See Steven Lee Meyers and David M. Herszenhorn, “U.S.-Russian Diplomacy, With a Personal Touch”,” New York Times, May 17, 2013.

Yet the U.S. decision to join the Russians in organizing a Syrian peace conference, aside from having a snowball’s chance in hell of leading to peace, has undercut efforts that might have resulted in sending arms to the Syrian rebels any time soon.

Once again, the United States has acted to undercut its allies, who (with France and Britain in the lead) among other things were pushing for an end to the European Union arms embargo on Syria. Once again, the U.S. has acted to put off the day of reckoning when Barack Obama might actually have to decide to openly supply arms to the armed opposition in Syria.

See “The emperor has no clothes”: Foreign policy without a moral core—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #19, The Trenchant Observer, March 29, 2012.

Once again, the United States has decided “to act through the Russians” in search of a solution to the crisis in Syria. When this strategy was adopted a year ago, it allowed the U.S. to continue its “pressure” on al-Assad with only words, not military actions, at the cost of tens of thousands of lives in Syria. The acknowledged (minimum) death toll now stands at 80,000.

However, David Kramer, the President of Freedom House and a former high State Department official, has forcefully reminded us of who Putin is, and the fallacious nature of the illusions that might lead us to believe that Russia could be helpful in Syria.

See David J. Kramer, “No help on Syria will come from Russia, Washington Post, May 17, 2013 (10:48 PM EDT).

Once again, we are reminded of Obama’s strong belief in personal relations, his belief in his own personal charm, and how he pursued his “reset” of relations with Russia under the illusion that his “warm” relations with President Dimitri Medvedev would affect events, with disastrous results. In Syria, he simply ignored what was happening on the ground and the actual policies the Russians were pursuing.

A famous journal during the Soviet era, particularly in the glasnost period, was entitled, “Argumenty i Fakty” (Russian: “Аргументы и факты”). Arguments and Facts. President Obama and John Kerry need to attend not only to their own and Moscow’s arguments with respect to Syria, but also–and primarily–to the facts regarding what the Russians are doing on the ground in Syria, and what the United States and its allies should be doing to counter or prevent these actions.

This week we know that Russia has deployed a number of warships to the Syrian port of Tartus, is delivering or is about to deliver land-to-sea missile and radar systems to Syria, and appears to be about to deliver a new advanced air-defense system and missiles to Syria. Russia is financing the Syrian state. Iran is supplying weapons, training and personnel to Syria. Lebanon’s Hezbollah has militia members inside Syria fighting alongside al-Assad’s forces.

See Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, and Gregory L. White, “Russia Raises Stakes in Syria; Assad Ally Bolsters Warships in Region; U.S. Sees Warning,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16, 2013 (updated 11:07 p.m. ET).

At the same time, Kerry and Obama, in addition to derailing French- and British-led efforts to lift the EU arms embargo against Syria and to postponing–indefinitely–any U.S. decision to openly provide arms to the insurgents (despite the crossing of the chemical weapons “red line”), have not responded to Lavrov’s ludicrous argument (not new) that Russia in only fulfilling the terms of old arms contracts, which are prohibited neither by international nor domestic law. Even at this level of detail, neither Kerry nor Obama has rebutted this argument, or even demanded that the texts of such contracts be made public.

Only since Obama took office has the U.S. been deterred from acting by the contractual terms of agreements such as those alleged to exist between Russia and Syria, a state led by one of the great war criminals of this or the last century. In fact, International law has much to say about war crimes and crimes against humanity, and about complicity in the commission of such crimes.

At the end of the day, there should be no confusion over the fact that the decision- maker in Russia is Vladimir Putin, who is not going to be moved by good relations with Obama (actually their relations are abominable), or by warm, friendly relations between Lavrov and Kerry. Lavrov is a very effective diplomat in the service of the Russian state, who takes his orders from Putin. It doesn’t hurt that he has cordial relations with Kerry, and it is good that the U.S. and Russia are talking to each other directly (rather than through a UN mediator like Kofi Annan or Lakhdar Brahimi), but there should be no illusions about whether or not rapport between Kerry and Lavrov will affect Putin’s calculus and behavior.

