Archive for the ‘U.N. Charter’ Category

U.N. General Assembly Adopts New Resolution on Syria (Doc. A/67/L.63) (May 15)–with vote tally

Friday, May 17th, 2013

(Developing story)

The United Nations General Assembly adopted a new resolution on Syria on May 15, 2013, calling on all parties to cease hostilities.

See “Press Release: General Assembly Adopts Text Condemning Violence in Syria, Demanding That All Sides End Hostilities.” U.N. Doc. GA/11372 (May 15, 2013).

The text of the draft Resolution (Resolution A/67/L.63), dated May 8, 2013, was adopted on May 15, 2013 by a vote of 107 in favour to 12 against, with 59 abstentions

The breakdown of the vote or vote tally was as follows:

The draft resolution on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic (document A/67/L.63) was adopted by a recorded vote of 107 in favour to 12 against, with 59 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu, Yemen.

Against:

Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.

Abstain:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia.

Absent:

Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Kiribati, Mauritania, Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.

–Press Release, above, U.N. Doc. GA/11372, May 15, 2013.

Thus, while Secretary of State John Kerry pursues the Russians’ objective of holding an international peace conference in Geneva, as proposed by Kofi Annan and approved by a meeting there on June 30, 2012, there are other international actors determined to maintain a spotlight on the atrocities that have been committed and that are being committed in Syria.

See Michael Young, “Washington blunders yet again in Syria,” The Daily Star (Beirut). May 16, 2013 (12:57 AM).

The Trenchant Observer

REPRISE: “Looney Toons” at the White House: New York Times article details Obama’s thinking on Syria—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #45 (May 27, 2012)

Tuesday, May 7th, 2013

Introduction to the REPRISE (May 7, 2013)

So, Obama’s “red line” on the use of chemical weapons in Syria turns out to be a red line that leads directly to the Kremlin.

What American diplomacy has failed to achieve, spectacularly, Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry now think they can achieve by talking to Putin and Lavrov.

Well, maybe. But hardly likely. Lavrov and Putin now achieve their goal of holding the conference Kofi Annan conjured up as one of his last “castles in the sky” at the conference held at Geneva on June 30, 2012.

How this will stop the killing in Syria is anyone’s guess.

It is just words, words to get Obama off the hook for his “red line” comment, which have come back to haunt him now that al-Assad has used chemical weapons in Syria.

Now that Obama is once again seeking a solution by going to the Russians, who have steadfastly supported al-Assad in his commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, we can all breathe a sigh of relief. See the following Reprise from the Trenchant Observer to understand just how pitiful this last move by Obama and “the gang who couldn’t shoot straight” is.

Sadly, our hopes in John Kerry seem to have been misplaced.  He appears now to have joined “the gang who couldn’t shoot straight”.  His role will be to do Obama’s bidding.  Obama will continue to control foreign policy from the White House, guided by assistants such as Ben Rhodes.

If this course is not corrected, the disasters of Obama’s first term are likely to be repeated, on a much grander scale with much graver consequences.

REPRISE: “Looney Toons” at the White House: New York  Times article details Obama’s thinking on Syria—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #45 (May 27)

Originally published May 27, 2012

looney-tunes
adj.
[after Looney Tunes, trademark for a series of animated cartoons] [Slang] crazy; demented: also loon’ y-tunes

***
loony
[Slang]
adj.
loon’i-er, looní-est [LUNATIC] crazy; demented
n.,
pl. loon’-ies a loony person Also loon” ey, pl. -eys

***
–Webster’s New Worl Dictionary

**************************************************

In a front-page article in today’s New York Times, Helen Cooper and Mark Landler describe the thinking behind President Obama’s policy towards Syria. They report,

WASHINGTON — In a new effort to halt more than a year of bloodshed in Syria, President Obama will push for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad under a proposal modeled on the transition in another strife-torn Arab country, Yemen.

The plan calls for a negotiated political settlement that would satisfy Syrian opposition groups but that could leave remnants of Mr. Assad’s government in place. Its goal is the kind of transition under way in Yemen, where after months of violent unrest, President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to step down and hand control to his vice president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, in a deal arranged by Yemen’s Arab neighbors. Mr. Hadi, though later elected in an uncontested vote, is viewed as a transitional leader.

The success of the plan hinges on Russia, one of Mr. Assad’s staunchest allies, which has strongly opposed his removal.

–Helen Cooper and Mark Landler, “U.S. Hopes Assad Can Be Eased Out With Russia’s Aid,” New York Times, May 27, 2012.

President Obama, administration officials said,

will press the proposal with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia next month at their first meeting since Mr. Putin returned to his old post on May 7. Thomas E. Donilon, Mr. Obama’s national security adviser, raised the plan with Mr. Putin in Moscow three weeks ago.

Donilon, who is not a seasoned diplomat, apparently did not impress Putin, judging by the latter’s cancellation of his participation in the G-8 summit at Camp David on May 18-19.

The biggest problem with the Yemen model, several experts said, is that Yemen and Syria are starkly different countries. In Yemen, Mr. Saleh kept his grip on power for three decades by reconciling competing interests through a complex system of patronage. When his authority collapsed, there was a vice president, Mr. Hadi, who was able to assert enough control over Yemen’s splintered security forces to make him a credible transitional leader.

In Syria, by contrast, Mr. Assad oversees a security state in which his minority Alawite sect fears that if his family is ousted, it will face annihilation at the hands of the Sunni majority. That has kept the government remarkably cohesive, cut down on military defections and left Mr. Assad in a less vulnerable position than Mr. Saleh. Even if he leaves, American officials conceded, there is no obvious candidate to replace him.

The sheer incompetence of this White House on foreign policy matters is stunning.

Paradoxically, among a number of news commentators within the Washington bubble, Obama is viewed as doing pretty well on foreign policy, particularly since taking out Osama Bin Laden. None of these commentators are foreign policy experts with any experience, however. Further, Democratic foreign policy experts have largely held their silence, probably out of concern that criticism could help the Republicans in the November elections. Moreover, Obama has since his first days in office charmed the press, and many reporters and commentators are simply unwilling to criticize the administration on foreign policy issues in any fundamental way.

Significantly, the Washington Post, which is the one newspaper read by most government officials in Washington, has simply failed to cover Syria with a reporter, usually being content to just run the AP wire story. What contributions they do make are limited in the main to stories providing information by administration officials, named and unnamed.

The Editorial Board, on the other hand, has written some clear-minded editorials on Syria. The disconnect betwee the Editorial Board and the reporting side of the newspaper is hard to understand, especially in view of the Post’s illustrious history.

