Archive for the ‘Pakistan military’ Category

Karzai reportedly involved in massive fraud favoring Ghani in Afghan presidential run-off

Saturday, August 23rd, 2014

Stunning details of the massive fraud in the Afghan presidental run-off election have been published in the New York Times, in an article by veteran Afghan correspondent Carlotta Gall.

It appears that President Hamid Karzai was deeply involved in the fraud, which greatly and implausibly favored Ashraf Ghani, as his opponent Abdullah Abdullah has charged since shortly after the second-round election was held.

See

(1) “Leading Afghan presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, narrowly escapes assassination in Kabul,” The Trenchant Observer, June 6, 2014.

(2) “Afghanistan Presidential Election: Abdullah Calls for Halt to Vote-Counting Alleging Fraud by the Electoral Commission,” The Trenchant Observer, dJune 18, 2014.

(3) “Obama Snubs Abdullah During Latter’s Trip to Washington,” The Trenchant Observer, May 22, 2010.

(4) “NEWS TO NOTE Deal by U.S. with Pakistan Military to Undercut Abdullah in Final Discussions?” The Trenchant Observer, November 11, 2009.

(5) “KARZAI’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL IN AFGHANISTAN—THE REAL EXTENT OF THE ELECTORAL FRAUD, ABDULLAH’S CHANCES, AND WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE,” the Trenchant Observer, October 16, 2009.

See also other articles listed on the Afghanistan page, in the upper right-hand corner of the home page, which can be reached by clicking on the banner above.

The Trenchant Observer

President Obama as “Executioner in Chief”

Friday, June 1st, 2012

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”
–Lord Acton (1834-1902)

SOURCES

Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” The New York Times, May 29, 2012.

Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Assessing Obama’s Counterterrorism Record, New York Times,” May 29, 2012.

Marc A. Thiessen, “The Obama-Bush doctrine”, The Washington Post, May 31, 2012 (opinion).

Tara McKelvey, “Covering Obama’s Secret War; When drones strike, key questions go unasked and unanswered,”Columbia Journalism Review, May/June 2012.

Andrew Rosenthal, “President Obama’s Kill List,” The New York Times, May 29, 2012 (Taking Note: The Ediorial Page Editor’s Blog).

Editorial, “Too Much Power for a President,” New York Times, May 30, 2012.

William Saletan, “Beyond the Kill List; On the dark side of the drone war, Obama’s rules don’t apply,” Slate, May 30, 2012

Amy Davidson, “The President’s Kill List,” The New Yorker (Daily Online Comment), May 30, 2012.

Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “Inside the CIA’s ‘Kill List’:
An excerpt from Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State,” September 6, 2011, Frontline, September 6, 2011.

Jonathan Miller, “Obama’s Secret Terrorism ‘Kill List’,” National Journal,
May 29, 2012.

David S. Cloud, “CIA drones have broader list of targets; The agency since 2008 has been secretly allowed to kill unnamed suspects in Pakistan.” Los Angeles Times, May 5, 2010.

Kevin Gosztola, “Obama’s Personal Role in Drone Executions,” The Dissenter (Firedoglake.com), May 29, 2012.

Is Obama incompetent as a foreign policy leader?

Perhaps it is a blessing for President Barack Obama that he is not too impressed by or attracted to the countries of Europe, for in five, 10 or 15 years he is not likely to be spending much vacation time there.

The charge that he is an incompetent leader when it comes to foreign policy, and is the head of a foreign policy team that could be characterized as “the gang who couldn’t shoot strait”, received significant support this week when the President, acting through leaks to the New York Times, revealed that he personally directs and authorizes the targeted executions by predator strikes in Yemen and Somalia, and about a third of the strikes in Pakistan (the more difficult and complex ones).

In addition to blowing the cover, sources and methods of the CIA agent in Abbottabad (Pakistan) who helped find Osama Bin Laden (by misleadingly posing as a doctor sponsoring an immunization campaign), the President has revealed a great number of operational details about the secret operation that led to the killing of Bin Laden in his bedroom.

Obama is obviously leaking details of hitherto covert actions in order to enhance his standing on foreign policy issues, for political purposes.

Moreover, “to spike the football”, to brag to the country and the world about his achievement, he made it plain that the Pakistani government had not known of the Abbottabad operation.  He left no room for ambiguity, which might have served to help avoid the government’s and the military’s humiliation, and also to obfuscate a little what was a flagrant violation of Pakistan’s soverignty.

As a result, U.S. relations with Pakistan are at a nadir, with no signs of improving significantly soon. Unless they do, the whole future of the Afghanistan venture will be placed gravely in doubt.

The Nation’s “Executioner in Chief”

But the above is mere background for the revelations this week, which raise far deeper issues of character, issues which go far beyond competency.

The Observer will never think of Barack Obama in the same way in the future, now that he has revealed through anonymous government sources that he has become the nation’s “Executioner in Chief”.  To the extent these actions cannot be justified under international law–and a great number clearly cannot be, he could of course be termed the nation’s “Assassin in Chief”. This is the reason he may have to choose his travel plans carefully in five, 10 or 15 years.

Assuming the power and moral authority of a god, Obama, the leader of the nation’s foreign policy “juggernaut”, has decided that he will be the person who decides who will live or die, which members on the “kill list” will die today, as a result of his pulling the trigger on the drone and special operations killing machine of the United States. The list is updated at a weekly government meeting by teleconference, with a hundred participants, who add and subtract names, and then pass the “nominations” list to the Oval Office.

Obama has become like a vengeful god who willingly kills people when he doesn’t even know their names, on the basis of their bad associations (e.g., membership in a bad or “terrorist” organization), their bad social profile (e.g., males over 14 years old, acting in “signature” bad patterns), or simply the fact they may be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Obama has taken “guilt by association” to an entirely new level, that of “execution for association”.

The news, while not entirely new, is incredibly shocking. The president assassinates people every day, or almost every day. Without judicial process. Without any accountability under either domestic or international law.

Justification in accordance with a legal memorandum which is itself classified is no legal justification at all, at least not in a democratic state governed by law. The duty of public legal justification of government actions is an absolute and bedrock principle of the rule of law, on both the domestic and the international levels.

His Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, performed a similar function authorizing CIA drone strikes when he was Director of Central Intelligence. As Secretary of Defense, he may now be approving similar strikes by the military when they are not referred to Obama to pull the trigger.

Let us stop and think for a minute.

What does it mean when our President, on a daily or almost daily basis, from the Oval Office or from wherever he may be, personally decides to kill one or a number of people, and in effect pulls the trigger, perhaps watching on a live video feed the execution of his order?

Can we speak meaningfully of “civilian control of the military”, when the president himself assumes a wartime combat role, and in effect functions not as a check on the military, but as an enabler, as a killer himself?

What does the daily participation in such activities do to an individual’s mind, and more importantly, to his soul?

We’ve known for some time that the President had a double character, that he was in the classical sense a Doppelgänger, but only now can we begin to appreciate how crooked one of his two characters has become, how warped and twisted it now appears under the examining power of any moral lens.

He exercises now the awesome powers that dictators in the past have ascribed to themselves, men like Stalin and Hitler, and others of more modern vintage.

What does it tell us about a person when we learn he is willing to kill an innocent woman or child, or boy or man for that matter, if it is part of the cost of killing his intended target, or even of killing a group of people who have the characteristics of the enemy, who he would gladly kill by name if only he knew their names?

What does it tell us that he is willing to kill that innocent woman and that child, not as unintended collateral damage but as quite foreseeable results of his pulling the trigger?

In what moral universe does he reside?

His apologists say that in moral terms he lives in the world of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and the latter’s justifications of “just wars” and “unjust wars”–as understood in the thirteenth century. In understanding Aquinas and other moral authorities, interpreted for him by his spiritual guide who is “almost like a priest”, John Brennan, Obama is also relying on a former CIA official who was at the heart of the Bush torture program, and who got comfortable with torture.

“The end justifies the means” seems to be the operative principle here.

This principle, when all the words and moral posturings are parsed, is the principle that is followed, the principle that is operative. This principle operates, in the Oval Office and elsewhere in the government, under the leadership of President Obama, despite the fact that the entire constitutional and legal history of the United States has been founded on a rejection of the pernicious idea it expresses.

How could a president involved on a daily or almost daily basis in such god-like decisions regarding which specific individuals will live or die–based on baseball cards summarizing the pertinent facts in favor of their death or survival, and involved further in the actual conduct of the extrajudicial killing operation, how could such a person dispassionately lead the government in designing its foreign policy and conducting its foreign affairs?

The warrior appears to have been captured by the wrenching emotional experience of war-fighting, of personally fighting the war. In fact, it is quite conceivable that Obama is suffering from a form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In thinking about his daily routines, and the war-fighting component of his life each day, it may be useful to review the DSM-5 criteria–the diagnostic criteria of the current proposed revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which is the authoritative diagnostic guide for mental conditions developed and used by psychiatrists and other mental health professionals.

Obama appears to think only in terms of perpetual warfare, like the warfare he is engaged in, personally, on an almost daily basis.

He has no vision of peace, and is unable to use his imagination to explore actions that might lead to peace. Beyond speeches, his foreign policy seems to be primarily reactive in nature. He has led few successful international initiatives. His administration has not secured a single multilateral international convention (treaty) of any great significance.

He has no appreciation of international law, which is a priori a fundamental building block of peace. One cannot imagine nations living together in peace without binding rules governing their behavior, including “rules of recognition” permiting the identification of such rules, and ultimately some kind of third-party judgment or decision as to the validity of conduct alleged to violate the rules. All of these rules, including those establishing an impartial judgment process, are known as rules or norms of international law.

In fact, there has been quite a lot of history since St. Thomas Aquinas. The Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) led to the founding of international law and the modern system of nation states through the writings of Hugo Grotius and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

That system of international law has developed over a period of more than three and a half centuries, and in particular following the ineffable horrors of  World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945).

There is a body of binding international law governing the use of force, which is applicable to drone strikes including the selection of targets. There is also a body of international law that prohibits the use of torture.

Obama, mumbling about Thomas Aquinas and the theoreticians of the “just war”, under the guidance of a high priest who himself became comfortable with torture and violation of the international law prohibiting torture (and U.S. law as well), has in effect turned his back on those three and a half centuries of developments in international law.

In justifying his drone and special operations activities, he has distorted the “law of war” or international humanitarian law, which has developed to mediate the horrors of war and to spare civilians, in order to purportedly justify these activities–without, however, subjecting his legal arguments to impartial international judgment.

The world America’s “Assassin in Chief” envisions is a world where he and John Brennan, and Leon Panetta, or their successors, will still need to meet weekly, or more often, as will a “nominations” group composed of a hundred other government officials, to decide who shall live and who shall die, as a result of their decisions, in the coming week or weeks.

Who, aside from the president himself, is responsible for Obama’s double character dragging him down into a dark and lightless place where even his soul cannot breathe?

Could it be the legions of fellow citizens who couldn’t take the trouble to think seriously about what Bush and then Obama were doing with their drone and special operations programs? Could it be the foreign policy experts, political leaders, and journalists who may have felt uneasy but who did not act, or who even willingly, gladly, drank the cool-aid as we descended into this moral abyss?

The Trenchant Observer

observer@trenchantobserver.com
www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv

For links to other articles by The Trenchant Observer, click on the title at the top of this page to go to the home page, and then consult the information in the bottom right hand corner of the home page. The Articles on Syria page can also be found here.

Obama’s New Year’s Resolutions for Foreign Policy in 2012

Thursday, January 5th, 2012

The Observer has been trying to get inside President Obama’s head for over two years. Recently, he may have succeeded, or had a very strange dream, in which the following was revealed:

Obama’s 10 New Year’s Resolutions for Foreign Policy in 2012

1. Ok, I will finally try to read through the impenetrable legalese of Philip Alston’s Report to the Human Rights Council on the legality under international law of U.S. drone attacks.

2. Admitting that public international law was not my favorite course in law school—in fact I can’t remember if I even took it—I will accept State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh’s longstanding offer to lead me in a weekly tutorial on the subject for, as Koh puts it, “as long as it takes for (me) to get it.”