In this context, it is extremely important to understand who Putin is, and what he has done in the past.

See, e.g.,

André Glucksmann, “The killing continues in Syria” (English translation)—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #81 (August 28), The Trenchant Observer, August 28, 2012.

André Glucksmann, “La tuerie continue en Syrie”—Obama’s debacle in Syria — Update #74 (August 13), The Trenchant Observer, August 13, 2012.

“What future for UNSMIS and for Kofi Annan? Russia pushes for more of the same, with an implied military threat to dissuade all from any other options—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #61 (July 11),” The Trenchant Observer, July 11th, 2012.

Surely the United States can come up with a better policy regarding Syria than “trust the Russians” and “play the Russians’ diplomatic game”.

The Trenchant Observer

The United Nations General Assembly adopted a new resolution on Syria on May 15, 2013, calling on all parties to cease hostilities.

See “Press Release: General Assembly Adopts Text Condemning Violence in Syria, Demanding That All Sides End Hostilities.” U.N. Doc. GA/11372 (May 15, 2013).

The text of the draft Resolution (Resolution A/67/L.63), dated May 8, 2013, was adopted on May 15, 2013 by a vote of 107 in favour to 12 against, with 59 abstentions

The breakdown of the vote or vote tally was as follows:

The draft resolution on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic (document A/67/L.63) was adopted by a recorded vote of 107 in favour to 12 against, with 59 abstentions, as follows:

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu, Yemen.

Against:

Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.

Abstain:

Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Brazil, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Zambia.

Absent:

Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Kiribati, Mauritania, Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan.

–Press Release, above, U.N. Doc. GA/11372, May 15, 2013.

Thus, while Secretary of State John Kerry pursues the Russians’ objective of holding an international peace conference in Geneva, as proposed by Kofi Annan and approved by a meeting there on June 30, 2012, there are other international actors determined to maintain a spotlight on the atrocities that have been committed and that are being committed in Syria.

See Michael Young, “Washington blunders yet again in Syria,” The Daily Star (Beirut). May 16, 2013 (12:57 AM).

The Trenchant Observer

You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you can not fool all of the people all of the time.
–Abraham Lincoln, (attributed)

Commentary and Opinion on Benghazi

Jonah Goldberg (op-ed), “Benghazi’s smoking guns; There’s an arsenal worth, from testimony at congressional hearings to the State Department’s flawed internal review to the four dead Americans,” Los Angles Times, May 14, 2013.

Thomas Sowell, “Lies, darn lies and Benghazi,” The Patriot-News (Penn.), May 16, 2013 (updated May 16, 2013 at 8:16 AM).

Scott Wilson, “Benghazi e-mails released by White House,” Washington Post, May 15, 2013 (at 5:20 pm). The article contains a link to the e-mails that were released.

Peggy Noonan, “The Inconvenient Truth About Benghazi Did the Obama administration’s politically expedient story cost American lives?” The Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2013 (Updated 6:41 p.m. ET).

Brett Stephens, “The Kissinger Question: Does America need a foreign policy? Obama thinks not,” Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2013 (8:35 p.m. ET)

Charles Krauthammer, “Redacted truth, subjunctive outrage,” Washington Post, May 17, 2013.

Analysis

The so-called “Benghazi talking points” are merely the symbol, the tip of the iceberg so to speak, for something much bigger.

     Credibility

We now know that the Obama administration deceived the American people about Benghazi.

We now know how the Obama administration deceived the American people about Benghazi.

We now know that the initial deception, represented by Susan Rice’s talk show appearances on September 16, was followed by other deceptions, by a cover-up of the initial deception. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney told the press, for example, that the White House made only one or two stylistic changes to the talking points, such as using another term instead of the “consulate” in Benghazi (there was no consulate, just a CIA black operation).

