctions list established by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and
1989 (2011) and reiterating its readiness, under the above-mentioned regime, to
sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who do not cut off all ties to Al-Qaida and associated groups, including AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar
Eddine, in accordance with the established listing criteria,

Expressing its continued concern over the serious threats posed by
transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, and its increasing links, in some
cases, with terrorism, and strongly condemning the incidents of kidnapping and
hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, noting
the increase in such kidnappings in the Sahel region, and underscoring the urgent
need to address these issues,

Expressing its determination to combat kidnapping and hostage-taking in the
Sahel region, in accordance with applicable international law and, in this regard,
noting the publication of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) “Algiers
Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of
Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists”,

Commending the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU), as well as the Secretary-
General, for their intensive efforts to solve the crisis in Mali, welcoming the
establishment by the AU, ECOWAS, the EU and the United Nations of a Joint Task
Force for Mali in Addis Ababa, encouraging them to maintain coordination in
support of the stabilization of the situation in Mali, including the national political dialogue and electoral process, noting that the requirement to report as requested in paragraph 10 of resolution 2085 (2012) was not fulfilled and looking forward to the submission of those reports,

Commending the efforts of African countries to contribute forces to AFISMA,
as authorized by resolution 2085 (2012), welcoming the deployment of AFISMA in
Mali and also commending Member States and regional and international
organizations that support this deployment in Mali,

Commending the contributions pledged at the Donors conference organized by
the AU in Addis Ababa on 29 January 2013 in support of AFISMA and the Malian
Defence and Security Forces, welcoming actual contributions already made and the
AU pledge to contribute through the AU’s assessed contributions, urging all donors
to translate their pledges into actual contributions and calling upon other Member
States and regional and international organizations to also contribute generously,

Encouraging international coordination to consolidate political and security
progress in Mali, and in this regard, regular meetings of the Support and Follow-Up
Group on the Situation in Mali, established by the AU Peace and Security Council
on 20 March 2012, and co-chaired by the AU, ECOWAS, EU and the United
Nations and attended by other international partners, and welcoming the conclusions
of the 5 February 2013 and 19 April 2013 meetings of the Follow-Up Group,

Taking note of the letter, dated 25 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-
General by the transitional authorities of Mali, which requests the deployment of a
United Nations operation to stabilize and restore the authority and the sovereignty
of the Malian State throughout its national territory,

Taking note of the letter, dated 26 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-
General by the President of the ECOWAS Commission requesting the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization mission and taking
note of the communiqué, dated 7 March 2013, of the AU Peace and Security
Council, as well as the attached letter dated 7 March 2013 and addressed to the
Secretary-General by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, expressing AU
support for the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization
operation in Mali,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/189), dated
26 March 2013, on the situation in Mali, including recommendations and options for
establishing a United Nations stabilization operation in Mali, Emphasizing that the transitional authorities of Mali have primary responsibility for resolving the interlinked challenges facing their country and protecting all their citizens and that any sustainable solution to the crisis in Mali should be Malian-owned, including a political process, also emphasizing that the cooperation among the countries of the region will be crucial for lasting peace and stability in Mali,

Encouraging the international community to provide broad support to resolve
the crisis in Mali through coordinated actions for immediate and long-term needs,
encompassing security, governance, development and humanitarian issues, looking
forward to the high-level international donors’ conference in Brussels on 15 May
2013 to support the development of Mali, commending the contributions already
made toward the 2013 Consolidated Appeal for Mali and urging all Member States
and other donors to contribute generously for humanitarian operations,

Determining that the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international
peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Commends the initial measures taken so far to restore constitutional order
and national unity in Mali, including the adoption by the Malian National Assembly,
on 29 January 2013, of a transitional road map, welcomes the establishment of the
Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission on 6 March 2013 and the appointment of
its Commissioners and calls on the Commission to commence its work as soon as
possible, and further calls on the transitional authorities of Mali to continue
urgently to take discernible steps towards consolidating stability, enhancing a
culture of democratic governance, and facilitating inclusive political dialogue to
bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion, which
should lead to political progress in this regard as early as possible;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, in close coordination with the AU and
ECOWAS, to support all dimensions of the transitional road map, with a view to its
swift implementation, including the work of the Dialogue and Reconciliation
Commission;

3. Urges the transitional authorities of Mali to hold free, fair, transparent
and inclusive presidential and legislative elections as soon as technically possible,
welcomes the stated commitment of the transitional authorities of Mali to organize
presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative elections on 21 July 2013,
stresses the importance of ensuring an environment conducive to the holding of
elections, in particular a secure environment prior to, during and following the
electoral period, equitable access to State-controlled media and provision for all
eligible persons, including internally displaced persons and refugees, to participate
in the electoral process and calls upon Member States, regional and international
organizations, as requested by the transitional authorities of Mali, to provide support to the electoral process, including through financial resources, electoral observation capacity and related technical assistance;

4. Demands that all rebel armed groups in Mali put aside their arms and cease hostilities immediately and urges all such parties in Mali who have cut off all
ties with terrorist organizations such as AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and associated terrorist groups and who recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, and the transitional authorities of Mali to engage expeditiously in an inclusive negotiation process, facilitated by the Secretary-General, in particular through his Special Representative for Mali when
appointed as referred to in paragraph 11 below, in close collaboration with the AU,
ECOWAS and the EU Special Representative for the Sahel;

5. Calls upon the international community, through the Support and Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali, to meet regularly in Mali and, as may be required, outside Mali, to assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement the transitional road map and monitor the progress made in this regard and to continue contributing to the promotion of lasting peace, stability, and reconciliation in Mali, requests the Secretary-General to facilitate the convening of the Support and Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali and stresses the importance of continued coordination between the United Nations, the AU and ECOWAS in the promotion of lasting peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Mali;

6. Demands that no member of the Malian Defence and Security Forces shall undermine and obstruct the implementation of the transitional road map or the efforts of the international community to foster political and security progress in Mali, stresses the importance of Malian civilian control and oversight of the Malian Defence and Security Forces and expresses its readiness to consider appropriate measures, as necessary, against those who take action that undermines the peace, stability, and security, including those who prevent the implementation of constitutional order;

7. Decides to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), requests the Secretary-General to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into MIN USMA, with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the discharge of UNOM’s mandated tasks, as of the date of adoption of this resolution, further decides that the authority be transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013 at which point MINUSMA shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, for an initial period of 12 months and requests the Secretary-General to include in MINUSMA, in close coordination with the AU and ECOWAS, AFISMA military and police personnel appropriate to United Nations standards;

8. Decides that the date referred to in paragraph 7 above and MINUSMA’s
phased deployment shall be subject to a further review by the Council within
60 days of the adoption of this resolution of the security situation in MINUSMA’s
area of responsibility, specifically with respect to the cessation of major combat
operations by international military forces in the immediate vicinity of and/or within MINUSMA’s envisaged area of responsibility and a significant reduction in the
capacity of terrorist forces to pose a major threat to the civilian population and
international personnel in the immediate vicinity of and/or within MINUSMA’s
envisaged area of responsibility, further decides, should the Council consider that
these criteria are not met before 1 July 2013, it shall concurrently adjust the timeline for MINUSMA’s deployment against these criteria;