3. I accept the challenge to deliver a speech based on a rewrite of my Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in Oslo which includes the themes of “a vision of peace” and “how to get there”.

4. To make my rewrite of the Oslo speech easy for everyone to understand, I will even stop avoiding the use of the words “international law”, which should be easier after (2), if not (1).

5. I will ask Ambassador Koh to explain to me in plain English what some of these European and European-influenced international lawyers keep referring to as “dédoublement fontionnel”, which I think has something to do with the idea that nations should try to build and strengthen international law, instead of just trying to see what they can get away with. I don’t really get the point, but maybe I’ll understand better if it is spelled out in English.

6. I agree that we don’t really want to be giving a lot of money to governments who murder outspoken journalists like Syed Saleem Shahzad. I think Admiral Mullen said something about this. Dexter Filkins made a pretty compelling case that the murder was ordered by the highest officials in the Pakistani military in his New Yorker article on September 19. (Letter From Islamabad: The Journalist and the Spies–The murder of a reporter who exposed Pakistan’s secrets. The New Yorker, September 19, 2011.)

There are even reports that the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, until recently, fears for his life in Pakistan as a result of “memogate”. But, as Richard Holbrooke used to stress, we have to deal with the Pakistanis, unsavory as that may be. I will agree to cutting U.S. aid to the military there by one half—from $1.3 billion to $650 million. Once they’ve arrested and tried the general(s) allegedly responsible for the order to murder Syed Saleem Shahzad, the other half of the aid will be restored.

7. I will enlist the CIA, with Leon Paneta’s help if necessary, in a secret program aimed at persuading the top civilian and military officials involved in Bush’s torture program to retire. Attorney General Eric Holder has concluded that none of them except a few low-level types should be prosecuted for torture, but if he has new evidence and wants to take up the issue again, I’ll let him. If other parties to the Torture Convention arrest some of these officials while they are traveling abroad, and ask us if it is OK for them to try them themselves, I’ll let the Attorney General make the call.

8. Ok, guys, I will finally issue an executive order that confirms my interpretation of U.S. laws banning torture as banning all kinds of torture, as that term is defined in the U.N. Convention Against Torture.

9. After completing (2) and (1), I will reconsider the position that U.S. citizens may be executed by drones or special commando operations without trial if they have been placed on a special targets list. I don’t really get the point about the fifth amendment language that “no citizen will be deprived of …life..without due process of law” and I don’t see how these guys can be given the right to an attorney, but I will commit to not invoking the “state secrets” doctrine to block further consideration of these issues by the courts.

10. Ok, while I think we already examined our strategy in Afghanistan in 2009, ad nauseum, I promise I will reread Ambassador Karl Eikenberry’s memos from November, 2009, for whatever that’s worth.

The Trenchant Observer

observer@trenchantobserver.com
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Assassination of Syed Saleem Shahzad: Pakistan is the problem

Saturday, July 9th, 2011

Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief for Asia Times Online, was assassinated in Pakistan at the time of or shortly after his disappearance on May 29, reportedly on the orders of top-level officials of the Pakistan intelligence agency.

See Editorial, “A Pakistani Journalist’s Murder,” The New York Times, July 7, 2011

Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistan’s Spies Tied to Slaying of a Journalist,” New York Times, July 4, 2011

“Pakistan ‘sanctioned’ killing of journalist, says US commander: Islamabad hits back at claim by Admiral Mike Mullen over murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, The Guardian, July 8, 2011

The Observer has previously referred to Shahzad’s reports on alleged behind-the-scenes deals between the Obama administration and the Pakistan military. The first was for the U.S. to withdraw its support of Abdullah Abdullah in negotiations for a unity government or at least the holding of a second-round election, in the stand-off that resulted from the massive fraud in the Afghanistan presidential elections held on August 20, 2009. The U.S. basically cast Abdullah aside, and backed Karzai as the legitimate winner in the elections, reportedly in exchange for Pakistani support in facilitating negotiations with the Taliban.

The second and related move by Hamid Karzai, believed to be at the insistence of Pakistan, was to fire the intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, and the interior minister, Hanif Atmar, who were viewed as too close to India and therefore hostile to Pakistan. Both were fomer members of the Northern Alliance, the force which with the United States toppled the Taliban government in 2001.

See The Trenchant Observer, “Intelligence Matters: In Afghanistan, Karzai Ousts Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and Intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh,” June 6, 2010

Now, perhaps partly as an unintended consequence of the humiliation of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies by President Obama, who loudly touted the fact that the United States took out Bin Laden without the foreknowledge or participation of Pakistani officials, a leading reporter on the inner workings of the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies has been murdered. According to American officials, the assassination was approved at very high levels of the Pakistan military and security agencies.

The Observer must observe, in passing, that Obama’s public humiliation of Pakistani military and intelligence officials was utterly unnecessary, and represented a novice’s mistake for a practitioner of foreign policy. In international affairs, it is important to allow your enemies, as well as your (questionable) allies and friends, to save face, and not to push them too hard into a corner. Doing so subjects them to intense internal political and other pressures and sharply limits their freedom of action in adopting policies that you may want them to follow.

Obama, in effect, stressed that the operation against Bin Laden violated the sovereignty of Pakistan, when he might easily have left that issue shrouded in ambiguity. His mistake was to publicly declaim that the Bin Laden operation was carried out without Pakistani knowldge. That wasn’t necessary. On the other hand, it was entirely appropriate to raise the issue of how Bin Laden had lived near Islamabad in Abbottabad, the very same town where the Pakistani “West Point” is located, without being detected. These were legitimate questions. The public humiliation was a grave mistake.

Since the Bin Laden killing, U.S.-Pakistan military and intelligence relations have taken a sharp turn for the worse.

We are left with a situation where we are faced with a nuclear-weapons state, which continues to support Taliban and other insurgent forces operating in Afghanistan, while our own ability to conduct anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations from within and against targets in Pakistan territory has been greatly curtailed.

The assassination of Shazad closed one of the few windows open to the world to follow and understand the machinations underway within Pakistani military and intelligence circles.

It also serves as a useful reminder that the United States has gained very little from its apparent deal with Pakistan by withdrawing its support for Abdullah in 2009, and acquiescing in the firing of Saleh and Atmar.