But we now know, from the e-mails regarding the Benghazi talking points that have been released, that the White House insisted that the State Department’s concerns be taken into account, that a Principals Deputies Committee meeting was held (under National Security Council procedures) on September 15, hours before the talking points were given to Susan Rice on the eve of her Sunday talk show appearances, that the State Department pushed hard for the elimination of any references to prior warnings about the tenuous situation in Benghazi, or to the involvement of terrorist organizations or al-Qaeda affiliates in the attacks, and that the talking points that emerged from that Deputies meeting adhered to the State Department’s demands.

We now know that the Obama administration employs the massive apparatus of the state to manage the news, subjecting something as straightforward as telling the American people why and how four Americans, including their Ambassador, were killed in Benghazi on September 11-12, 2013, to endless convolutions of negotiated texts which had as their aim to downplay or obfuscate the known facts: the attacks in Benghazi were carried out by terrorist organizations with links to al-Qaeda, including Ansar al-Sharia.

We now know that we cannot take anything Jay Carney or Barack Obama says at face value. We must examine the assertion further.

President Obama’s credibility is in a free fall, whereas that of his press secretary has already hit the earth, shattered. Obama doesn’t understand these facts. Until he does, and takes forceful corrective action, his presidency will be crippled.

And this is only the tip of the iceberg.

     Incompetence

Beneath this tip of the iceberg, the release of the e-mails reveals a shocking level of incompetence in the White House foreign policy team’s management of the Benghazi talking points and crisis. They were concerned about the the prejudicial impact of statements based on the talking points, for example, on judicial proceedings that might result from the FBI’s investigation into who was behind the attack!

Wait a minute!

Since when does the U.S. government ascertain who is behind events in foreign countries through an FBI investigation? Doesn’t the FBI investigate crimes within the U.S., and aren’t the CIA, other intelligence agencies, and the State Department responsible for reporting on the causes of events abroad? To be sure, the FBI may be called in when its special expertise is needed, as in the USS Cole investigation in Yemen in 2000, though in retrospect even that precedent raises serious questions.

But what utter incompetence and confusion can explain the fact that the Obama administration, in response to a terrorist attack on what was essentially a CIA operation iin Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of four Americans including the Ambassador, assigned responsibility for ascertaining who was behind and participated in the attack to…the FBI?

With regard to Benghazi, we seem to have encountered the perfect marriage of supreme incompetence and politically motivated manipulation of the facts presented to the American people.

The situation is much worse than we thought.

Democrats Must Come Forward

This is not ultimately, or at least should not be, a partisan issue.

For the good of the Republic, one can only hope that Democrats will now come forward to force the president to look at and face the facts, as others see them (including impartial observers who have been paying attention to the details), and to quickly take whatever actions may be necessary both to organize his foreign policy team so that competent people are in charge, and to revamp his communications strategy and personnel in order to restore his credibility, starting by shooting straight with the American people.

The country needs a bi-partisan foreign policy. Attention to the details of the questions and the administrations’s responses should be the standard by which both the questioner and the administration are judged, not the party affiliation of the questioner involved.

The Trenchant Observer

1. Obama continues stonewalling on Benghazi. Credibility in free fall.

2. Jay Carney has lost all credibility for truthfullness, and should resign.

3. Obama punts on chemical weapons “red line”, plays Russians’ game in Syria–Again! Just like one year ago. Obama unable to think or act strategically. Iran understands Obama’s threats are just words, not backed by action. Nuclear program proceeds.

4. Obama escalates news management operation with assault on freedom of the press in AP phone records affair, with chilling effect. If you publish a story the Obama team doesn’t want circulating, they will come after you and hurt you. Meanwhile, Holder’s leaks’ investigations go nowhere.

5. Benghazi subjected to terrorists attacks–today! Middle East in revolutionary turmoil, while U.S. strategy is in a shambles, or non-existent.

6. Kerry allows self to be humiliated by Putin, waiting three hours to see the czar. He came to Moscow begging, with a hopelessly weak hand on Syria. What did he expect? At least he might have left for the airport, and arrived in Washington before Russia’s shipment of a new air defense system arrived in Syria.

7. Maduro consolidates Chavista take-over through fraudulent elections in Venezuela. U.S. has forgotten where Venezuela is exactly–just somewhere near Cuba.