9. Calls for tangible achievements in the political process in Mali, which
are of critical significance for the successful deployment and activities of
MINUSMA;

10. Reiterates that Member States and regional and international
organizations are urged to continue to provide coordinated support to AFISMA
pursuant to its resolution 2085 (2012), until the transfer of authority from AFISMA
to MINUSMA, including military training, provision of equipment, intelligence and
logistical support, requests the Secretary-General to accelerate the disbursement of
the United Nations Trust Fund established pursuant to its resolution 2085 (2012) to
support AFISMA, and decides that equipment donated or granted to AFISMA, or
where the ownership remains with the donor, shall not be considered contingentowned
equipment;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special
Representative for Mali and Head of Mission of MINUSMA, who shall, from the
date of appointment, assume overall authority on the ground for the coordination of
all the activities of the United Nations, and its agencies, funds and programmes, in
Mali and shall use good offices and coordinate efforts of the international
community in order to support the priority elements as defined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3
and 4 above and who shall, from the transfer of authority from AFISMA to
MINUSMA, lead all tasks of the mandate of MINUSMA as defined in paragraph 16
below, and coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali,
including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and
Security Sector Reform (SSR), further emphasizes that the Special Representative
shall ensure optimal coordination between MINUSMA and the United Nations
Country Team in Mali, in connection with the aspects of their respective mandates;

12. Decides that MINUSMA will comprise up to 11,200 military personnel,
including reserve battalions capable of deploying rapidly within the country as and
when required, and 1,440 police personnel, calls upon Member States to provide
troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment in order to enhance the
capacity of MINUSMA to operate, and discharge its responsibilities, effectively and
requests the Secretary-General to recruit qualified staff, who have the professional
experience and skills appropriate to the tasks defined under applicable competency
areas in paragraphs 16 and 17 below;

13. Welcomes the commitment of the Secretary-General, as outlined in
paragraph 81 of his report (S/2013/189), to take all possible steps, including through the full use of existing authorities and at his discretion, to accelerate the deployment of civilian and military capabilities in Mali, in order to best respond to the Council’s expectations and the needs of the Malian people and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 12 above, to have MINUSMA ready to commence its activities;

14. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps in order to
ensure inter-mission cooperation, notably between MINUSMA and UNMIL and
UNOCI, appropriate transfers of troops and their assets from other United Nations
missions to MINUSMA, subject to the following conditions: (i) the Council’s
information and approval, including on the scope and duration of the transfer,
(ii) the agreement of the troop-contributing countries and (iii) the security situation where these United Nations missions are deployed and without prejudice to the performance of their mandates;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the other United Nations
missions in the region, notably UNMIL and UNOCI, share logistic and
administrative support with MINUSMA, to the extent possible, without prejudicing
their operational capacities with respect to their mandates, in order to maximize the
effectiveness and efficiency of the missions in the West African region, and to report thereon for consideration as appropriate;

16. Decides that the mandate of MINUSMA shall be the following:

(a) Stabilization of key population centres and support for the
reestablishment of State authority throughout the country

(i) In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize the key
population centres, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter
threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those
areas;

(ii) To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish
State administration throughout the country;

(iii) To support national and international efforts towards rebuilding the
Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through technical
assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programmes, as well
as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities and in close
coordination with other bilateral partners, donors and international
organizations engaged in these fields, including the EU;

(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other
support, in mine action and weapons and ammunition management;

(v) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in developing and
implementing programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the dismantling of militias and
self-defence groups, consistent with the objectives of reconciliation and taking
into account the specific needs of demobilized children;

(b) Support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including
the national political dialogue and the electoral process

(i) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement swiftly the
transitional road map towards the full restoration of constitutional order,
democratic governance and national unity in Mali;

(ii) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the
national and local levels, including through local partners as appropriate, in
order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;

(iii) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali and communities in the north
of Mali to facilitate progress towards an inclusive national dialogue and
reconciliation process, notably the negotiation process referred to in paragraph
4 above, including by enhancing negotiation capacity and promoting the
participation of civil society, including women’s organizations;

(iv) To support the organization and conduct of inclusive, free, fair and
transparent presidential and legislative elections, including through the
provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective
security arrangements;

(c) Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel

(i) To protect, without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional
authorities of Mali, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,
within its capacities and areas of deployment;

(ii) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed
conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and
Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and
gender-based violence in armed conflict;

(iii) To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and
ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and
associated personnel;

(d) Promotion and protection of human rights

(i) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or
violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law
committed throughout Mali and to contribute to efforts to prevent such
violations and abuses;

(ii) To support, in particular, the full deployment of MINUSMA human rights
observers throughout the country;

(iii) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on
violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations
committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed
conflict;

(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in their efforts to promote
and protect human rights;

(e) Support for humanitarian assistance
In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to contribute to the
creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of
humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the
voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close
coordination with humanitarian actors;

(f) Support for cultural preservation
To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, as necessary and feasible, in
protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration
with UNESCO;

(g) Support for national and international justice
To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the transitional
authorities of Mali, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to
justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali,
taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of the
situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal
Court;

17. Authorizes MINUSMA to use all necessary means, within the limits of its
capacities and areas of deployment, to carry out its mandate as set out in paragraphs
16 (a) (i) and (ii), 16 (c) (i) and (iii), 16 (e), 16 (f) and 16 (g) and requests
MINUSMA’s civilian and military components to coordinate their work with the aim
of supporting the tasks outlined in paragraph 16 above;

18. Authorizes French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas
of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities
of MINUSMA until the end of MINUSMA’s mandate as authorized in this
resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent
and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, further requests France to
report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali and to
coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in
paragraph 34 below and decides to review this mandate within six months after its
commencement;

19. Urges all parties in Mali to cooperate fully with the deployment and
activities of MINUSMA, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom
of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Mali
to enable MINUSMA to carry out fully its mandate;

20. Calls upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the
free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, as
well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and
spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of MINUSMA;

21. Reiterates that the training, consolidation and redeployment of the
Malian Defence and Security Forces is vital to ensure Mali’s long-term security and
stability and to protect the people of Mali and stresses the importance of the Malian
Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing security
throughout the Malian territory;

22. Welcomes the deployment of the European Union Training Mission
(EUTM) in Mali which is providing training and advice for the Malian Defence and
Security Forces towards contributing to strengthening civilian authority and respect
for human rights and calls upon the EU, notably its Special Representative for the
Sahel, to coordinate closely with MINUSMA, and other bilateral partners of Mali
engaged to assist the transitional authorities of Mali in the Security Sector Reform
(SSR);

23. Urges Member States, regional and international organizations to provide
coordinated assistance, expertise and training, including on human rights and
international humanitarian law, especially concerning the protection of women and
children, and capacity-building support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces,
including through the United Nations Trust Fund established pursuant to its
resolution 2085 (2012) for Peace and Security in Mali, and in close coordination
with existing initiatives, in particular EUTM to help restore the authority of the
State of Mali over its entire national territory, to uphold the unity and territorial
integrity of Mali and to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations and
associated groups;