Despite the reputed “successfulness” of the administration’s foreign policy leadership–which analytically does not stretch beyond the fact that it has not become an issue which hurts the Obama in the presidential race, the utter lack of serousness of Preident Obama and the White House on Syria is exposed for all to see in today’s New York Times article by Cooper and Landler.

Washington’s response to Moscow’s callous support of al-Assad as he killed thousands of people through war crimes and crimes against humanity is on a par with Éduoard Daladier’s and Neville Chamberlain’s betrayal of Czechoslovakia in October, 1938, when they signed “the Munich Pact”.

One of the first betrayals on Syria was with Turkey:

Secretary Clinton caught her Turkish counterpart off guard during their meeting in Washington last month. Clinton reportedly told Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu that the Obama Administration “preferred going through the Russians” in an attempt to achieve a political solution being shopped by the UN/Arab League’s Special Syrian Envoy Kofi Annan.
–Amb. Marc Ginsberg, “Syria Is Obama’s Srebrenica,” Huffington Post (The Blog), March 28, 2012 .

On the U.S. decision to sell out its regional allies and to work through Russia instead, see

The Trenchant Observer, “The emperor has no clothes”: Foreign policy without a moral core—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #19 (March 29), March 29, 2012.

The Trenchant Observer, “Into the Abyss: Washington’s Fecklessness, Syria’s Fate—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #20 (March 30), March 30, 2012.

The reader is invited to read the Observer’s recent articles on Syria, and to draw his or her own conclusions as to whether Obama, Donilon, Clinton and the rest of the administration’s foreign policy team are conducting a competent foreign policy, first of all in Syria, but also everywhere else.

In the Observer’s opinion, this team is “the gang who couldn’t shoot straight”. For example, the Sixth Summit of the Americas, held in Cartagena, Colombia on April 14-15, was totally overshadowed by the prostitution scandal involving members of the Secret Serivce and the U.S. military. Little press attention was given to the substance of the meeting, the most important of the year with the leaders of the Latin American countries.

See Brian Ellsworth (Cartagena, Colombia), “Despite Obama charm, Americas summit boosts U.S. isolation,” April 16, 1012.

Now, on the Syrian question, by following a path of “working through the Russians”, the Obama administration has given up its last shred of moral legitimacy in the Middle East. Between al-Assad, Russia, China, and Iran, on the one hand, and the people of Syria, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, on the other, and in the face of immense human suffering and the ongoing commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the al-Assad regime, the United States is pursuing a strategy of “working through the Russians.”

Obama is incompetent as a foreign policy leader. Former Ambassador Marc Ginsberg is to be congratulated for his moral courage in speaking out on the question of Syria, in a clear voice.

What the United States needs, desperately, is for other foreign policy experts–and national leaders–to speak out with equal clarity, be they aligned with the Democratic Party in the United States, with the Republicans, or from other countries that are friends of the United States.

In the meantime, the international community would do well to look elsewhere than to the United States for leadership on the Syrian question.

See The Trenchant Observer, “At least 70 killed nationwide; massacre of 50 in Houla; U.N. International Commission on Syria Update—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update # 43 (May 25),” May 25, 2012.

The Trenchant Observer, “Chief of UN Observers confirms massacre at Houla; NGOs report 35 children and total of 110 killed—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #44 (May 26),” May 26, 2012.

The Trenchant Observer

U.N. Security Council adopts resolution (SC Res. 2100) establishing peacekeeping force in Mali

Saturday, April 27th, 2013

(developing story)

The United Nations Security Council adopted on April 25 Resolution 2100 establishing a U.N. peackeeping force in Mali, effective July 1, 2013. The Security Council’s Press Release (SC/10987) summariezes the resolution and the statements of the delegates, and also contains the text of the resolution. The Press release, except for the resolution (reproduced in full beow), follows:

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Security Council
6952nd Meeting (AM)

Security Council Establishes Peacekeeping Force for Mali Effective 1 July, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2100 (2013)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Will Have Up to 11,200 Troops, 1,440 Police, Take over for African-Led Mission (AFISMA)

The Security Council today unanimously approved the creation of a 12,600 member peacekeeping force in the West African nation of Mali, strongly condemning the January offensive by armed groups towards the south and stressing that terrorism could only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach to isolate the terrorist threat.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by 1 July 2013, and thereby transfer the functions of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) — set up by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in September — to the new entity. The Secretary-General was requested to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into its activities and to appoint a Special Representative for Mali and Head of Mission to assume overall authority for the coordination of United Nations activities.

By the terms of resolution 2100 (2013), MINUSMA would comprise up to 11,200 military personnel, including reserve battalions able to deploy rapidly within the country, as required, and 1,440 police personnel. The Council called on Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment.

In terms of mandate, the Council authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means, in support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize key population centres, especially in the north, deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas. It would support Mali’s transitional authorities to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country, and support both national and international efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector.

By other terms, French troops were authorized to use all necessary means to intervene in support of MINUSMA when under “imminent and serious threat” and upon the request of the Secretary-General, with the Council deciding to review that role within six months of its commencement.

The seven-part mandate also included responsibilities to support the implementation of Mali’s transitional road map — adopted in January to restore democracy and stability — as well as for the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel, and promotion and protection of human rights. In the area of national and international justice, MINUSMA would support the efforts of the transitional authorities to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, taking into account their referral of the situation in Mali since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court.

Demanding that all rebel armed groups set aside their arms and cease hostilities immediately, the Council urged all such parties who had cut all ties with terrorist groups — such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Ansar Eddine — and who recognized, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, to engage “expeditiously” in an inclusive negotiation process, facilitated by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Mali once appointed.

Further by the text, the Council urged transitional authorities to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections “as soon as technically possible”, welcoming the commitment to organize presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative polls on 21 July 2013.

After adoption, the representative of the Russian Federation said he had voted in favour of the text, mindful of stepping up assistance to overcome a complex crisis in Mali. The main responsibility for resolving existing problems lay with Malians. The Mission’s tasks must aim exclusively at providing assistance. Following the Council’s approval of the intervention brigade for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), today’s decision was “of alarm”, as what had once been considered an exception, was now a standing practice — one with unpredictable consequences for the safety of United Nations personnel and the Mission’s legal status.

He went on to say that the Secretary-General’s report underscored the need for a clear division between peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement activities, and that MINUSMA did not provide for offensive operations. In the resolution’s preamble, the unacceptability of such actions was reaffirmed. Blue helmets should not be used to arrest those accused of having carried out war crimes. It was clear that a military solution did not exist and that the Mission must be backed by tangible political processes.