8. U.S., unwilling to lead in Syria, fosters divisions among allies in the Persian Gulf

9. Taking a page from Nixon, Obama targets political opponents through IRS.

10. Little hope for coherent US. foreign policy strategy and implementing actions. Kerry’s ineptitude in Moscow shows “the gang who couldn’t shoot straight” will continue to call the shots from the White House.

11. Who does President Obama remind you of more, Winston Churchill or Neville Chamberlain?

Upon reflection, perhaps it’s better not to write about any of these stories, at least not tonight. The disaster is too big. A larger canvas is needed.

The Trenchant Observer

See Mark Mardell (North American Editor), “After Benghazi revelations, heads will roll,” BBC News, May 10, 2013.

In order to understand the signficance of the Benghazi affair, it is important to recall how it has unfolded. For a detailed analysis of this saga, in roughly chronological order, see the following articles previously published by the Trenchant Observer:

New York Times makes ad hominem attack against Senator Lindsey Graham (R–South Carolina), February 13, 2013 ”

Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and the foreign policy “successes” of our celebrity leaders, February 2, 2013

Hillary Clinton and “The Benghazi Triangle”—where careers and reputations vanish without a trace, December 17, 2012

Lies, Spies and Politics: The Incredible Evolution of the Benghazi “Talking Points” Narrative–Part II, November 27, 2012

Lies, Spies and Politics: The Incredible Evolution of the Benghazi “Talking Points” Narrative–Part I, November 22, 2012

Possible motives for forcing Petraeus resignation, November 19, 2012

Deliberate ambiguity: Talking points, and what Susan Rice said on September 16 talk shows, November 16, 2012

Petraeus, Allen, Benghazi potpourri, November 16, 2012

Benghazi machinations continue: CIA announces investigation of Petraeus on eve of his testimony to Congress, November 16, 2012

Chain-of-command failure? Benghazi and the ghost of “Black Hawk Down”; Obama’s credibility (Updated November 15), November 14, 2012

All Eyes on Benghazi: The Petraeus Affair, Allen’s e-mails, and other distractions, November 13, 2012

Collateral damage: Holly Petraeus, and other victims of the Petraeus affaire (II), November 11, 2012

Collateral damage: Holly Petraeus, and other victims of the Petraeus affair, November 11, 2012

On eve of testimony to Congress on Benghazi, CIA Director David Petraeus forced out over an affair, November 9th, 2012

Benghazi update: New questions raised on intelligence, decision-making failures (Updated November 6, 2012), November 5, 2012

New details on Benghazi attack on consulate, American response, October 13, 2012

No time for cowboys: U.S. preparation for reprisals against Libyan targets, October 3, 2012

U.S. Ambassador to Libya murdered during assault on American consulate in Benghazi, September 12, 2012

The Ultimate Questions

At the end of the day, the most important questions that remain unanswered are the following:

1. What did the President know, and when did he know it?

2. What was the involvement of the President in the decision making on the night of September 11-12?

3. What orders did the President issue to the military and other agencies (such as the CIA) on the night of September 11-12, 2012?

4. What recommendations for military action did the President receive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and what was his response to these recommendations?

The Trenchant Observer

“(T)he arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”

“Before the crown we wear, there is the cross that we must bear. Let us bear it–bear it for truth, bear it for justice, and bear it for peace. Let us go out this morning with that determination. And I have not lost faith. I’m not in despair, because I know that there is a moral order. I haven’t lost faith, because the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”

–Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Why I am opposed to the war in Vietnam,” Sermon at Ebenezer Baptist Church on April 30, 1967.

The Case of Nibia Zabalsagaray (Sabalsagaray)
Uruguayan General Miguel Dalmao has been found guilty of the murder of Nibia Sabalsagaray in 1974.

See Associated Press (Buenos Aires, “Uruguayan general found guilty of junta’s 1974 murder of communist; General Miguel Dalmao convicted of murder of professor and activist Nibia Sabalsagaray during Uruguay’s military dictatorship,” The Guardian, May 9, 2013. (16.36 EDT)

See also:

“Uruguay Supreme Court annuls amnesty law, as accountability continues in Latin America, intlawgrrls.com-voices on international law, policy, practice, November 3, 2010 (with picture of Nibia Sabalsagaray).