The much-touted negotiations with the Taliban have come to nothing, and hold very little promoise of ever producing tangible results. We are no further along in this regard, in fact, than we were two years ago. The illusions fed by the flawed assumption of the possibility of a political settlement with the Taliban remain as far from the reality on the ground and the realm of real-world possibilities as they were then. The difference is that now President Obama, with his recent speech on the the path forward in Afghanistan, has adopted a posture of publicly relying on those illusions.

The consequences in Afghanistan are likely to be harsh. Moreover, we now face a much larger problem in Pakistan than even that faced in Afghanistan itself, which we have yet to devise a successful strategy to address.

The effects of the loss of Special Ambassador to Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador, Richard Holbrooke, who died suddenly in December, 2010, have been devastating.

On July 9, 2011, the United States faces a one-time ally in Pakistan which looks much more like a hostile state that 1) will block a peaceful resolution of the war in Afghanistan on terms acceptable to the West and the international community; 2) itself has become a great center of Islamic radicalism and the spawning of terrorist behavior; and 3) poses an ultiimate risk to the United States and other nations due to its possession of nuclear weapons.

If a country like Pakistan can decide, at the highest military and intelligence levels, to assassinate a journalist whose reports reveal messy facts they would prefer to remain hidden, how can the United States continue to proceed as if it were an ally?

The Trenchant Observer

www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv

*******

Links to some of the Observer’s articles dealing with Syed Saleem Shahzad and the issues he raised, and excerpts from these articles, are reporduced below.

NEWS TO NOTE: Pakistani sources report progress in back-channel talks with Taliban, September 18, 2010

See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban soften as talks gain speed,” Asia Times On-Line (www.atimes.com), September 15, 2010.

“Pakistan Desire to “Mediate” with Taliban Consistent with Earlier Reports of Deal to Support Karzai in Election Settlement,”
February 10th, 2010

NEWS TO NOTE Deal by U.S. with Pakistan Military to Undercut Abdullah in Final Discussions?
November 11th, 2009

Bin Laden and the Debate Over Torture–Revived

Saturday, May 7th, 2011

Some former U.S. officials responsible for torture under the Bush administration have claimed that the trail to Bin Laden was uncovered by the use of torture. The Telegraph (London) reports:

Jose Rodriguez, the agency’s former head of counterterrorism, said vital information had come from bin Laden deputies Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Aby Faraj al Libbi, who were subjected to “enhanced interrogation techniques”.

–Gordon Rayner, “Osama bin Laden dead: torture unlocked bin Laden hideout ex-CIA man says — Key intelligence that led the US to Osama bin Laden’s hideout was obtained under torture in secret “black site” prisons, a former CIA officer has claimed, The Telegraph, May 5, 2011.

John Yoo, the author the legal memoranda authorizing torture under the Bush administration, writes is on Op-Ed piece in the Wall Street Journal:


Sunday’s success also vindicates the Bush administration, whose intelligence architecture marked the path to bin Laden’s door. According to current and former administration officials, CIA interrogators gathered the initial information that ultimately led to bin Laden’s death. The United States located al Qaeda’s leader by learning the identity of a trusted courier from the tough interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks, and his successor, Abu Faraj al-Libi.

Armed with the courier’s nom de guerre, American intelligence agencies later found him thanks to his phone call to a contact already under electronic surveillance. Last August, the courier traveled to bin Laden’s compound, but it took another eight months before the CIA became certain that the al Qaeda leader was hiding inside.
Armed with the courier’s nom de guerre, American intelligence agencies later found him thanks to his phone call to a contact already under electronic surveillance. Last August, the courier traveled to bin Laden’s compound, but it took another eight months before the CIA became certain that the al Qaeda leader was hiding inside.

–John Yoo (Op-ed), “From Guantanamo to Abbottabad,” Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2011.

The apologists for the torture policy of the Bush administration raise a hard question for President Obama, but not the one they think:

Why have John Yoo and other architects of the Bush administration’s policy of torure not been prosecuted, in accordance with U.S. law and the international legal obligations of the United States under the Convention Against Torture?

See Mark Benjamin, “The torture debate is back, but what about the criminal probe?” TIME, May 4, 2011.

The Trenchant Observer, “The Clock is Ticking: U.S. Application of the Torture Convention,” February 20, 2010.

The Trenchant Observer, “Craig’s Departure, the Ban on Publication of Any Torture Photograph, and Reaffirmation of the Prohibition Against Torture,” November 25, 2009

The claims of the torture apologists have been rebutted by a number of current and past U.S. officials, though that is really beside the point here.

On the fundamental moral issues involved in the debate over the efficacy of torture, see The Trenchant Observer, “Consorting with the Devil? The Debate over the Efficacy of Torture,” October 1, 2009 (written April 24, 2009).

Meanwhile, there appear to be few moral doubts about the efficacy of torture among the leaders of Libya, Syria, and many other countries.

Are we OK with their use of torture? If not, what can we say to them to urge them to stop?

The Trenchant Observer

www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv

Obama’s Foreign Policy Quagmires and Successes

Tuesday, January 4th, 2011

As 2011 begins, it is useful to consider where the U.S. and the world are in terms of developing and implementing foreign policies that address the very serious problems that we face. We shall consider only a few areas here, but readers are encouraged to add their own analyses.

The New START Treaty

On December 22, 2010, the Washington Post reported,

The Senate ratified the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as New START, by a vote of 71 to 26, easily clearing the threshold of two-thirds of senators present as required by the Constitution for treaty ratification.

For the Washington Post, a margin of five votes amounted to “easily clearing” the requirement of Senate ratification of treaties by a two-thirds margin.

Peter Baker of the New York Times was more circumspect, reporting that

The treaty had the support of the nation’s uniformed military leaders and of a host of Republican national security veterans, including former President George H. W. Bush and five former secretaries of state, Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. Baker III, Colin L. Powell and Condoleezza Rice. But many of the party’s potential 2012 presidential candidates, like Sarah Palin, Mitt Romney, Newt Gingrich and John Thune, came out against it, as did the two top Republican leaders in the Senate, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Mr. Kyl, the lead Republican negotiator.