Tiéman Hubert Coulibaly, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Mali, said today’s adoption was an important step in efforts to stem activities of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Mujahideen and other groups, as well as ensure peace and stability throughout the territory. The resolution would transfer functions from the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the new United Nations Stabilization Mission.

For its part, Mali was fully prepared to welcome the Mission, which could stabilize main urban centres in the north, restore State authority, protect civilians, and promote and protect human rights and humanitarian assistance. Thanks to AFISMA, the Malian security forces and others, progress had been made in taking back main cities in the north and centre of the country. Small cells of armed rebels continued to threaten Mali’s stability and territorial integrity, as well as stability in the region. He welcomed the international commitment to deter the return of armed groups. Those groups must lay down their arms, cease hostilities, and recognize Mali’s territorial integrity.

He went on to stress that there could be no sustainable development without peace and stability, appealing for better coordination of the international response to Mali’s short-, medium- and long-term needs, especially in the areas of security, governance and humanitarian action. He hoped that the International Conference of Donors, on 15 May, would help achieve results, urging international and regional organizations to join the “wave of solidarity”.

For its part, the transitional Government was implementing the road map by taking steps for the holding of fair, free, transparent elections and the start of an inter-Malian dialogue, he said, which included the creation of a Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission comprised of 30 commissioners representing the country’s diversity. He reiterated the pledge to cooperate with the Council and play its role in the implementation of the resolution, thanking France, in particular, for helping Mali end the terrorist offensive, as well as ECOWAS, the European Union, the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and all bilateral and multilateral partners, and neighbouring countries for their help in dealing with the crisis.

Tété António, Permanent Observer for the African Union, spoke on behalf of Pierre Buyoya, African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel Region, recalling that the African Union and ECOWAS had been focused on the crisis in Mali from the start. Efforts now would focus on assisting Malian authorities in restoring its national unity, territorial integrity and constitutional order in a peaceful climate marked by national reconciliation.

To do that, the two organizations had outlined a strategy, he said, comprised of a political process and, if necessary, military action. The dialogue process was based on the belief that every possible peaceful way must be used before resorting to military action. It was incumbent on the African Union to take steps for possible military intervention. The attack on Konna in January provided a reason to support such an approach, as it undermined dialogue efforts ongoing with some armed groups. As such, it was normal to back an initiative for transforming AFISMA into a United Nations mission. He was pleased that some of his concerns regarding the draft version had been taken into account in the final version.

Against that backdrop, he urged that the central political roles of the African Union and ECOWAS be recognized in their cooperation with the United Nations Mission. They would keep a strong presence in Bamako. In addition, he hoped that consultations — which had been a hallmark of all joint actions taken thus far — would continue, inter alia, in taking major decisions, the selection of military and civilian leaders, and in the coordination between MINUSMA, French forces and the Malian army through the appointment of liaison officers. The transformation of AFISMA was an example of the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations, which he hoped would lead to a lasting solution to the crisis Mali.

The meeting began at 10:13 a.m. and adjourned at 10:33 a.m.

Full Text of Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2100 (2013) reads as follows:

25 United Nations S/RES/2100 (2013)
Security Council Distr.: General
25 April 2013
12-24771 (E)
*1224771*
Resolution 2100 (2013)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting, on
25 April 2013

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2085 (2012), its
Presidential Statements of 26 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/7) and 4 April 2012
(S/PRST/2012/9) as well as its Press Statements of 22 March 2012, 9 April 2012,
18 June 2012, 10 August 2012, 21 September 2012, 11 December 2012 and 10 January 2013 on Mali,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial
integrity of Mali,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the
parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Condemning strongly the offensive launched on 10 January 2013 by terrorist,
extremist and armed groups towards the south of Mali and stressing that terrorism
can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the
active participation and collaboration of all States, and regional and international
organizations to impede, impair, and isolate the terrorist threat, and reaffirming that terrorism could not and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization,

Welcoming the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the
transitional authorities of Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist and
armed groups towards the south of Mali and commending the efforts to restore the
territorial integrity of Mali by the Malian Defence and Security Forces, with the
support of French forces and the troops of the African-led International Support
Mission in Mali (AFISMA),

Stressing the need to work expeditiously toward the restoration of democratic governance and constitutional order, including through the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections and emphasizing the importance for the transitional authorities of Mali to move swiftly in a process of inclusive dialogue and active engagement with Malian political groups, including those who have previously advocated independence, are prepared to cease hostilities, have cut off all ties with terrorist organizations and who recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and
humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region and over the insecurity which hinders
humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of armed groups, terrorist and
criminal networks, and their activities, the presence of landmines as well as the
continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens
the peace, security, and stability of States in this region,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure
the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety of civilians receiving
assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Mali and
stressing the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of
need,

Condemning strongly all abuses and violations of human rights and violations
of international humanitarian law, including those involving extrajudicial
executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and sexual and gender-based violence,
forced amputations, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children,
attacks against schools and hospitals, forced displacements, and destruction of
cultural and historical heritage, committed in Mali by any group or individuals,
noting, especially, widespread abuses of human rights by terrorist, extremist and
armed groups in the north of Mali, condemning strongly the reports of retaliatory
attacks, including those based on ethnicity and those allegedly perpetrated by
members of the Malian Defence and Security Forces against civilians, and calling
upon all parties to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with
their obligations under applicable international law,
Reiterating, in this regard, that all perpetrators of such acts must be held
accountable and that some of such acts referred to in the paragraph above may
amount to crimes under the Rome Statute and taking note that the transitional
authorities of Mali referred the situation in Mali since January 2012 to the
International Criminal Court on 13 July 2012 and that the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court opened, on 16 January 2013, an investigation into
alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012,

Taking note of the listing of Ansar Eddine and its leader Iyad Ag Ghali,
recalling the listing of Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and
the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), on the Al-Qaida
sanctions list established by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and
1989 (2011) and reiterating its readiness, under the above-mentioned regime, to
sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who do not cut off all ties to Al-Qaida and associated groups, including AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar
Eddine, in accordance with the established listing criteria,

Expressing its continued concern over the serious threats posed by
transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, and its increasing links, in some
cases, with terrorism, and strongly condemning the incidents of kidnapping and
hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, noting
the increase in such kidnappings in the Sahel region, and underscoring the urgent
need to address these issues,

Expressing its determination to combat kidnapping and hostage-taking in the
Sahel region, in accordance with applicable international law and, in this regard,
noting the publication of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) “Algiers
Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of
Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists”,