24. Reiterates that the transitional authorities of Mali have primary
responsibility to protect civilians in Mali, further recalls its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of
S/RES/2039 (2012) civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security and calls upon MINUSMA and all military forces in Mali to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

25. Requests MINUSMA to take fully into account gender considerations as
a cross cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the transitional authorities of Mali in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels and at an early stage of the stabilization phase, including the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, as well as in the national political dialogue and electoral processes;

26. Requests that MINUSMA take fully into account the need to protect
civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects in the performance of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, where undertaken jointly with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence
Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces
(S/2013/110);

27. Urges the transitional authorities of Mali to ensure that all perpetrators of
serious violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international
humanitarian law are held accountable and to continue to cooperate with the
International Criminal Court, in accordance with Mali’s obligations under the Rome
Statute;

28. Calls upon the transitional authorities of Mali, with the assistance of
MINUSMA, consistent with paragraph 16 above, and international partners, to
address the issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials and the United Nations
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in order to ensure the safe
and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of small arms and
light weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked or
illicitly held weapons and further stresses the importance of the full implementation
of its resolution 2017 (2011);

29. Urges Sahel and Maghreb States to enhance interregional cooperation
and coordination in order to develop inclusive and effective strategies to combat in a comprehensive and integrated manner the activities of terrorist groups, namely
AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Eddine, and prevent the expansion of those groups as
well as to limit the proliferation of all arms and transnational organized crime and,
in this regard, takes note of the outcome of the Conference organized by CTED and
CTITF in Rabat on the Cooperation on Border Control in the Sahel and the
Maghreb;

30. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of MINUSMA
with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and
to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur;

31. Requests MINUSMA, within its capabilities, its areas of deployment and
without prejudice to its mandate, to assist the Committee pursuant to resolutions
S/RES/2039 (2012), 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2083 (2012);

32. Requests the Secretary-General to consider the environmental impacts of
the operations of MINUSMA when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context,
encourages MINUSMA to manage them, as appropriate and in accordance with
applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and
regulations, and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites;

33. Requests the Secretary-General and the transitional authorities of Mali to
conclude, within 30 days of the adoption this resolution, a status-of-forces
agreement with regards to MINUSMA, taking into consideration General Assembly
resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel and decides that pending the conclusion
of such an agreement, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990
(A/45/594), shall apply provisionally;

34. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of
the situation in Mali and the implementation of the mandate of MINUSMA, to
report to the Council within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution, specifically
with regards to paragraph 8 and 9 above, and then every three months from 1 July
2013 and to include in his reports to the Council updates on the security situation,
the priority political elements as defined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above on the
implementation of the transitional road map, relevant information on the progress,
promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law as
well as a review of the troop level, force generation and deployment of all
MINUSMA’s constituent elements;

35. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.April 2013
Security Council

Links

U.N. Security Council Press Release summarizing the resolution and statements of the dlegates regarding their votes is found here.

The official text of Resolution 2100 is found here.

The Trenchant Observer

Smart drones, the goal of peace, and the future of mankind

Sunday, March 17th, 2013

In an Op-Ed piece by Bill Keller published in the New York Times on March 16, 2013, Keller describes the high probability that “smart drones” will be introduced in the future, in which the aerial-borne robotic machine and its computer will decide which targets and individuals and groups to fire upon, without human intervention. Keller notes that Israel, in fact, has already introduced such an aircraft, the Harpy. Keller notes,

Israel is the first country to make and deploy (and sell, to China, India, South Korea and others) a weapon that can attack pre-emptively without a human in charge. The hovering drone called the Harpy is programmed to recognize and automatically divebomb any radar signal that is not in its database of “friendlies.” No reported misfires so far, but suppose an adversary installs its antiaircraft radar on the roof of a hospital?

–Bill Keller, Op-Ed, “Smart Drones,” New York Times, March 16, 2013.

The entire op-ed piece speaks of advances in warfare based on the underlying assumption that continued warfare is inevitable, and that the most we can aspire to is to limit some forms of warfare or weapons used, such as land-mines. While there is a great deal to be said for international treaties and institutions that limit types and the extent of warfare–international humanitarian law or “the law of war” has precisely that aim, it seems that humanity has fallen into a downward spiral in its thinking and aspirations relating to war, and into what is in fact a profound moral abyss.

In 1945, no one doubted that the goal of international society and the new United Nations Charter and Organization should be the prevention of war, and the maintenance of international peace and security. This goal was almost self-evident to generations which had suffered the ravages of World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945).

But today our leaders no longer espouse the goal of international peace. Like President Barack Obama in his Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech or Lecture in 2009, they have no vision of peace as an overriding goal to which other objectives should be subordinated. Rather, permanent war is in the minds of the leaders of today. Obama, in thinking about his pivot to Asia, is thinking about military deployments in the region to check China’s rising military power. In the stand-off with Russia and China in the United Nations Security Council over Syria, the larger question of the goals and vision of international society has been lost, primarily but not exclusively as a result of Russian and Chinese obstinacy.

At best, particularly under Obama, we have a dearth of American leadership in world affairs in general and in the maintenance of international peace and security in particular. Here, France has stepped into the vacuum, first acting as a catalyst in Libya and more recently, acting by introducing French forces into Mali to halt the fall of that country to Islamic terrorist groups and Tuareg guerrillas.

But who, and in which countries, dares today to articulate a powerful vision of peace and how to get there?

Without a powerful vision of peace, such as that originally laid out in 1945 in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, humanity will continue to stumble down the terrible path of war, now to be mechanized with smart drones, and also soon to be characterized by an imminent breakdown in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In five years, or at most 10, Iran will have nuclear weapons. In five years, or at most 10, North Korea will have weapons and delivery vehicles that can land a nuclear bomb in Seattle or Los Angeles, if not Washington, New York, Moscow or London.

Is it not time that we in the United States seek to purify ourselves of the flawed thinking of the Bush and the Obama administrations about the inevitability of war, about the malleability of our most sacred moral values such as the inviolability of the human person, about the central importance of respect for fundamental human rights, of every person–even enemy combatants–and begin to concentrate with all our mental, social and political powers on the question of peace, and how to achieve it?

Is not war, and the pursuit of war, evil, and are not the pursuit of international peace and the fundamental human rights of all persons in all countries goals which embody our highest moral values?

Should we, then, not act on the basis of those values, and turn all of our efforts to developing our visions of peace and our roadmaps on how to get there?

It is perhaps no exaggeration to assert that a positive future for mankind depends on our visions of peace and our efforts to achieve them, far more than it depends on the technological “advances” we might make in developing ever-better machines of war.

Now, let’s think one step further and ask whether peace can be established without international rules that are binding in nature. Is there any realistic vision of peace that does not rest, ultimately, on the development and observance of international law and institutions? That was the vision of the founders of the League of Nations in 1919, and of the founders of the United Nations in 1945.

Is it not time for a renewal of hope, of positive goals, of our own deeply-felt visions of peace, and of our own stalwart and courageous actions to secure that peace?

The Trenchant Observer

What difference does it make if John Brennan is confirmed?

Wednesday, February 27th, 2013

In the end, what difference does it make if John Brennan is confirmed as CIA Director by the Senate?