Still, he noted, ratification of the New START Treaty amounted to “what is probably the most tangible foreign policy achievement of Mr. Obama’s two years in office.”

It is an important achievement in an area in which there have been few.

The margin of victory, however, laid bare the opposition in the leadership of the Republican party to any major international agreements, even those that are manifestly in the nation’s interest (e.g., by allowing verification to resume). What is remarkable, moreover, is not so much that the treaty was ratified as how close it came to defeat.

Iraq

On other fronts, the fact that a grand-coalition government has finally been formed in Iraq gives cause for hope, though the final observation of Thomas Ricks in his book, The Gamble, still rings true.

The heart of the Iraq matter still lies before us. [U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan] Crocker maintained in both interviews with him in Baqdad in 2008, and he likely is correct. “What the world ultimately thinks about us and what we think about ourselves,” he said, “I think is going to be determined much more by what happens from now on than what’s happened up to now.”

“In other words,” Ricks concluded, “the events for which the Iraq war will be remembered probably have not yet happened.”

–Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: David Petraeus and the American Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (New York: Penguinn, 2009), p. 325.

Nonetheless, the formation of a grand coalition government in Iraq, with strong U.S. encouragement, amounts to a significant success, at least for the moment.

Iran

With respect to Iran, U.S. policymakers might find satisfaction in the fact that they and others were able, through careful and sustained diplomacy, to develop a consensus within the U.N. Security Council that resulted in the imposition of new and tougher sanctions against Iran. Still, Iran continues its uranium enrichment program, which many believe is aimed at developing a nuclear weapons capability, or weapon, at the earliest possible date. To be sure, the introduction of the Stuxnet worm into computers involved in Iran’s nuclear program may have slowed the clock down, relieving immediate pressures for military action. On the other hand, there is a great need for public discussion and negotiation of new international legal norms and treaties limiting the use of cyber-warfare, of which the Stuxnet worm may be an early example.

Afghanistan

Elsewhere, the landscape is considerably bleaker. Afghanistan is caught in an endless war in which allied forces continue to sacrifice lives and treasure, making progress in military terms, but with little if any evidence of progress on the governance front. There is a good deal of reporting that suggests that the situation vis-à-vis the Taliban, in the country as a whole, is deteriorating.

More ominously, the untimely death of Richard Holbrooke may have eliminated a strong voice from the civilian side of Obama’s policy-making team. Recent reports that the military are making plans to engage the Taliban and other insurgent groups more actively within the territory of Pakistan suggest that a narrow, military view of the struggle in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains ascendant in the White House.

–See Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, “U.S. Military Seeks to Expand Raids in Pakistan,” New York Times, December 20, 2010.

The much-touted (and promised) December review of the degree to which progress had been made in Afghanistan following the “surge” of 2010, seems not to have occurred in any meaningful sense of the term. The results of the “review”–”stay the course”–were telegraphed well in advance of its formal conclusion.

Obama appears caught in a dilemma with no easy solution. While he succeeded in taking Afghanistan off the table in the 2010 congressional elections, and may succeed in doing so through the 2012 presidential elections as well, there is no viable strategy for improving governance in sight. A significant government collapse–perhaps on the order of the Hue Offensive in South Vietnam in 1968, could cost him the election in 2012.

Yet if he presses the fight against the Taliban and others too far in Pakistan, he may accelerate a destabilization of the government there which leads to a military coup. It is hard to see how Pakistan could be governable or a military government more effective in taking military action against the Taliban under such a scenario, while the risks and dangers of such instability in a nuclear weapons state are manifest.

North Korea

Meanwhile, on the Korean Peninsula, extremely dangerous confrontations involving the use of force occurred in 2010, while North Korea continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons in the context of a looming succession struggle.

Asia, Africa, and Latin America

Elsewhere, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, a number of foreign policy events occurred that were highly significant. We shall offer our observations on some of them in future articles.

Economic Issues

Economic issues, of course, were at the center of some of the most important foreign policy events of 2010, but these lie beyond the scope of the present article. Europe came to the rescue of Greece and Ireland, in particular, and made clear that it would defend the euro and where necessary provide support to euro-zone countries whose financial systems came into crisis. In the United States, a sluggish recovery was underway, but employment remained extremely weak. With further stimulus efforts foreclosed by political divisions, the Federal Reserve Bank decided to start printing money under a program known as Quantitative Easing II or “QE II”. Wall Street has largely recovered, as has the auto industry as a result of a federal rescue package.

November, 2010 Elections

Voters were not impressed, and returned a Republican majority to the House of Representatives, while reducing the Democratic majority in the Senate by five notes–the precise margin of victory in the ratification vote on the New START Treaty.

The Trenchant Observer

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Strategic disarray in Afghanistan

Sunday, October 3rd, 2010

“The current near-term strategy appears to be to try to kill enough of the Taliban’s leaders to force them to negotiate a settlement on terms acceptable to Hamid Karzai.”

“This war will not be won, or defeat avoided, by fine intellectual distinctions.”

“What Obama needs to do is to take the bull by the horns, and start exploring options for the early departure of Hamid Karzai. This will be a monumentally challenging task. So was D-Day in World War II.”

Current U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan

The bad news from Afghanistan, and about U.S. policy making in Washington, is coming in at a dizzying pace.

Hardly had we recovered from the Wikileaks disclosures, when Bob Woodward’s Obama’s Wars threw a sharp spotlight on the nature and quality of deicision making in the White House.

At such a juncture, it is useful to reflect for a moment on our strategy in Afghanistan.

The United States developed during the course of the war in Iraq the ability to combine real-time intelligence with targeted killings and special operations. Some military and civilian leaders appear to have concluded that this capability turned the war in Iraq around. They underestimate or forget the significance of other factors such as genuine elections and a real government partner in achieving the turnaround there.

In Afghanistan, U.S. military and civilian policymakers have bought into the seductive allure of this extraordinary targeted killing capability, falling into the trap of rejecting the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine (embodied in David Petraeus’ COIN army manual).

The leitmotif of the Army’s COIN doctrine is that such conflicts are won by protecting the people and gaining their support as a result of providing them with security. This takes a long time.

As now revealed in Bob Woodward’s description of Obama’s drawn-out policy review of last summer and fall, the president has wanted desperately to get out of Afghanistan.