Commending the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU), as well as the Secretary-
General, for their intensive efforts to solve the crisis in Mali, welcoming the
establishment by the AU, ECOWAS, the EU and the United Nations of a Joint Task
Force for Mali in Addis Ababa, encouraging them to maintain coordination in
support of the stabilization of the situation in Mali, including the national political dialogue and electoral process, noting that the requirement to report as requested in paragraph 10 of resolution 2085 (2012) was not fulfilled and looking forward to the submission of those reports,

Commending the efforts of African countries to contribute forces to AFISMA,
as authorized by resolution 2085 (2012), welcoming the deployment of AFISMA in
Mali and also commending Member States and regional and international
organizations that support this deployment in Mali,

Commending the contributions pledged at the Donors conference organized by
the AU in Addis Ababa on 29 January 2013 in support of AFISMA and the Malian
Defence and Security Forces, welcoming actual contributions already made and the
AU pledge to contribute through the AU’s assessed contributions, urging all donors
to translate their pledges into actual contributions and calling upon other Member
States and regional and international organizations to also contribute generously,

Encouraging international coordination to consolidate political and security
progress in Mali, and in this regard, regular meetings of the Support and Follow-Up
Group on the Situation in Mali, established by the AU Peace and Security Council
on 20 March 2012, and co-chaired by the AU, ECOWAS, EU and the United
Nations and attended by other international partners, and welcoming the conclusions
of the 5 February 2013 and 19 April 2013 meetings of the Follow-Up Group,

Taking note of the letter, dated 25 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-
General by the transitional authorities of Mali, which requests the deployment of a
United Nations operation to stabilize and restore the authority and the sovereignty
of the Malian State throughout its national territory,

Taking note of the letter, dated 26 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-
General by the President of the ECOWAS Commission requesting the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization mission and taking
note of the communiqué, dated 7 March 2013, of the AU Peace and Security
Council, as well as the attached letter dated 7 March 2013 and addressed to the
Secretary-General by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, expressing AU
support for the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization
operation in Mali,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/189), dated
26 March 2013, on the situation in Mali, including recommendations and options for
establishing a United Nations stabilization operation in Mali, Emphasizing that the transitional authorities of Mali have primary responsibility for resolving the interlinked challenges facing their country and protecting all their citizens and that any sustainable solution to the crisis in Mali should be Malian-owned, including a political process, also emphasizing that the cooperation among the countries of the region will be crucial for lasting peace and stability in Mali,

Encouraging the international community to provide broad support to resolve
the crisis in Mali through coordinated actions for immediate and long-term needs,
encompassing security, governance, development and humanitarian issues, looking
forward to the high-level international donors’ conference in Brussels on 15 May
2013 to support the development of Mali, commending the contributions already
made toward the 2013 Consolidated Appeal for Mali and urging all Member States
and other donors to contribute generously for humanitarian operations,

Determining that the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international
peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Commends the initial measures taken so far to restore constitutional order
and national unity in Mali, including the adoption by the Malian National Assembly,
on 29 January 2013, of a transitional road map, welcomes the establishment of the
Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission on 6 March 2013 and the appointment of
its Commissioners and calls on the Commission to commence its work as soon as
possible, and further calls on the transitional authorities of Mali to continue
urgently to take discernible steps towards consolidating stability, enhancing a
culture of democratic governance, and facilitating inclusive political dialogue to
bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion, which
should lead to political progress in this regard as early as possible;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, in close coordination with the AU and
ECOWAS, to support all dimensions of the transitional road map, with a view to its
swift implementation, including the work of the Dialogue and Reconciliation
Commission;

3. Urges the transitional authorities of Mali to hold free, fair, transparent
and inclusive presidential and legislative elections as soon as technically possible,
welcomes the stated commitment of the transitional authorities of Mali to organize
presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative elections on 21 July 2013,
stresses the importance of ensuring an environment conducive to the holding of
elections, in particular a secure environment prior to, during and following the
electoral period, equitable access to State-controlled media and provision for all
eligible persons, including internally displaced persons and refugees, to participate
in the electoral process and calls upon Member States, regional and international
organizations, as requested by the transitional authorities of Mali, to provide support to the electoral process, including through financial resources, electoral observation capacity and related technical assistance;

4. Demands that all rebel armed groups in Mali put aside their arms and cease hostilities immediately and urges all such parties in Mali who have cut off all
ties with terrorist organizations such as AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and associated terrorist groups and who recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, and the transitional authorities of Mali to engage expeditiously in an inclusive negotiation process, facilitated by the Secretary-General, in particular through his Special Representative for Mali when
appointed as referred to in paragraph 11 below, in close collaboration with the AU,
ECOWAS and the EU Special Representative for the Sahel;

5. Calls upon the international community, through the Support and Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali, to meet regularly in Mali and, as may be required, outside Mali, to assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement the transitional road map and monitor the progress made in this regard and to continue contributing to the promotion of lasting peace, stability, and reconciliation in Mali, requests the Secretary-General to facilitate the convening of the Support and Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali and stresses the importance of continued coordination between the United Nations, the AU and ECOWAS in the promotion of lasting peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Mali;

6. Demands that no member of the Malian Defence and Security Forces shall undermine and obstruct the implementation of the transitional road map or the efforts of the international community to foster political and security progress in Mali, stresses the importance of Malian civilian control and oversight of the Malian Defence and Security Forces and expresses its readiness to consider appropriate measures, as necessary, against those who take action that undermines the peace, stability, and security, including those who prevent the implementation of constitutional order;

7. Decides to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), requests the Secretary-General to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into MIN USMA, with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the discharge of UNOM’s mandated tasks, as of the date of adoption of this resolution, further decides that the authority be transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013 at which point MINUSMA shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, for an initial period of 12 months and requests the Secretary-General to include in MINUSMA, in close coordination with the AU and ECOWAS, AFISMA military and police personnel appropriate to United Nations standards;

8. Decides that the date referred to in paragraph 7 above and MINUSMA’s
phased deployment shall be subject to a further review by the Council within
60 days of the adoption of this resolution of the security situation in MINUSMA’s
area of responsibility, specifically with respect to the cessation of major combat
operations by international military forces in the immediate vicinity of and/or within MINUSMA’s envisaged area of responsibility and a significant reduction in the
capacity of terrorist forces to pose a major threat to the civilian population and
international personnel in the immediate vicinity of and/or within MINUSMA’s
envisaged area of responsibility, further decides, should the Council consider that
these criteria are not met before 1 July 2013, it shall concurrently adjust the timeline for MINUSMA’s deployment against these criteria;

9. Calls for tangible achievements in the political process in Mali, which
are of critical significance for the successful deployment and activities of
MINUSMA;