I remember Nibia Sabalsagaray, or rather her case at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)–or the Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH), as it is known in Spanish. The IACHR is the human rights organ of the Organization of American States, established pursuant to both the OAS Charter and the American Convention on Human Rights (in force since 1978).

Although much litigation has ensued, including decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and several decisions by the Uruguayan Supreme Court on what amounted to an amnesty law, the original decision of the IACHR, issued four years after the facts, is worth recalling in detail.

The 1978 Decision on Case 1870 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

The Text of the Commission’s decision in Case No. 1870 (Nibia Zabalsagaray) follows:

Case 1870

Uruguay

WHEREAS:

In a communication dated August 22, 1974, the following was denounced:

A young woman, a 20-year-old student and professor, NIBIA ZABALZAGARAY, (was) killed as a result of tortures inflicted at the Police Station at Señaleros, located in the El Peñarol neighborhood of Montevideo.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in a note dated October 8, 1974, transmitted the pertinent parts of the denunciation to the Government of Uruguay and requested that it provide the appropriate information;

The Government, in a note date May 23, 1975, requested a ninety-day extension in order to provide the information requested;

The Commission, in a note dated June 12, 1975, granted a thirty-day extension to the Government, which elapsed on July 12, 1975;

The Government of Uruguay, in a note dated July 12, 1975, reported the following to the Commission:

I – The death of Miss Nibia Zabalzagaray

The individual in question was detained on July 29, 1974 and within 24 hours of her detention she committed suicide in her cell.

The competent judicial organ intervened, ordering an opinion from the forensic physician. His reports states: ‘asphyxiation by suspension’ (hanging) as the cause of death.

The intervening Judge, in the absence of proof of any illegality, closed the proceedings on August 2, 1974.

The claimant, in a communication dated July 8, 1975, provided additional information to the Commission, the pertinent parts of which appear below:

NIBIA ZABALZAGARAY – professor of literature, single, 24 years of age.

The individual was detained, tortured and killed, all within a period of 10 hours, on Saturday, June 29, 1974.

At 1:30 a.m., three men dressed in military uniforms and two civilians appeared at her room at the Campomar Home for Workers’ Children in Montevideo (she was a native of the Department of Colonia). They interrogated her as to her political convictions and left with her at 3:00 a.m. and refused to reveal their identity and the place to which they were taking her.

Ten hours later, those in charge of the residence received a phone call informing them that Nibia Zabalzagaray had died and that they should inform some member of the family so that the latter might claim her body at the Military Hospital. Her uncles appeared there and were informed that Nibia was dead on arrival at the Hospital, and that her personal effects and her clothing (she was nude) should be claimed at the barracks of the Engineers Battalion No 5 and Transmissions Service (Camino Casavalle, Montevideo).

The death certificate, issued by Dr José Alejandro Mautone, attributed the death to suicide by hanging.

The relatives were denied the necessary authorization to conduct another autopsy. The corpse, however, underwent an external examination by experts, the results of which contradicted the official ruling.

The true cause of her death is asphyxiation through application of the torture known as the “dry submarine” (application of a plastic bag on the head, thereby preventing breathing) or cardiac arrest under torture.

No judicial action was taken as a result of the death of Nibia Zabalzagaray. No official received any military disciplinary punishment.

The Commission, in a note date October 24, 1975, forwarded to the Government of Uruguay the pertinent parts of the additional information provided by the claimant, and requested that the Government provide the following information:

b) A copy of the legal record and actions taken during the proceedings that were closed by the intervening judge on August 2, 1974, ‘in the absence of proof of any illegality,’ as stated in the corresponding part of the note from Your Excellency’s Government of July 12 of this year.

c) A copy of the autopsy on the corpse of Miss Nibia Zabalzagaray.