However, he has not come up with a strategy to do so. Somewhat disastrously, he has partially rejected the military’s advice, giving them a deadline of July, 2011 to start handing control over to he Afghans and withdrawing troops. This sent the wrong signal to everyone in the region.

It was, and is, an impossible assignment. The deadline does not allow for even a limited COIN strategy that could show results by the announced December policy review deadline.

Whether because of the strategy review and deadline, or because McChrystal with his background in special operations was a firm believer in that form of counterinsurgency warfare, U.S. strategy in Aghanistan shifted radically away from trying to secure and hold territory and population centers, particularly after the failure of the Marja campaign earlier this year.

The current near-term strategy appears to be to try to kill enough of the Taliban’s leaders to force them to negotiate a settlement on terms acceptable to Hamid Karzai.

What happens in the long-delayed Kandahar campaign, and whether it is possible to hold the region while leaving Ahmed Karzai in place, will reveal whether there may still be a COIN component of an evolving strategy now that David Petraeus is in command.

The War-Fighting Role of the CIA

Now we learn that the military is providing drones and other equipment to the CIA, which has assumed a war-fighting role, presumably because of their ability to locate human targets for drone and special operations attacks.

It should not come as a surprise that with the CIA and special ops forces directing the assault on the Taliban in their Pakistani sanctuaries, considerations of international law have been jettisoned almost entirely.

The Washington Post reports that the CIA (through employees and contractors, we know from other sources), has taken a lead role in the drone attacks. As non-military personnel, these individuals do not appear to be protected by the provisions of the law of war or humanitarian law that might otherwise apply, even under the Bush and Obama Administrations’ extraordinarily broad interpretations of those provisions.

Karzai’s Peace Council

Earlier this week Carlotta Gall of the New York Times reported that President Hamid Karzai had created (out of thin air) a large body to negotiate peace and reconciliation with the Taliban, in total diregard of the Afghan Constitution. She communicated this plan to her readers without so much as mentioning the September 18 elections and the massive fraud that is currently underway.

Keeping our Eyes on the Ball

So, we are trying to kill and intimidate the Taliban to the conference table, at a time when many if not most reports indicate they are gaining momentum against the fatally corrupt government of Hamid Karzai. We are ignoring the impact on the population of Pakistan, and even its military, of repeatedly taking direct military action within the territory of that sovereign state–regardless of whatever “consent” may have been given by the military or even the civilian government.

With a short-sighted focus on exiting Afghanistan as soon as possible, we seem oblivious to the very great risks that our drone attacks may have an impact in Pakistan which, together with the impact of the recent floods, could cause politics in that country to spin out of control.

The president appears to have his eyes on the wrong ball, which is Afghanistan. It is simply not realistic to assume that we can withdraw from that country in the short term, without producing disastrous consequences.

We need to keep our eyes on the nuclear ball, which is in Pakistan. Aghanistan will not achieve stability if efforts to achieve it destablize Pakistan, which is the real ball game in this part of the world.

It is also time to take the war-fighting role away from the CIA, and to leave conduct of this war to the military, under the direction of the commander-in-chief.

On questions of stategy, Obama quite properly will and should have the final word. He would be well-advised, however, to listen most carefully to the civilian and military experts with direct responsibilities and/or experience on the ground, and to ignore the fine intellectual distinctions others around him throw out–such as finding a “more spphisticated” way of fighting corruption in the country.

This war will not be won, or defeat avoided, by fine intellectual distinctions.

What Obama needs to do is to take the bull by the horns, and start exploring options for the early departure of Hamid Karzai. This will be a monumentally challenging task. So was D-Day in World War II.

The Trenchant Observer

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NEWS TO NOTE: Pakistani sources report progress in back-channel talks with Taliban

Saturday, September 18th, 2010

Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief for Asia Times Online, reports that back-channel conversations with the Taliban during Ramadan, orchestrated by the Pakistani military, have led to a softening of the Taliban’s positions. Shahzad writes,

Asia Times Online has learned that the backchannel talks have to date resulted in the Taliban agreeing to issue a policy statement on their relationship with al-Qaeda. They will clarify that they provided protection to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in line with Afghan traditions of being hospitable.

It was the presence of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan that led the US to invade the country in late 2001 in retaliation for the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US.
The Taliban will spell out their position of decrying international terrorism and of not supporting violence in Muslim countries. Above all, they will clearly state that the Taliban are an indigenous movement struggling against foreign occupation forces with no agenda outside Afghan boundaries.

“This is the first time the situation has reached this level and this is the result of several months of unannounced but untiring efforts by the Pakistan army, with the consent of US military leaders who have very patiently and diligently allowed the Pakistan army to create this environment in which the Taliban feel comfortable, and they are now showing flexibility in their attitude,” a senior Pakistani security official familiar with the talks told Asia Times Online.

See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban soften as talks gain speed,” Asia Times On-Line (www.atimes.com), September 15, 2010.

Shazad has provided reports on Pakistani military efforts to mediate with the Taliban and other parties to the conflict in Afghanistan. See, e.g., the following articles by The Observer:

“Pakistan Desire to “Mediate” with Taliban Consistent with Earlier Reports of Deal to Support Karzai in Election Settlement,”
February 10th, 2010

NEWS TO NOTE Deal by U.S. with Pakistan Military to Undercut Abdullah in Final Discussions?
November 11th, 2009

Interestingly, he reports in the current article, “Neither the Afghan government nor the Pakistani government is officially aware of the backchannel initiative with the Taliban.”

The Trenchant Observer

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Fighting corruption and other challenges in Dexter Filkins’ Corrupt-istan

Saturday, September 18th, 2010

Some time is likely to pass before the results of Saturday’s National Assembly elections in Afghanistan become known, and are officially announced.

In the meantime, it is useful to reflect on the more fundamental issues facing the United States, NATO and other allied countries engaged in the effort to secure the country from the Taliban–or at least arrange a departure that does not lead to the rapid collapse of the Afghan government.

As we get caught up in the details provided to our reporters by U.S. military and civilian officials in Afghanistan and Washington, and also those of allied nations, we tend to forget several fundamental facts about the country.