10. Reiterates that Member States and regional and international
organizations are urged to continue to provide coordinated support to AFISMA
pursuant to its resolution 2085 (2012), until the transfer of authority from AFISMA
to MINUSMA, including military training, provision of equipment, intelligence and
logistical support, requests the Secretary-General to accelerate the disbursement of
the United Nations Trust Fund established pursuant to its resolution 2085 (2012) to
support AFISMA, and decides that equipment donated or granted to AFISMA, or
where the ownership remains with the donor, shall not be considered contingentowned
equipment;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special
Representative for Mali and Head of Mission of MINUSMA, who shall, from the
date of appointment, assume overall authority on the ground for the coordination of
all the activities of the United Nations, and its agencies, funds and programmes, in
Mali and shall use good offices and coordinate efforts of the international
community in order to support the priority elements as defined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3
and 4 above and who shall, from the transfer of authority from AFISMA to
MINUSMA, lead all tasks of the mandate of MINUSMA as defined in paragraph 16
below, and coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali,
including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and
Security Sector Reform (SSR), further emphasizes that the Special Representative
shall ensure optimal coordination between MINUSMA and the United Nations
Country Team in Mali, in connection with the aspects of their respective mandates;

12. Decides that MINUSMA will comprise up to 11,200 military personnel,
including reserve battalions capable of deploying rapidly within the country as and
when required, and 1,440 police personnel, calls upon Member States to provide
troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment in order to enhance the
capacity of MINUSMA to operate, and discharge its responsibilities, effectively and
requests the Secretary-General to recruit qualified staff, who have the professional
experience and skills appropriate to the tasks defined under applicable competency
areas in paragraphs 16 and 17 below;

13. Welcomes the commitment of the Secretary-General, as outlined in
paragraph 81 of his report (S/2013/189), to take all possible steps, including through the full use of existing authorities and at his discretion, to accelerate the deployment of civilian and military capabilities in Mali, in order to best respond to the Council’s expectations and the needs of the Malian people and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 12 above, to have MINUSMA ready to commence its activities;

14. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps in order to
ensure inter-mission cooperation, notably between MINUSMA and UNMIL and
UNOCI, appropriate transfers of troops and their assets from other United Nations
missions to MINUSMA, subject to the following conditions: (i) the Council’s
information and approval, including on the scope and duration of the transfer,
(ii) the agreement of the troop-contributing countries and (iii) the security situation where these United Nations missions are deployed and without prejudice to the performance of their mandates;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the other United Nations
missions in the region, notably UNMIL and UNOCI, share logistic and
administrative support with MINUSMA, to the extent possible, without prejudicing
their operational capacities with respect to their mandates, in order to maximize the
effectiveness and efficiency of the missions in the West African region, and to report thereon for consideration as appropriate;

16. Decides that the mandate of MINUSMA shall be the following:

(a) Stabilization of key population centres and support for the
reestablishment of State authority throughout the country

(i) In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize the key
population centres, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter
threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those
areas;

(ii) To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish
State administration throughout the country;

(iii) To support national and international efforts towards rebuilding the
Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through technical
assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programmes, as well
as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities and in close
coordination with other bilateral partners, donors and international
organizations engaged in these fields, including the EU;

(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other
support, in mine action and weapons and ammunition management;

(v) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in developing and
implementing programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the dismantling of militias and
self-defence groups, consistent with the objectives of reconciliation and taking
into account the specific needs of demobilized children;

(b) Support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including
the national political dialogue and the electoral process

(i) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement swiftly the
transitional road map towards the full restoration of constitutional order,
democratic governance and national unity in Mali;

(ii) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the
national and local levels, including through local partners as appropriate, in
order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;

(iii) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali and communities in the north
of Mali to facilitate progress towards an inclusive national dialogue and
reconciliation process, notably the negotiation process referred to in paragraph
4 above, including by enhancing negotiation capacity and promoting the
participation of civil society, including women’s organizations;

(iv) To support the organization and conduct of inclusive, free, fair and
transparent presidential and legislative elections, including through the
provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective
security arrangements;

(c) Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel

(i) To protect, without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional
authorities of Mali, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,
within its capacities and areas of deployment;

(ii) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed
conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and
Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and
gender-based violence in armed conflict;

(iii) To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and
ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and
associated personnel;

(d) Promotion and protection of human rights

(i) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or
violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law
committed throughout Mali and to contribute to efforts to prevent such
violations and abuses;

(ii) To support, in particular, the full deployment of MINUSMA human rights
observers throughout the country;

(iii) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on
violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations
committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed
conflict;

(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in their efforts to promote
and protect human rights;

(e) Support for humanitarian assistance
In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to contribute to the
creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of
humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the
voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close
coordination with humanitarian actors;

(f) Support for cultural preservation
To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, as necessary and feasible, in
protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration
with UNESCO;

(g) Support for national and international justice
To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the transitional
authorities of Mali, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to
justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali,
taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of the
situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal
Court;

17. Authorizes MINUSMA to use all necessary means, within the limits of its
capacities and areas of deployment, to carry out its mandate as set out in paragraphs
16 (a) (i) and (ii), 16 (c) (i) and (iii), 16 (e), 16 (f) and 16 (g) and requests
MINUSMA’s civilian and military components to coordinate their work with the aim
of supporting the tasks outlined in paragraph 16 above;

18. Authorizes French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas
of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities
of MINUSMA until the end of MINUSMA’s mandate as authorized in this
resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent
and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, further requests France to
report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali and to
coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in
paragraph 34 below and decides to review this mandate within six months after its
commencement;

19. Urges all parties in Mali to cooperate fully with the deployment and
activities of MINUSMA, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom
of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Mali
to enable MINUSMA to carry out fully its mandate;

20. Calls upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the
free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, as
well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and
spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of MINUSMA;

21. Reiterates that the training, consolidation and redeployment of the
Malian Defence and Security Forces is vital to ensure Mali’s long-term security and
stability and to protect the people of Mali and stresses the importance of the Malian
Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing security
throughout the Malian territory;

22. Welcomes the deployment of the European Union Training Mission
(EUTM) in Mali which is providing training and advice for the Malian Defence and
Security Forces towards contributing to strengthening civilian authority and respect
for human rights and calls upon the EU, notably its Special Representative for the
Sahel, to coordinate closely with MINUSMA, and other bilateral partners of Mali
engaged to assist the transitional authorities of Mali in the Security Sector Reform
(SSR);

23. Urges Member States, regional and international organizations to provide
coordinated assistance, expertise and training, including on human rights and
international humanitarian law, especially concerning the protection of women and
children, and capacity-building support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces,
including through the United Nations Trust Fund established pursuant to its
resolution 2085 (2012) for Peace and Security in Mali, and in close coordination
with existing initiatives, in particular EUTM to help restore the authority of the
State of Mali over its entire national territory, to uphold the unity and territorial
integrity of Mali and to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations and
associated groups;