1. Well, for one thing, it may be the last chance for the Senate to get control of a failed foreign policy, and to actually put someone in who would complement Secretary of State John Kerry–as a member of a team that can get the nation’s foreign policy back on a track that might avoid further disasters, and maybe even lead to some successes.

Vali Nasr, the Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of International Affairs, is publishing a book, The Dispensable Nation, which is coming out in April and is already making waves as one of the first hard-hitting assessments of Obama’s foreign policy in his first term.. And the story isn’t pretty. Obama has led the nation into one failure after another, but liberals and Democrats have been unwilling to hold him accountable. The president, after all, perfectly represents the mood of the American people, by and large, who just want to get out of Bush’s wars and focus on domestic issues.

But the world exists, regardless of what the public in general want, and it keeps turning. It keeps spinning, in fact, in ways that often seem adverse to U.S. interests, and sometimes it seems even to be spinning out of control.

Brennan’s confirmation will tilt the balance of Obama’s foreign policy team back to the place where it has been for the last four years, with Obama mainly interested in killing terrorists by drones, while at the same time dragging his feet in other international crIsis arenas, such as Syria, Mali, or even Libya (until the French and the British dragged the U.S. into it, once Security Council authorzation was secured). Obama, in the end, is not interested in foreign policy, and doesn’t know how to conduct it. So he, and we, need a strong team.

2. Brennan is the High Priest of the war on terror, the Holy Warrior leading “The Last Crusade” against the Islamic terrorist infidels. And the strategy is simple–simply to kill them before they kill us. He is not plagued by self-doubt. Obama, in becoming a warrior himself, may have modeled himself on Brennan.

The only problem is that we may have been so busy fighting this war of  targeted executions that we failed to notice, much less try to influence, strategic developments of enormous significance.

While Brennan was busy managing the “kill lists” and coordinating drone strikes on the infidels, Obama was giving up the ship to Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, offering Morsi  support and not criticism when he launched his legal coup d’etat on November 22, abrogating the rule of law in the nascent democracy of Egypt. Morsi pushed through his illegitimate constitution, shutting down the Constitutional Court with brown-shirt tactics in the street.

What difference does that make?

Well, for one thing, al-Azhar university, which is the highest center of Islamic learning in the city which is the cultural capital of the Arab world, is now facing increasing pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists to assume a more fundamentalist approach to religious issues. These include those covered by the sharia, or Islamic law, now raised to a position of preeminence in Morsi’s Islamist constitution.

In effect, Brennan was leading Obama to go and try to kill terrorist leaders with drones, while the geotectonic plates of the Middle East were shifting in Egypt. As this was taking place, Obama and Hillary Clinton remained frozen, unable to act as events unfolded in Egypt. Yet the success of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa is likely to be determined much more by developments at al-Azhar that by mid-level terrorists being killed by drones in Yemen

3. Then there are the moral issues. Torture. Extraordinary renditions to states which torture. Secret CIA “black prisons”, hidden from everyone, even the International Committee of the Red Cross. And targeted executions, including “signature” strikes against unknown individuals who evidenced a pattern of activities indicating they were terrorists. Any male over 14 killed in a drone attack was automatically deemed to be a terrorist, which was one way of keeping civilian casualties down–at least for those living within the White House bubble.

It is interesting how Brennan makes his legal arguments purporting to justify targeted killings.  He paints a picture of the ideal case. The  real cases, however, where unknown boys 14 years of age or older merit having their guts spattered in the sand, are cases we don’t know about, and whose justifying legal memoranda we will never see, because they are secret, indeed if in individual cases they exist at all. A legal opinion to support an execution would have to be individual, taking the specific facts of the case into account, and public, and presented to a competent judicial authority.

4. There are also issues of individual moral responsibility, and guilt, incurred by killing people outside the civilizing strucures of law, including international law.

Senators voting on Brennan face this moral responsibility, and potentially moral guilt from sanctioning actions which, in strictly legal terms, might be characterized as presumptive war crimes or other international crimes.

Like the Argentine politicians and generals who argued they faced the cancer of terrorism, Brennan’s supporters may find plausible arguments for going along with international crimes.

Then there is the argument that we should let bygones be bygones. Just turn the page, and move on.  Of course that was not the position adopted by Justice Robert Jackson at Nuremberg.

If there is one book the Senators might want to read before voting on the Brennan nomination, it is “The Question of German Guilt”, by the famous German philosopher Karl Jaspers. Jaspers, in a series of lectures at the University of Heidelberg in 1948, articulated with elegant distinctions the kinds of criminal, political, moral and existential guilt Germans might feel or be accused of, as the blinders came off about what Hitler and the Nazis had done in the Third Reich. His analysis is exceedingly pertinent to “The Question of American Guilt”.

There are also a few films the Senators might want to watch before voting on the Brennan nomination. One of the best is “The Official Story”, winner of an Academy Award for Best Foreign Film in 1985, which addresses questions of individual moral responsibility in the Argentine context. “Judgment at Nuremberg”, with Spencer Tracy starring as Justice Jackson, would be another.

Given Brennan’s use of the “cancer” metaphor to describe terrorism’s advances, the Senators might benefit from watching “Z”, Costa-Gavras’ film about the right-wing coup in Greece. Then there is always “Missing”, a film starring Jack Lemon which in the context of Agusto Pinochet’s coup in Chile powerfully conveys the impact on individuals and families of those who abandon law in favor of pure force in their battle against the “cancer” of terrorism–as they see it.

5. We must bear witness to the truth and fight to uphold the rule of law. Just as the excesses of the “Palmer raids” in 1919, or the internment of Japanese citizens in World War II, came to be understood as great deviations from the rule of law, so too some day future historians will ask, “Did no one oppose these outrageous violations of fundamental rights, or seek to prevent them from being carried out?”

We and others, at least, must speak out–as loudly and effectively as we can–so that there is some evidence that people opposed these outrages upon the Constitution and the rule of law. The challenges we face are not as great as those faced by Sophie Scholl, who distributed pamphlets in Hitler”s Germany, for which she was executed, or others who faced the power of totalitarian states, yet nonetheless spoke out.

In seeking to answer the historians’ question, the vote of individual Senators on the Brennan nomination will be duly noted, and the judgment of history will be entered, and it will fall upon those who vote, or abstain or are absent, on the Brennan nomination in the Senate.

Did this or that Senator stand up for the rule of law, and vote against a confirmation that would send a clear signal to the world that America endorses holy warriors who have no regard for international law and human rights? Or not?

How did these Senators, on the dates of these votes, define the nature of American Democracy in 2013? That is the question historians will ask, and about which they will write.

The Trenchant Observer

Imagine: The Collapse of International Order, Syria, and Berlin in 1945

Wednesday, February 20th, 2013

There is nothing inevitable about international order.

The lessons of two world wars which informed the creation of the United Nations in 1945, and the maintenance of international peace and security for over 60 years, can be forgotten.

It is entirely conceivable that without decisive leadership from either Europe or the United States, the international order that has existed for many decades could start to wobble and even collapse.

And it is nearly impossible to conceive of such leadership emerging any time soon.

The rubble in Syria resembles the rubble in Berlin and the destruction in Germany in 1945, which occurred the last time the international order collapsed.

How bad could it get?