First, Afghanistan is a narco-state, where drug money and drug lords hold inordinate sway.

Second, the country is the second most corrupt country in the world, according to Transparency International which ranks it 179th, with only the anarchic state of Somalia ranking lower at 180th.

Third, while the United States has supported the development of institutions necessary for good governance over the course of the nine-year war, as have the United Nations and other allied nations, its Central Intelligence Agency has at the same time been paying many high-ranking Afghan officials either as assets or to provide specific information and services, on a long-term and continuing basis. Many of these officials have been known to be corrupt.

Fourth, the United States has been unable to break free from its support of president Hamid Karzai, even when the presidential elections held in August 2009 gave it an opportunity to do so through adherence to the Afghan constitution and the electoral machinery that had been set up in accordance with Afghan legislation. Despite a massive vote against Karzai and for Abdullah that, even after a portion of the votes produced by corruption had been discounted, required that a second-round runoff election be held, the U.S. stood by Karzai.

The massive corruption of the electoral process, apparently orchestrated by Karzai, was corrected in part only by the Electoral Complaints Commission that at that time had a majority of three international members. Lost in the news reporting was the critical fact that the ECC had only examined the results of the voting stations where the most egregious fraud had occurred. The actual extent of the fraud was in all likelihood far greater than that examined and found by the ECC, and it is quite possible that Abdulllah Abdullah, who came in second, could have won a free and fair second round election.

The U.S., instead of facing down Karzai, turned to Pakistan and apparently struck a deal to gain the cooperation of the Pakistani military in negotiating with the Taliban, in exchange for ceasing its pressure on Karzai to either actually hold a second-round election or form a national unity government with Abdullah. In the face of Karzai’s refusal to meet Abdullah’s demand that the members of the Independent Electoral Commission who had orchestrated the fraud be replaced, the latter withdrew from the race.

As Thomas Friedman observed in the New York Times in his March 31 op-ed column,

When you can steal an election, you can steal anything. How will we get this guy to curb corruption when his whole election, and previous tour in office, were built on corruption? How can we be operating a clear, build-and-hold strategy that depends on us bringing good governance to Afghans when the head of the government is so duplicitous?

See also The Trenchant Observer, “Thomas L. Friedman on Karzai; Hard Options,” March 31, 2010.

Fifth, when U.S. anti-corruption efforts collide with the pervasive corruption at the top of the Afghan government, which reportedly has many high-ranking officials on the CIA payroll, those efforts seem to always be sacrificed as the intelligence agencies weigh in to protect their assets.

See, e.g., Dexter Filkins and Mark Mazzetti, “Karzai Aide in Corruption Inquiry Is Tied to C.I.A.,” New York Times, August 25, 2010

Recently, Karzai blocked the efforts of two U.S. supported Afghan anti-corruption bodies when they sought to arrest officials close to Karzai widely reputed to be corrupt. Karzai then fired Deputy Attorney General Fazel Ahmad Faqiryar, who had been in charge of these anti-corruption efforts. The New York Times, in an editorial on August 25, 2010, noted,

A report in Thursday’s Times that the aide, Mohammed Zia Salehi, is a paid agent of the C.I.A. shows, once again, the seamy complications of this war.

In late July, Mr. Salehi, a top national security adviser to Mr. Karzai, was arrested after being accused of soliciting bribes to help block an investigation of the New Ansari Exchange. New Ansari, a financial firm based in Kabul, is suspected of helping move billions of dollars out of Afghanistan.

The two anticorruption agencies, the Major Crimes Task Force and the Sensitive Investigations Unit, were established by the Afghan government last year with encouragement from the United States. They are independent, with broad powers to arrest, detain and try suspects, and they receive technical and other help from the F.B.I. and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

–Editorial, “Mr. Karzai’s Promises,” New York Times, August 25, 2010

The Central Dilemma Facing the U.S. in Afghanistan

The central dilemma facing the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan is that good governance is required for the Taliban to be checked, both according to U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine (as enunciated in the Army manual drafted by Petraeus), and under the specific conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. Yet good governance cannot be built, or governance strengthened, without law and the framework of law that such governance requires.

In a word, the U.S. and its allies are not likely to succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan, or in reducing the likelihood of destabilization of Pakistan as a result of failure in Afghanistan, without clearly setting out as its objective the establishment and consolidation of a constitutional or rule-of-law state.

That does not mean that the United States must maintain large military forces in Afghanistan until such a state is firmly in place, but it does mean that U.S. and allied efforts in the country must be oriented toward that goal, and not undermine it.

A long-term commitment from the U.S. and its allies on the civilian side, to assist in building and strengthening such a rule-of-law state, may be required. Such a commitment, however, would reassure Afghan partners dedicated to such an enterprise, and potential adherents, that the Umited States will not simply withdraw its troops and leave the country to warlords, drug lords, and the Taliban.

Two must-read articles lay out the depths of the pervasive corruption that exists in Afghanistan, and the inherent contradictions–as well as the strange if not delusional thinking–involved in current U.S. policymaking discussions on the subject of how to fight this corruption. See

Dexter Filkins, “Inside Corrupt-istan, a Loss of Faith in Leaders,” The New York Times, September 4, 2010; and

Mark Mazzetti and Rod Norland, “U.S. Debates Karzai’s Place in Fighting Corruption,” New York Times, September 14, 2010

Filkins writes,

It’s not as if the Americans and their NATO partners don’t know who the corrupt Afghans are. American officers and anti-corruption teams have drawn up intricate charts outlining the criminal syndicates that entwine the Afghan business and political elites. They’ve even given the charts a name: “Malign Actor Networks.” A k a MAN.

Looking at some of these charts—with their crisscrossed lines connecting politicians, drug traffickers and insurgents — it’s easy to conclude that this country is ruled neither by the government, nor NATO, nor the Taliban, but by the MAN.

It turns out, of course, that some of the same “malign actors” the diplomats and officers are railing against are on the payroll of the C.I.A. At least until recently, American officials say, one of them was Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president’s brother. Mr. Karzai has long been suspected of facilitating the country’s booming drug trade.

President Obama’s Response

How has president Obama reacted to Karzai’s interventions to block anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan and his firing of Deputy Attorney General Fazel Ahmad Faqiryar?