24. Reiterates that the transitional authorities of Mali have primary
responsibility to protect civilians in Mali, further recalls its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of
S/RES/2039 (2012) civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security and calls upon MINUSMA and all military forces in Mali to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

25. Requests MINUSMA to take fully into account gender considerations as
a cross cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the transitional authorities of Mali in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels and at an early stage of the stabilization phase, including the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, as well as in the national political dialogue and electoral processes;

26. Requests that MINUSMA take fully into account the need to protect
civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects in the performance of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, where undertaken jointly with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence
Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces
(S/2013/110);

27. Urges the transitional authorities of Mali to ensure that all perpetrators of
serious violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international
humanitarian law are held accountable and to continue to cooperate with the
International Criminal Court, in accordance with Mali’s obligations under the Rome
Statute;

28. Calls upon the transitional authorities of Mali, with the assistance of
MINUSMA, consistent with paragraph 16 above, and international partners, to
address the issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials and the United Nations
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in order to ensure the safe
and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of small arms and
light weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked or
illicitly held weapons and further stresses the importance of the full implementation
of its resolution 2017 (2011);

29. Urges Sahel and Maghreb States to enhance interregional cooperation
and coordination in order to develop inclusive and effective strategies to combat in a comprehensive and integrated manner the activities of terrorist groups, namely
AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Eddine, and prevent the expansion of those groups as
well as to limit the proliferation of all arms and transnational organized crime and,
in this regard, takes note of the outcome of the Conference organized by CTED and
CTITF in Rabat on the Cooperation on Border Control in the Sahel and the
Maghreb;

30. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of MINUSMA
with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and
to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur;

31. Requests MINUSMA, within its capabilities, its areas of deployment and
without prejudice to its mandate, to assist the Committee pursuant to resolutions
S/RES/2039 (2012), 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2083 (2012);

32. Requests the Secretary-General to consider the environmental impacts of
the operations of MINUSMA when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context,
encourages MINUSMA to manage them, as appropriate and in accordance with
applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and
regulations, and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites;

33. Requests the Secretary-General and the transitional authorities of Mali to
conclude, within 30 days of the adoption this resolution, a status-of-forces
agreement with regards to MINUSMA, taking into consideration General Assembly
resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel and decides that pending the conclusion
of such an agreement, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990
(A/45/594), shall apply provisionally;

34. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of
the situation in Mali and the implementation of the mandate of MINUSMA, to
report to the Council within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution, specifically
with regards to paragraph 8 and 9 above, and then every three months from 1 July
2013 and to include in his reports to the Council updates on the security situation,
the priority political elements as defined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above on the
implementation of the transitional road map, relevant information on the progress,
promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law as
well as a review of the troop level, force generation and deployment of all
MINUSMA’s constituent elements;

35. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.April 2013
Security Council

Links

U.N. Security Council Press Release summarizing the resolution and statements of the dlegates regarding their votes is found here.

The official text of Resolution 2100 is found here.

The Trenchant Observer

Obama’s “red line” baby talk, and the Red Herring of whether it has been crossed

Thursday, April 25th, 2013

In the 21st century, statesmen don’t shout at the leaders of other nations and threaten, “if you cross this red line, my red line because I am powerful and can hurt you, if you cross this red line which I have drawn in the sand, I will huff and puff and I’ll blow your house down.”

The apogee of all of this red line talk was when Benjamin Netanyahu, at the United Nations, drew a crude picture of a bomb with an arbitrary red line to show the point beyond which Iran can’t continue down the path to making a nuclear bomb without Israel attacking it militarily.

All this talk of red lines is silly because it is unilateral, arbitrary, and lacks any claim of legitimacy.

It’s the way some leaders might have spoken to leaders in other countries in the 19th century or earlier.

Now, things have changed. We have a United Nations Charter and well-developed rules of international law governing the use of force.

Statesmen today talk to each other in the language of international law, not the playground threats of children who don’t know yet much about rules and law and the limits society places on their behavior.

Statesmen don’t talk that way, but regrettably some national leaders still do.

All the talk about Obama’s “red lines” in Syria and whether they have been crossed constitutes one big RED HERRING.

The questions we ought to be discussing, instead of chasing the Red Herring, include the following:

1. Does the present situation in Syria, including al-Assad’s barbarism (e.g., war crimes and crimes against humanity on a massive scale), negatively affect the vital national interests of the United States, or those of its allies?

2. If so, what must be done, both alone and in conjunction with others, to defend those vital national interests?

3. How are those interests likely to be affected if no effective action is taken to halt al-Assad’s barbarism?

4. Does the United States have a vital national interest in preventing and halting the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and widespread violations of fundamental human rights on a massive scale?

5. If the United States is going to act, “If not now, when?”

These are the questions people should be talking about, and not Obama’s baby talk about red lines and arguments about whether they have been crossed.

The Trenchant Observer

Obama’s distorted relationship with the truth: Al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria

Wednesday, April 24th, 2013

(developing story)

See Isabelle Lasserre, “Washington tergiverse face aux armes chimiques d’Assad,” Le Figaro, 23 avril 2013 (mis à jour le 24/04/2013 à 16:13).

President Obama has gotten himself into a real bind with all of his talk of “red lines” in Syria. If al-Assad crossed Obama’s red line on using chemical weapons, the U.S. was going to…going to…going to…do something really big, like even intervene militarily.

Now, with Israeli generals asserting al-Assad has used chemical weapons, and other allies’ intelligence agencies essentially in agreement, it would seem that Obama has to do … SOMETHING!

The situation is reminiscent of Hillary Clinton’s reluctance to call al-Assad a war criminal, because that would increase pressures on the administration to act.

But Obama does not want to act in Syria. Despite the unanimous recommendations of his secretaries of state, his defense minister, his CIA Director, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

So, his solution for the moment is to say we are still investigating whether Syria used chemical weapons in places like Homs, Aleppo, and maybe even Damascus.

One would think he can only investigate for so long. On the other hand, as his leak investigations show, or his torture investigations, he’s pretty good at stretching out investigations until no one remembers or cares.

This time, in Syria, however. the truth just may be getting poised to take a big bite out of Obama’s credibility–such as it is–and his silly use of words like “red lines”.

He really ought to be basing his statements on international law, not imaginary and unilaterally imposed “red lines”, which are naked assertions of power devoid of the appeals to legitimacy contained in international law.