You could have wars like the one in Syria devastating countries in Africa, a nuclear attack on Los Angeles from North Korea, Iran with nuclear weapons and delivery systems within 5-10 years, and Israel surrounded by hostile Islamist states.

Things could fall apart.

Imagine a world without law, without international law governing the use of force which is generally observed and which states seek to  uphold when it is violated.

Imagine true anarchy unleashed upon the world.

Imagine a  world in which states use force without acknowledging they have acted, and without any obligation to publicly justify the legitimacy of their actions by reference to international law.

That is the direction in which we are heading.

The Trenchant Observer

Instead of issuing statements with no legal force, the Security Council should act now to maintain international peace and security in Mali

Saturday, January 19th, 2013

ECOWAS and the African Union may provide the troops for military intervention to assist the French and Malian forces in repelling the advances of Islamist groups and Tuareg insurgents in Mali, but they are not up to the task of leading and coordinating the whole effort.

Such leadership must come from the U.N. Security Council, which must work much harder now than it did before in passing Resolution 2085 on December 20, 2012.

Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring international peace and security. Instead of issuing meaningless Press Statements which, though they have no legal force, mislead the world into thinking they are actually doing something when they are not, the members of the Security Council should get on with it, and take effective action under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Otherwise, they will become as irrelevant in Mali as they have become in Syria.

At the end of the day, someone has to lead. If it is to be the French, with American support, let them lead through the Security Council. All the ideological language about the intervention force being “African-led” should be dropped at once.

The objective here is not to have an “African-led” force, but rather to have an effective force that is capable of defeating the jihadists and revolutionaries who have seized much of Mali, and–at least until the French intervened–were advancing on Bamako.

The world does not need another Afghanistan, or a country like what Syria is becoming. The world must act, and the institution through which it must act is the Security Council.

Leadership is needed, now. If France is to take the lead, the U.S. and the other Security Council members should pull behind France and provide full support, acting through the Security Council.

In any event, the terms of Resolution 2085 have been overtaken by events on the ground. Consequently, the Security Council needs to immdiately negotiate and adopt a new resolution on Mali which takes current realities into account.

The Trenchant Observer

French continue bombing insurgent positions in Mali; Where is the U.S.?

Monday, January 14th, 2013

Another day of fighting in northern Mali, with French aerial bombardments of insurgent positions; U.S. appears disinterested.

See

Afua Hirsch in Bamako and Kim Willsher in Paris, “Mali conflict: France has opened gates of hell, say rebels;Islamist militant leader warns French government as fighter jets continue assault on rebel camps and convoys in central Mali, The Guardian, January 14, 2013 (16.34 EST).

Le Monde.fr avec AFP et Reuters,”Paris agit au Mali avec le soutien de l’ONU’” Le Monde, 15 janvier 2013 (Mis à jour le 15.01.2013 à 07h43).

Pierre Prier, “Mali : les islamistes lancent une contre-offensive,” Le Figaro, 14 janvier 2013 (Mis à jour à 23:46).

Adam Nossiter, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti ( Bamako),”French Strikes in Mali Supplant Caution of U.S.,” New York Times, January 13, 2013

The Trenchant Observer

U.N. Security Council Issues Press Statement on Mali (SC/10878) (including text)

Friday, January 11th, 2013

The United Nations Security Council issued a Press Statement on January 10, 2013 regarding the deteriorating situation in Mali (SC/10878; AFR/2502).

The text of the Press Statement follows:

Security Council Press Statement on Mali

The following Security Council press statement was issued today by Council President Mohammad Masood Khan ( Pakistan):

The members of the Security Council express their grave concern over the reported military movements and attacks by terrorist and extremist groups in the north of Mali, in particular their capture of the city of Konna, near Mopti. This serious deterioration of the situation threatens even more the stability and integrity of Mali and constitutes a direct threat to international peace and security.

The members of the Security Council recall resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2085 (2012) adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the urgent need to counter the increasing terrorist threat in Mali.

The members of the Security Council reiterate their call to Member States to assist the settlement of the crisis in Mali and, in particular, to provide assistance to the Malian Defence and Security Forces in order to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations and associated groups.

The members of the Security Council express their determination to pursue the full implementation of its resolutions on Mali, in particular resolution 2085 (2012) in all its dimensions. In this context, they call for a rapid deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA).

The members of the Security Council call for the immediate issuance of an agreed political road map, which includes serious negotiations with non-extremist Malians in the north and presses for the full restoration of democratic governance.

The statement has no legal effect, and is in effect essentially meaningless.

The most recent action by the Security Council was the adoption of Resolution 2085 on December 20, 2012. That resolution, which appeared to be hurriedly cobbled together to meet a 45-day deadline contained in a previous Security Council resolution, had a confusing text, no clear lines of command and responsibity, and no clear timeline for international military action to be taken against the insurgents in northern Mali.

See The Trenchant Observer, “U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2085 authorizing political, training and military action to restore control over North in Mali; confused resolution launches international bureaucratic and decision-making monstrosity,”
December 21, 2012.

For the latest news reports, see

Associated Press, Mali Seeks French Help Against Extremists,” NPR
News, January 10, 2012 (9:39 PM EST).

Le Monde.fr avec AFP et Reuters. “Le Mali demande l’aide militaire de la France, Le Monde, 11 janvier 2013 (Mis à jour le 11.01.2013 à 08h19).

David Baché. “Mali : les combats reprennent entre l’armée et les islamistes,”
Le Figaro, 10 janvier 2013 (Mis à jour à 19:15).

The situation is complicated by demands to replace the government of transition in Mali, upon which the entire edifice of Security Council Resolution 2085 is based.

France is supposed to respond to the appeal for help from the government of Mali on Friday, January 11. It may be that France has the only military force capable of intervening quickly enough to halt the advance of the rebels from the North. Whether they will choose to do so is an open question.

The manifest defects in Resolution 2085 have now become evident for all to see, under the pressure of impending events. The talk at the time Resolution 2085 was passed was that military action should not be expected before September or October 2013.

The Security Council’s calls for others to act demonstrates how far removed the Security Council has moved from being able to take effective action itself to maintain international peace and security.

The Trenchant Observer

60,000 killed in Syria—REPRISE II: The Olympic Games, and the Battle for Aleppo, Begin—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #91 (January 2, 2013)

Wednesday, January 2nd, 2013

Barbarism in a Leaderless World

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights now estimates there have been “59,648 individuals reported killed in Syria between 15 March 2011 and 30 November 2012.” This number may in fact be well short of the actual number as tens of thousands of people are reported to have disappeared with no word as to their fates.

See United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Data analysis suggests over 60,000 people killed in Syria conflict: Pillay,” United Nations Human Rights, January 2, 2012. See Megan Price, Jeff Klingner, and Patrick Ball, “Preliminary Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Republic,” The Benetech Human Rights Program, 2 January 2013, here.

At such a juncture it is appropriate to reprise the article whose text appears below, yet again. See also Jacques Prévert’s poem “Barabara”, in The Trenchant Observer, “REPRISE: Hommage à Homs: Jacques Prévert, “Barbara” (with English translation); Paul Verlaine, “Ariette III” —Obama’s Debacle in Syria— Update #53 (June 19)

Originally published July 28, 2012

The Opening of the XXX Olympic Games

It was a poignant moment, as world leaders gathered in London last night (July 27) for the opening of the XXX Olympic Games, with the performance of an extraordinary spectacle, in which at one point five Olympic rings appeared suspended in the heavens over the Olympic Stadium. Over a billion people were said to have watched the opening ceremonies on television.