On Monday, September 14, Mazzetti and Norland report, the president met with his senior advisors to address the problem:

The Obama administration is debating whether to make Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, a more central player in efforts to root out corruption in his own government, including giving him more oversight of graft investigators and notifying him before any arrests, according to senior American officials.

The corruption issue was at the center of a two-hour White House meeting on Monday, with President Obama and senior aides agreeing that efforts to tackle corruption should be balanced against the need to maintain ties with the Afghan government.

“The discussion on corruption, in essence, is really a discussion about our relationship with Karzai,” said one senior Obama administration official, who like several others interviewed for this article spoke only on condition of anonymity.

Officials cautioned that no firm decisions had been made about whether President Karzai should have any veto power over anticorruption efforts. They said that Mr. Obama told his advisers on Monday to come up with a more “sophisticated” policy toward Afghan corruption.

Mr. Obama, the officials said, directed government agencies — including the Pentagon, the State Department, the Justice Department and the C.I.A. — to develop guidelines that could isolate the corruption that fuels anger among Afghans and drives many into the ranks of the insurgency, as opposed to the more routine kickbacks and bribes that grease the Afghan political system.

“The corruption we need to combat is the corruption that undermines the fight against the Taliban,” said a second American official. “That means going after officials who abuse ordinary Afghans and drive them to the other side — a plundering landlord or a brutal, thieving cop.”

In other words, the idea is to pursue some corruption, but not the corruption at the top of the Afghan government. In the president’s words, the challenge is to come up with a more “sophisticated” policy toward fighting Afghan corruption.

Perhaps more importantly, Obama’s call for more “sophisticated” options for fighting corruption in Afghanistan reflects Karzai’s continued ability to “roll” the president, who every time he hits a brick wall seems to call for more analysis.

There is room for some doubt as to whether these “sophisticated” intellectual distinctions and options, if found and implemented, will ever gain traction in the second most corrupt country in the world, Corrupt-istan.

To the Observer, the idea of trying to make Karzai a more central player in efforts to root out corruption in his own government sounds like giving Al Capone a more central role in cleaning up Chicago.

In the meantime, anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan are “paused”. See Rod Nordland and Alissa J. Rubin, “New Afghan Corruption Inquiries Frozen,” New York Times, September 14, 2010.

The Trenchant Observer

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Senator Kerry’s Conflict of Interest in Afghanistan

Thursday, August 19th, 2010

Senator John Kerry (D-MA) traveled to Kabul on August 17 to deliver the Obama administration’s warning to Hamid Karzai that he must clean up corruption in his government if he wants the United States to continue sending its treasure and troops to Afghanistan.

News reports recall that Kerry traveled to Kabul in November, 2009 to urge him to respect the findings of the Electoral Complaints Commission that Karzai had not won a majority of the votes in the first-round elections for president on August 20, and that consequently a second-round election should be held.

Karzai acceded to this immediate request. However he refused to respond to the demand of his rival in the presidential runoff, Abdullah Abdullah, that the Independent Electoral Commission’s members be replaced in order for there to be a real chance for a fair second-round election. The Independent Electoral Commission had been deeply involved in the massive fraud in Karzai’s favor in the first-round elections, and had officially sanctioned that fraud. Only the Electoral Complaints Commission, which at that time had a majority of “international” members, prevented that fraud from being directly consummated, by ruling that Karzai had not achieved a majority of the votes.

In view of Karzai’s failure to replace members of the Independent Electoral Commission who had sanctioned the fraud, Abdullah withdrew from the second-round elections before they could be scheduled to be held. Under the electoral law, the candidate who finished third should have advanced to the second-round runoff. This did not occur.

From these facts, news organizations began to repeat the canard that Senator Kerry had, through his personal “rapport” with Karzai, succeeded in persuading the Afghan president to honor the official results of the first-round election, accepting that a second round would have to be held.

In an apparent bow to the demands of Pakistan’s military and as part of the price of a deal for their help in negotiating with the Taliban, the U.S. stopped pressuring Karzai to enter a national unity government in talks with Abdullah, effectively pulling the rug out from under the latter.

Given Karzai’s failure to respond to his demands and the likelihood of massive fraud in the second-round elections, Abdullah withdrew from the elections. The United States immediately accepted this outcome, and began trumpeting to the world that Karzai was the legitimate and democratically-elected president of Afghanistan.

Senator Kerry’s Fundamental Conflict of Interest

Senator Kerry, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has a duty to oversee the actions of the executive branch in conducting the foreign policy of the United States. He and his Committee are responsible for advising the Senate as to the wisdom and coherence of that foreign policy, and whether to approve legislation to finance its implementation.

Yet by acting in an executive branch capacity to directly assist the President in his achievement of foreign policy objectives, Kerry has entered—perhaps unintentionally and with the best of motives—into a realm where his efforts on behalf of the executive involve a direct conflict of interest with his responsibilities as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. For he cannot be expected to exercise the independent judgment required in conducting Senate oversight responsibilities of foreign policy actions in which he himself has directly taken part.

Senator Kerry may indeed have important diplomatic skills that might be employed in service to the nation. If Hillary Clinton were to resign, he would certainly be a strong candidate to become Secretary of State.

But he cannot undertake executive functions and responsibilities without entering into a fundamental conflict of interest with his legislative mandate and duties as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Only the Executive, under our constitution, can conduct the foreign policy of the United States. Statements by Senator Kerry that he is in Kabul in his capacity as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee should be dismissed as the fig leaf that they are. It appears beyond doubt that, as a result of Karzai’s interference with the work of anti-corruption bodies established in Afghanistan, the Obama administration found itself in an impasse with Karzai and called upon Kerry to help break it.

This is implementing foreign policy, not gathering information that might be useful in making legislative judgments. However well-intentioned such conduct may be, it is constitutionally inappropriate.

We need Senator Kerry in his constitutional role as Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, delivering absolutely independent, objective, and critical judgments on the wisdom and conduct of U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan.

Given the importance of the position he holds in the Senate, his judgment must at all times avoid even the appearance of impropriety. In the ninth year of the war in Afghanistan, we need his independent and critical judgment more than ever.

The Trenchant Observer

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