Obama’s principal approach to foreign policy issues is to try to solve them with words. We’ll see if words suffice this time, or if action may be forced upon a reluctant president.

The Trenchant Observer

U.N. Security Council should meet urgently to deal with North Korea’s nuclear threats

Friday, April 12th, 2013

The United Nations Charter is the only constitution we have for governance of the planet. It is not likely that it is going to be changed signficantly or that we are going to get a new one.

Therefore, we need to use it to deal with grave threats to international peace and security such as North Korea’s recent threats to attack neighboring countries, perhaps with nuclear weapons.

No one can deny that a grave threat to international peace and security exists.

See, e.g., Jethro Mullen, “North Korea issues new threat to U.S. bases,” CNN, March 26, 2013 (updated 7:38 PM EDT).

Unless we are to go back to the system of the great powers in 19th century, we need to use the international law and institutions that we have, which were created following World War II.

Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter provides in part:

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

The “threat to the peace” consists of North Korea’s threats to attack its neighbors, in violation of Article 2 paragrpahs 3 and 4 of the U.N. Charter, which provide:

Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1.The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2.All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3.All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4.All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

It is time that the Security Council assume its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

This is the world’s constiution. It cannot be taken for granted. Great Powers may think they know what North Korea is going to do. But the time for the Security Council to act is now, not after Seoul or another city has been wiped off the map.

New and additional sanctions should be imposed against North Korea for its recent behavior of actively threatening to launch nuclear attacks on other countries.

If such threats are not sanctioned now, will they become commonplace in the future? And if they do, who can assure the world that they will never be carried out?

The Trenchant Observer

A Powerful Vision of International Peace: The United Nations Charter

Thursday, March 28th, 2013

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

PREAMBLE

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

• to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
• to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
• to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

• to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
• to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
• to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
• to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Trenchant Observer

Smart drones, the goal of peace, and the future of mankind

Sunday, March 17th, 2013

In an Op-Ed piece by Bill Keller published in the New York Times on March 16, 2013, Keller describes the high probability that “smart drones” will be introduced in the future, in which the aerial-borne robotic machine and its computer will decide which targets and individuals and groups to fire upon, without human intervention. Keller notes that Israel, in fact, has already introduced such an aircraft, the Harpy. Keller notes,

Israel is the first country to make and deploy (and sell, to China, India, South Korea and others) a weapon that can attack pre-emptively without a human in charge. The hovering drone called the Harpy is programmed to recognize and automatically divebomb any radar signal that is not in its database of “friendlies.” No reported misfires so far, but suppose an adversary installs its antiaircraft radar on the roof of a hospital?

–Bill Keller, Op-Ed, “Smart Drones,” New York Times, March 16, 2013.

The entire op-ed piece speaks of advances in warfare based on the underlying assumption that continued warfare is inevitable, and that the most we can aspire to is to limit some forms of warfare or weapons used, such as land-mines. While there is a great deal to be said for international treaties and institutions that limit types and the extent of warfare–international humanitarian law or “the law of war” has precisely that aim, it seems that humanity has fallen into a downward spiral in its thinking and aspirations relating to war, and into what is in fact a profound moral abyss.

In 1945, no one doubted that the goal of international society and the new United Nations Charter and Organization should be the prevention of war, and the maintenance of international peace and security. This goal was almost self-evident to generations which had suffered the ravages of World War I (1914-1918) and World War II (1939-1945).

But today our leaders no longer espouse the goal of international peace. Like President Barack Obama in his Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech or Lecture in 2009, they have no vision of peace as an overriding goal to which other objectives should be subordinated. Rather, permanent war is in the minds of the leaders of today. Obama, in thinking about his pivot to Asia, is thinking about military deployments in the region to check China’s rising military power. In the stand-off with Russia and China in the United Nations Security Council over Syria, the larger question of the goals and vision of international society has been lost, primarily but not exclusively as a result of Russian and Chinese obstinacy.

At best, particularly under Obama, we have a dearth of American leadership in world affairs in general and in the maintenance of international peace and security in particular. Here, France has stepped into the vacuum, first acting as a catalyst in Libya and more recently, acting by introducing French forces into Mali to halt the fall of that country to Islamic terrorist groups and Tuareg guerrillas.

But who, and in which countries, dares today to articulate a powerful vision of peace and how to get there?

Without a powerful vision of peace, such as that originally laid out in 1945 in the Preamble and Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter, humanity will continue to stumble down the terrible path of war, now to be mechanized with smart drones, and also soon to be characterized by an imminent breakdown in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

In five years, or at most 10, Iran will have nuclear weapons. In five years, or at most 10, North Korea will have weapons and delivery vehicles that can land a nuclear bomb in Seattle or Los Angeles, if not Washington, New York, Moscow or London.

Is it not time that we in the United States seek to purify ourselves of the flawed thinking of the Bush and the Obama administrations about the inevitability of war, about the malleability of our most sacred moral values such as the inviolability of the human person, about the central importance of respect for fundamental human rights, of every person–even enemy combatants–and begin to concentrate with all our mental, social and political powers on the question of peace, and how to achieve it?

Is not war, and the pursuit of war, evil, and are not the pursuit of international peace and the fundamental human rights of all persons in all countries goals which embody our highest moral values?

Should we, then, not act on the basis of those values, and turn all of our efforts to developing our visions of peace and our roadmaps on how to get there?

It is perhaps no exaggeration to assert that a positive future for mankind depends on our visions of peace and our efforts to achieve them, far more than it depends on the technological “advances” we might make in developing ever-better machines of war.

Now, let’s think one step further and ask whether peace can be established without international rules that are binding in nature. Is there any realistic vision of peace that does not rest, ultimately, on the development and observance of international law and institutions? That was the vision of the founders of the League of Nations in 1919, and of the founders of the United Nations in 1945.

Is it not time for a renewal of hope, of positive goals, of our own deeply-felt visions of peace, and of our own stalwart and courageous actions to secure that peace?

The Trenchant Observer

Senate confirms John Brennan as CIA Director—with tally and breakdown of vote

Friday, March 8th, 2013

The United States confirmed the nomination of John Brennan to be Director of Central Intelligence on Thursday afternoon, March 7, 2013, by a vote of 63-34, with three Senators not voting.

See the official vote tally, with a break-down by senator, state, and party, here.

(http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1&vote=00032)

Senator Rand Paul’s filibuster on March 6 succeeded in enlisting a large number of Republicans to vote against the Brennan nomination.

The questions Paul raised go far beyond whether a president may kill an American citizen in the United States by a drone strike. A number of questions raised by Paul, and other critics including The Trenchant Observer, remain unanswered.