Here, in the very heart of the democratic civilizations of Europe, the Olympic ideal shone brightly.

In ancient Greece, the Olympic Games were preceded by a “Sacred Truce” among the warring city-states, in which athletes were guaranteed safe passage to and from the games, and all fighting was to be halted for a period of one month. This period was eventually extended to allow the athletes and visitors to return home.

The games were held every four years from 776 BC to 393 AD, when they were abolished by the Christian Byzantine Emperor Theodosius I. The ancient Olympic Games lasted for 1170 years. The Modern Olympic Games were initiated in 1896, and have been held every four years or more often since then except for 1916, 1940 and 1944.

–”Brief History of the Olympic Games,” NOSTOS (Hellenic Information Society, UK).

Importantly, the Olympic Games today stand as a symbol for humanity’s goal of one day achieving universal peace. The alternative, it seems, is either the goal of endless war, or the resignation that goes with the sense of helplessness we feel when we reject the goal of peace.

The Battle for Aleppo, and the Response of the World

Meanwhile, in Aleppo in Syria, a country where the international community and the Security Council have been unable to reach agreement to act effectively to halt the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the portents of death and destruction were all too palpable yesterday and today, as the regime’s troops, tanks, artillery, helicopters and war planes began a concerted assault on the lightly armed rebels of the Syrian Liberation Army, in what a pro-Assad Damascus newspaper termed “the Mother of all Battles”.

Today, on Saturday, July 28, the battle was joined in earnest.

For news of recent developments on the ground in Syria, see

Luke Harding (in Anadan, on the Aleppo front line), “Syrian rebels near Aleppo: ‘We are besieging Assad’s army’; Regime forces have been pulverising rebel-held districts using artillery and helicopter gunships. But the rebels are upbeat,” The Guardian, July 28, 2012 (11:35 EDT).

Damien McElroy (in Aleppo), “Badly armed rebels face tanks as Syria’s mother of all battles begins,” The Telegraph, July 28, 2012 (6:57PM BST).

Álvaro de Cózar (Special Correspondent in Marea), “El Ejército sirio avanza para tomar Alepo; Las tropas de El Asad atacan con bombas y tanques los barrios en manos rebeldes; Las líneas de teléfono y el suministro de energía han sido cortados, El País, 28 Julio 2012 (23:45 CET).

Kareem Fahim and Ellen Barry, “Syrian Military Intensifies Assault on Rebels in Aleppo,” New York Times, July 28, 2012

***
Unfortunately, Americans accessing the Internet do not find it easy to gain a sense of what is actually taking place on the ground, due to “The Filter Bubble” which prevents most U.S. observers on the Internet from seeing the search results for newspapers outside of their own country (including, e.g., British and other newspapers which have correspondents on the ground in Syria).  To get around The Filter Bubble, see the directions in the bottom right-hand column on the right on our Home Page, or go here.

Thus, as the world turns its attention to the joyful spectacle of athletes from countries throughout the world competing on the basis of individual merit, as humanity comes together for its quadrennial celebration of the richness and diversity of the human family, the people in Aleppo and in Syria are left to face the absolute terror and barbarism of the Bashar al-Assad regime, alone.

Russia and China, along with the Syrian regime, are clearly to blame for this state of affairs, and populations who follow international affairs throughout the world are aware of the role they have have played in thwarting effective U.N. Security Council action. Memories of how they have backed the murderous regime of al-Assad are likely to be long indeed in the Middle East, and also in the democracies of the world.

The United States and other Western countries warn of an impending massacre in Aleppo, as if anyone but they themselves could save the day.

It is a new role for Americans: Eyewitness News reporters without an inkling of any sense of moral responsibility that might lead them to act. In this role, they are following the lead of their president.

The Americans, the Europeans, top U.N. officials and others loudly deplore the lamentable state of affairs in Syria in general, and the unfolding of the “mother of all battles” in Aleppo, in particular.

Leaderless, they stand helpless and paralyzed before the terror and barbarism of al-Assad.

They provide countless declarations of moral outrage, and call for the nations of the world to increase their “pressure” on the al-Assad regime.

The “pressure” of which they speak is a “pressure” of words, of plaintive moral appeals directed to war criminals whose moral depravity is beyond dispute. Or perhaps the “pressure” may even consist of voluntary economic sanctions, imposed by different countries outside the framework of the U.N. Security Council, whose impact is uncertain and in any event will take much time.

Neither words nor economic sanctions, however, will stop al-Assad’s armies.

These leaders are at once appalled by the terror, the barbarism, the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity before their very eyes, and caught in their own moral cowardice, impotent, helpless, with verbal reproaches the only weapons they have the courage to wield. Paralyzed by their own cowardice, they will not act—not effectively, not in time to save the thousands of additional deaths that the grinding gears of war portend to claim, and of which they so earnestly warn.

Enough with Words!

These leaders can all do the world one big favor:  Stop denouncing al-Assad’s atrocities, at least until they are willing to do something really effective to bring them to a halt.

With their moral energies thus freed, they can pay close attention to the facts on the ground, to what is actually happening to thousands of human beings in the maw of war, and then they can seek quiet solace in their churches, their synagogues, their mosques, and the other spiritual refuges in which they must, as individual human beings, come to terms with what they have seen, and what they have not done.

Enough with words!

Enough with the self-absolving declarations these leaders offer to the world, and to themselves, so they can sleep at night, knowing they were present at Srebrenice, present at Auschwitz, present in Rwanda, over a very long period of time, and did nothing.

President Theodore Roosevelt, Recipient of the 1907 Nobel Peace Prize, on Words and Deeds

As for President Obama, who reportedly likes to think of himself as emulating the great American presidents, the words of President Theodore Roosevelt, recipient of the 1907 Nobel Peace Prize, come to mind. Roosevelt declared:

“International Peace”

We must ever bear in mind that the great end in view is righteousness, justice as between man and man, nation and nation, the chance to lead our lives on a somewhat higher level, with a broader spirit of brotherly goodwill one for another. Peace is generally good in itself, but it is never the highest good unless it comes as the handmaid of righteousness; and it becomes a very evil thing if it serves merely as a mask for cowardice and sloth, or as an instrument to further the ends of despotism or anarchy. We despise and abhor the bully, the brawler, the oppressor, whether in private or public life, but we despise no less the coward and the voluptuary. No man is worth calling a man who will not fight rather than submit to infamy or see those that are dear to him suffer wrong. No nation deserves to exist if it permits itself to lose the stern and virile virtues; and this without regard to whether the loss is due to the growth of a heartless and all-absorbing commercialism, to prolonged indulgence in luxury and soft, effortless ease, or to the deification of a warped and twisted sentimentality.

Moreover, and above all, let us remember that words count only when they give expression to deeds, or are to be translated into them (emphasis added). The leaders of the Red Terror2 prattled of peace while they steeped their hands in the blood of the innocent; and many a tyrant has called it peace when he has scourged honest protest into silence. Our words must be judged by our deeds; and in striving for a lofty ideal we must use practical methods; and if we cannot attain all at one leap, we must advance towards it step by step, reasonably content so long as we do actually make some progress in the right direction.