They are not academic questions. They call out not for more fancy legal analysis, bur rather for actions by Senators, Congressmen, and citizens to stop the Obama administration from violating international law and the Constitution, and to force the administration to publish—for all—their secret legal memoranda, so that citizens can react to uphold the rule of law, and leading scholars, foreign countries, and the judges of international tribunals may answer U.S. claims in their writings, state practice (official reactions by other countries), and judicial decisions.

The Trenchant Observer

UPDATE (MARCH 6) WITH LINKS TO SENATOR RAND PAUL FILIBUSTER; REPRISE: Secret Laws, the John Brennan vote, and the rule of law

Sunday, March 3rd, 2013

SENATOR RAND PAUL FILIBUSTER UPDATE

At 12:39 a.m. EST, Senator Rand Paul concluded a filibuster on the floor of the U.S. Senate that lasted more than 12 hours, conducting a rare “speaking” filibuster of the confirmation vote for John Brennan to be CIA Director. Brennan was approved by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence earlier by a vote of 12-3.

The filibuster was carried live on C-Span II.

See C-SPAN for the archived debate up to the present, here.

Brennan is expected to be confirmed shortly.

But historians will look back at this dark period in which America abandoned the rule of law, and ask, “Who Spoke Up? Who opposed such actions?” Rand Paul will have a privileged place in the history they write. At least one Senator took this set of issues beyond the comfort zone. Others will stand up in voting against the Brennan nomination, some for the reasons set forth by Paul and in the article reproduced below.

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REPRISE: Secret Laws, the John Brennan vote, and the rule of law

We must bear witness to the truth and fight to uphold the rule of law.

Originally published February 24, 2013

Let  us step back for a moment from the details of what John Brennan is saying now in order to get confirmed by the Senate as CIA Director.

The Senate Select Intelligence Committee vote on his confirmation, like the full Senate vote that may follow, poses fundamental moral and political questions for the Senators who will be voting.  Because the Brennan confirmation itself raises key questions regarding the struggle against terrorism and the rule of law, they will in effect be voting for a definition of American democracy as it exists today, in 2013.

Moreover, because the U.S. has been been viewed over the centuries as a beacon of liberty, their votes will have far-reaching impacts throughout the world, where the nature of democracy is also at issue.

Most importantly, perhaps, their votes will engage their own individual moral responsibilty for government actions which they, whether by acquiescence or affirmation, in effect approve of by their votes on the Brennan nomination.

These questions go to the heart of what it means to say America is a democratic nation governed by the rule of law.

In a democracy, can the government rule by secret laws?

In a democracy, can secret decrees or interpretations of legal authority be used to authorize or condone acts of torture, extraordinary renditions, or targeted killings?

What is the difference between secret star chamber proceedings in a dictatorship and secret proceedings in the U.S. Executive Branch by which it is decided that the right to life of a U.S. citizen, or a foreign citizen for that matter, is to be extinguished and that individual is then killed?

What does it say about American democracy today, in 2013, if Executive branch claims of legal authority to act extra-judicially to kill citizens of the U.S. or other countries are tacitly accepted, when the legal justifications for such actions are held in secret from the public and the Congress as a whole?

What does it say about American democracy when the constitutionality and legality of such actions, purportedly authorized by secret legal memoranda, are not subject to judicial review as a result of the Executive’s’ invocation of the “state secrets privilege”, whose broad interpretation by the Bush and Obama administrations the courts have not yet had the courage to strike down?

Can the American Democracy be said to be based on the rule of law, in 2013, under these circumstances?

Mr. Brennan is by all accounts the chief architect under Mr. Obama of the targeted killings programs of the Obama administration. In all likelihood, he is the single person who has done the most to persuade Mr. Obama, a former President of the Harvard Law Reviw and a former adjunct professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Chicago Law School, to go over to “the dark side”.

He did so in part by offering Obama moral justifications based on so-called “just war theory” going back to St. Thomas Aquinas, while ignoring the last century of developments in international law and the historical lessons they embodied.

In addition, Mr. Brennan has a deep association with the torture and extraordinary renditions programs of the Bush administration. He was unable, at his February 7, 2013 confirmation hearing before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, to state clearly that “waterboarding” constitutes torture. Throughout his testimony he referred to acts of torture as “enhanced interrogation technicques” or, in even more Orwellian shorthand, as “EITs”.

Further, if one examines carefully the transcript of the Frebruary 7 confirmation hearing, one finds that he is a master of circumlocution and verbal legerdemain, and of telling political superiors what they want to hear.

Will he be able to enforce U.S. and international legal obligations prohibiting torture within the Central Intelligence Agency?  This appears hardly likely in view of his past, and his unwillingness to admit that even waterboarding is torture.

He has also said that the Bush torture program of enhanced interrogation techniques “saved lives”.  If he believes that to be the case, and the efficacy of torture is the standard to be applied, it is hard to see how he might avoid giving others in the CIA the impression he would give a wink and a nod to any aberrant behavior they felt they had to do.

Nor is Brennan likely to reestablish the human intelligence capabilities of the CIA, with his history of being the chief architect of the “killing lists” and the Obama policy of “targeted killings”–which is merely a euphemism for the words “extrajudicial executions” or “targeted assassinations” whenever they are conducted in  violation of international law (which may be much more often than Obama claims.)

The fact that he is extraordinarily skilled at telling political authorities exactly what they want to hear, and has other Obama officials willing to assert (on background, to be sure) that he is a voice of moral restraint within the White House, or is determined to improve the Agency’s human intelligence capabilities, should not be taken at face value. He is, after all, a spook, a trained expert in deception.  We should look at his history, his actions, and not just what he says today, in reaching any judgment about whether he should be confirmed.

Do we know yet today, for example, what role if any he played in the strange evolution of the Benghazi talking points?  His colleague, acting CIA Director Michael Morrell, could not even get his version of testimony to Congress on the talking points straight in a single day.

Can a democracy kill people on the basis of secret legal memoranda purporting to find legal authority for the Executive for such actions?

Can a democracy conduct extrajudicial killings in other countires without publishing its interpretation of international law that would authorize such killings, without subjecting its legal arguments to evaluation and responses by impartial experts from other countries, other states, and eventually the judges of international tribunals?

Can the Executive in a democracy kill individuals on the basis of secret legal justifications which are are shielded from judicial review and from the public?

That is the question. It is time that Senators take a stand on these issues, and there is no better opportunity or place to take such a stand than on the vote to confirm John Brennan.

By their votes, each Senator will incur individual moral responsibility for the actions he or she condones or rejects, and responsibility before history for the answers each gives  regarding the nature of democracy in America, in 2013.

The Trenchant Observer