[Footnote] 2. The “Terror” is a term characterizing the conduct of power in revolutionary France by the second committee of Public Safety (September, 1793-July, 1794), sometimes identified as the “Red Terror” to distinguish it from the short-lived “White Terror”, which was an effort by the Royalists in 1795 to destroy the Revolution.

–Theodore Roosevelt, 1907 Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech, delivered May 5, 1910.

President Obama and the other leaders of the world would do well to take these words to heart, today, and every day hereafter until they find the courage to take effective action to halt the barbarism and the terror in Syria.

The Trenchant Observer

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For links to other articles by The Trenchant Observer, click on the title at the top of this page to go to the home page, and then use the “Search” Box or consult the information in the bottom right hand corner of the home page. The Articles on Syria page can also be found here. The Articles on Targeted Killings page can also be found here.

REPRISE: The U.N. Charter, International Law, and Legal Justifications for Military Intervention in Syria—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #90 (December 12, 2012)

Wednesday, December 12th, 2012

This article was first published on September 1, 2012

The situation in Syria (is) unfolding “in front of our eyes”, with the regime deploying fighter jets against the people, in addition to heavy artillery and tanks, (Ahmet DAVUTOĞLU, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, told the Security Council on August 30). “How long are we going to sit and watch while an entire generation is being wiped out by random bombardment and deliberate mass targeting?” he asked. “If we do not act against such a crime against humanity happening in front of our eyes, we become accomplice to the crime,” he warned.

As we wrote following the August 30 meeting of the Security Council,

Everyone wants a ceasefire and an end to the killing. Few seem to have come to grips with the fact that the use of force will be required, outside the framework of the Security Council. There can be little doubt that, within the Security Council itself, there is not going to be any agreement to use force (or even to adopt strong economic sanctions) to bring al-Assad’s barbarism to a halt.

This will have to be done outside the framework of the Security Council. What is needed is for one or more countries, preferably but not necessarily acting as a coalition, to just act to set up the safe zones, and one or more accompanying no-fly zones if that is required as a result of al-Assad’s response.

–U.N. Security Council Meets: More “blah, blah, blah”, and no action—Obama’s debacle in Syria — Update #82 (August 30), August 31, 2012.

Such action should be accompanied by a justification under international law.

That justification should stress that the purpose of the action is to protect the population of Syria against the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The stated purpose of the operation should not be to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad, which is impermissible under international law. On the other hand, it would be permissible if an operation which protected the population against the commission of such crimes also facilitated a process that would bring to account those in Syria who are responsible for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

While such fine distinctions may seem of little significance to those not versed in international law, they are in fact quite important in terms of limiting the precedent that would be set and obtaining support from other countries for such action, if not immediately at least over time.

For further discussion of legal justifications for intervention in Syria, see the following articles by The Trenchant Observer and the sources cited therein:

Continuing massacres in Syria, at Daraya and elsewhere; legal justification for military intervention — Obama’s Debacle in Syria —Update #78 (August 26), August 26, 2012

REPRISE: Humanitarian Intervention in Syria Without Security Council Authorization—Obama’s Debacle in Syria— Update #68 (July 25), July 25, 2012

Military Intervention to establish “no-kill zones” and humanitarian corridors—Syria Update #9 (February 25), February 24, 2012

The critical issue with respect to legal justifications for establishing and defending “safe zones” or “no-kill zones” in Syria, and the establishment of no-fly zones if required, is whether such action would violate Article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) provides:

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

On the face of it, the use of force to enforce a no-fly zone, or to defend a “safe zone” from assaults by Syria’s army, would involve an action against the “territorial integrity” of Syria. This is the horn of the dilemma.

Read literally, any permanent member of the Security Council could, through the use of its veto, block any military action by any state within the territory of another state, except in the case of an “armed attack”, no matter what the circumstances. In principle, such a veto could block any action by the civilized nations of the world to bring to a halt a war crimes and crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing such as occurred in Kosovo, or even genocide such as that conducted by Adolph Hitler during World War II.

Various interpretations of the Charter have proposed ways out of this logical box. One is the so-called “teleological” interpretation, by which Article 2(4) must be interpreted not literally, but rather in the light of the general purposes of the U.N. Charter and its other principles. Using this approach, one might justify the establishment of “no-kill zones” and “no-fly zones” in Syria.

The problem is that such “teleological” interpretations might open Pandora’s box, allowing multiple interpretations and opportunities for abuse by states intervening for their own purposes, e.g., to overthrow the al-Assad regime, while putting a humanitarian argument forward to justify their actions. Or, to cite another example, Israel and the United States might attempt to justify an attack on Iran to take out or greatly degrade its nuclear enrichment capabilities and what they believe is a secret program aimed at developing nuclear weapons, on the rationale that it is necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Alternatively, Israel and the United States could in principle attempt to justify an attack on Iran as an exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense, an exception to the prohibition in Article 2(4) contained in Article 51 of the Charter, which provides:

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The key words in Article 51 are “if an armed attack occurs”, which has been interpreted as embodying the requirements that the armed attack have occurred or be imminent, immediate and leave no time for other actions. Exercise of the right of self-defense has traditionally been subject to the requirements “immediacy, necessity and proportionality”.

See Flavio Paioletti, “The 21st Century Challenges to Article 51,” e-International Relations, June 30, 2011.

The United States and other nations have not always acted within this tight legal framework. In 1999, for example, the United States and NATO conducted a unilateral bombing campaign against Serbia in a successful effort to get the government to stop its policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Despite its humanitarian purpose, no legal justification was advanced by the U.S. Department of State for the action.

In Iraq, the United States sought to justify its 2003 invasion of that country both on the basis of previous Security Council resolutions and on the basis of the “right” advanced by the Bush administration to “pre-emptive self defense”.

The concern of states and legal scholars from around the world is that by allowing “teleological” interpretations of Article 2(4) or expansive interpretations of what constitutes “an armed attack” creating a right of individual and collective self-defense, such interpretations would open the door to increasingly expansive assertions of the right to use force across international frontiers. It is significant that in the case of Kosovo, no legal justification was offered.

So, we are left with the legal regime brilliantly defined by the founders of the United Nations to establish rules and mechanisms to effectively regulate the international use of force, on the one hand, and the fact that as the populations of more and more countries seek to demand respect for their fundamental human rights, and the right to participate in government, existing dictorships may resort to the appalling use of terror and crimes against humanity and war crimes in defending their hold on power, as has happened recently in Libya and Syria.

Unlike domestic laws and the constitution in the U.S., the United Nations Charter and other international agreements are subject to rules of strict interpretation, as established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This makes sense, as nations are generally extremely wary of ceding authority to international institutions, and rules of strict interpretation are necessary in order to secure participation in international treaties. While the United Nations Charter is something of a special case, since very few countries would consider withdrawal from the organization, acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice remains voluntary, a fact which underlines the continuing importance of rules of strict interpretation.

Caught in this logical box, are we to stand idly by as tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of human beings are slaughtered, whenever a permanent member of the Security Council exercises a veto?

The United Nations Charter is 67 years old. It has survived the Korean war, the war in Vietnam, the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan (1980), the Balkan wars, genocide in Rwanda and the Sudan, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The fundamental question is whether states should: (1) simply act outside the charter when they feel compelled to do so for humanitarian reasons (e.g., Kosovo); (2) justify their actions on legal grounds, preferably as taken with the support of regional organizations (e.g., NATO) or a broad coalition of nations; or (3) do nothing in the face of acts of barbarism such as those being committed in Syria.

In the case of Kosovo, Russia brought a resolution to a vote in the Security Council which condemned the bombing of Serbia, but the resolution was defeated 12-3.

Perhaps that is as close to 100% compliance with the Charter norms as we can get in the world today.

The ultimate choice is between undertaking effective action that will halt the atrocities in Syria, or sticking with our current policies.

In the case of the U.S., the current policy is carefully calibrated to comply with the requirements on the use of force laid down by the International Court of Justice in 1986 in the Nicaragua case. In that case, the Court held that direction and control of rebel groups was required in order for assistance to rebel groups to constitute an armed attack, thereby triggering a right of individual or collective self defense.

If the decision is made to establish safe zones and associated no-fly zones (if necessary), a final choice is whether to provide some legal justification for such action, or to follow the example of the United States in the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, and offer none.

While the choice here is not entirely clear, a strong argument can be made for advancing a highly restrictive legal justification, narrowly tailored to the circumstances in the Syrian case, together with the support of a regional body such as NATO, and undertaken only as a provisional measure of protection until such time as the Security Council can act effectively to protect the population of Syria from the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Russia may bring a resolution condemning such action in the Security Council. Assuming the resolution is defeated by a healthy margin, as occurred in the case of Kosovo, this may be the closest to compliance with the Charter as is possible today.

The Trenchant Observer

“L’État, c’est moi”—Mohamed Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood launch coup d’état in Egypt

Tuesday, November 27th, 2012

“L’Etat, c’est moi.”
“I am the state.”
–quote attributed to King Louis IV

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has executed a legal coup d’état through a decree by President Mohamed Morsi arrogating all legal power to himself, thereby abrogating the rule of law in Egypt.

The text of Morsi’s Constitutional Decree (informal translation)

The following text and English translation of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s constitutional declaration is from Ahram Online.

In a surprise move Thursday, President Mohamed Morsi issued a new Constitutional Declaration.

The declaration began by stating that the January 25 Revolution had mandated the president with the responsibility to achieve revolutionary demands and to root out remnants of the old regime from Egypt’s state institutions. It also called for the building of a “new legitimacy built on a constitution” to promote “principles of freedom, justice and democracy.”

Ahram Online provides a translated version of Thursday’s Constitutional Declaration.

We have decided the following:

Article I

Reopen the investigations and prosecutions in the cases of the murder, the attempted murder and the wounding of protesters as well as the crimes of terror committed against the revolutionaries by anyone who held a political or executive position under the former regime, according to the Law of the Protection of the Revolution and other laws.

Article II:

Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president since he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People’s Assembly [lower house of parliament] is elected, are final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be suspended or canceled and all lawsuits related to them and brought before any judicial body against these decisions are annulled.

Article III:

The prosecutor-general is to be appointed from among the members of the judiciary by the President of the Republic for a period of four years commencing from the date of office and is subject to the general conditions of being appointed as a judge and should not be under the age of 40. This provision applies to the one currently holding the position with immediate effect.

Article IV:

The text of the article on the formation of the Constituent Assembly in the 30 March 2011 Constitutional Declaration that reads, “it shall prepare a draft of a new constitution in a period of six months from the date it was formed” is to be amended to “it shall prepare the draft of a new constitution for the country no later than eight months from the date of its formation.”

Article V:

No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house of parliament] or the Constituent Assembly.

Article VI:

The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution.

Article VII:

This Constitutional Declaration is valid from the date of its publication in the official gazette.

–Muftah Editors, “English Text of Egyptian President Morsi’s Thanksgiving Day Constitutional Decree,” November 22, 2012.

–See “English text of Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration; Ahram Online provides English version of President Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration appointing new prosecutor-general; immunising Constituent Assembly and Shura Council from dissolution, ahramonline, November 22, 2012.

The True Intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood promised it would not present a candidate in the presidential elections. It did not honor its pledge.

The Muslim Brotherhood took down the leadership of the military, substituting its own.

The Muslim Brotherhood withdrew police protection from the American Embassy in Cairo on September 11, 2012, allowing demonstrators to enter the grounds, in violation of the U.N. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).

It would appear that the Muslim Brotherhood now seeks to launch its version of “Islamic democracy” by retrying individuals charged with crimes and acquitted, and by retroactively trying individuals for new crimes, in violation of fundamental human rights as embodied in the Universival Declaration on Human Rights and the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Egypt is a party.  It has also stacked the commission charged with drafting a new constitution with Islamists, and threatens to reinstate a lower house of parliament which has been dissolved by the courts because of the Brotherhood’s vioilations of the electoral law.

U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides, in pertinent part, the following:

Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.

Article 14
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law….

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

(5) Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.

7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.

Article 15
1 . No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed….

2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1967, in force 1976)

A Misstep, or the End of All Illusions?

There is strong evidence to suggest that the Muslim Bortherhood’s strategic goals in Egypt include establishing an Islamic dictatorship where opposing parties and power centers have been eliminated or neutralized, so that nothing stands in the way of the Brotherhood’s will. France’s King Louis XIV claimed to rule by divine right. The Muslim Brotherhood is acting as if it has such a divine right to rule Egypt.

It is possible, however, that the overreaching represented by Morsi’s decree was a clumsy and ill-considered mistake. If that is the case, the decree should be withdrawn forthwith.

If it is not withdrawn, foreign countries and foreign investors should be placed on notice that the rule of law is dead in Egypt. In such a country, the foreign investment needed to lift the population from crushing poverty is not likely to appear.

World Bank Standby Loan of $4.8 Billion

The World Bank is in the process of approving a $4.8 billion standby loan facility for Egypt.

CAIRO — Egypt reached a preliminary agreement with an International Monetary Fund team for a loan of as much as $4.8 billion that officials say is necessary to support the ailing economy and attract more funding.

The “22-month standby arrangement” for the loan, which will carry an interest rate of about 1.06 percent, will be distributed in eight quarterly amounts if it is approved by the IMF’s board, Andreas Bauer, who headed the fund’s technical team to the country, told reporters Tuesday.

Planning Minister Ashraf el-Arabi said the board will review the agreement next month.

–”World Briefs: Egypt, IMF sign loan pact,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, November 21, 2012.

The United States has been craven in its failure to condemn Morsi’s “constitutional decree”. Once U.S. leaders get back to the helm of the U.S. ship of state, which is currently running on auto-pilot, they should make it clear to Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood that the financial suppport of the IMF, financed by their own taxpayers, was premised on the existence of a democratic state in Egypt.

If that assumption no longer holds, and it does not so long as Morsi does not rescind his decree, the United States and other members of the I.M.F. should not approve the $4.8 billion standby loan arrangement for Egypt.

The Trenchant Observer