The Government of Uruguay, in a note dated May 18, 1976, refused to provide the information specified in the foregoing paragraph;

To date, the Government of Uruguay has still not provided the Commission either a copy of the actions taken during the proceedings or a copy of the autopsy on the corpse of Miss Nibia Zabalzagaray; and

From the information provided by the Government itself, it is concluded that no other proceeding or internal remedy is pending decision,

THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, RESOLVES:

1. To declare that all available information leads to the presumption that the cause of death of Miss Nibia Zabalzagaray, who was arrested by authorities and died ten hours after her arrest while in the custody of authorities, was a consequence of acts of violence she experienced during her detention.

2. To point out to the Government of Uruguay that the events denounced constitute a serious violation of the right to life (Article I of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man).

3. To recommend to the Government: a) that it order a thorough and impartial investigation to determine the true cause of the death denounced and, in accordance with Uruguayan laws, punish the individual or individuals responsible, should it be proven that a murder has been committed; b) that it advise the Commission of the measures taken to implement the recommendations contained in the above section within a period of no more than thirty days.

4. To forward this resolution to the Government of Uruguay and to claimants.

5. To include this resolution in its Annual Report to the General Assembly of the Organization (Article 9 (bis), c, iii of the Statute) if the Government has not advised the Commission of the measures it has taken to conduct the investigation recommended under operative paragraph 3 within a thirty-day period.

Adopted at meeting Nº 559th, January 30, 1978 (45th Session) and forwarded to the Government of Uruguay on February 21, 1978.

–Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Decision on Case 1870, January 20, 1978
–The Spanish text is found here.

While President Jimmy Carter signed the Ameican Conventionon Human Rights in 1978, it has never been ratified by the United States.

Syria and the Long Arc of Justice

40 years is a long time to wait for justice, but at least it gives Bashar al-Assad and the leaders of Syria something to look forward to in their old age. Moreover, as the indictments and trials of Slobodan Milosovich, Radovan Karadzich, and Ratko Mladich suggest, things are changing. Al-Assad and his henchmen may not have to wait so long.

The Trenchant Observer

Introduction to the REPRISE (May 7, 2013)

So, Obama’s “red line” on the use of chemical weapons in Syria turns out to be a red line that leads directly to the Kremlin.

What American diplomacy has failed to achieve, spectacularly, Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry now think they can achieve by talking to Putin and Lavrov.

Well, maybe. But hardly likely. Lavrov and Putin now achieve their goal of holding the conference Kofi Annan conjured up as one of his last “castles in the sky” at the conference held at Geneva on June 30, 2012.

How this will stop the killing in Syria is anyone’s guess.

It is just words, words to get Obama off the hook for his “red line” comment, which have come back to haunt him now that al-Assad has used chemical weapons in Syria.

Now that Obama is once again seeking a solution by going to the Russians, who have steadfastly supported al-Assad in his commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, we can all breathe a sigh of relief. See the following Reprise from the Trenchant Observer to understand just how pitiful this last move by Obama and “the gang who couldn’t shoot straight” is.

Sadly, our hopes in John Kerry seem to have been misplaced.  He appears now to have joined “the gang who couldn’t shoot straight”.  His role will be to do Obama’s bidding.  Obama will continue to control foreign policy from the White House, guided by assistants such as Ben Rhodes.

If this course is not corrected, the disasters of Obama’s first term are likely to be repeated, on a much grander scale with much graver consequences.

REPRISE: “Looney Toons” at the White House: New York  Times article details Obama’s thinking on Syria—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #45 (May 27)

Originally published May 27, 2012

looney-tunes
adj.
[after Looney Tunes, trademark for a series of animated cartoons] [Slang] crazy; demented: also loon’ y-tunes

***
loony
[Slang]
adj.
loon’i-er, looní-est [LUNATIC] crazy; demented
n.,
pl. loon’-ies a loony person Also loon” ey, pl. -eys

***
–Webster’s New Worl Dictionary

**************************************************

In a front-page article in today’s New York Times, Helen Cooper and Mark Landler describe the thinking behind President Obama’s policy towards Syria. They report,

WASHINGTON — In a new effort to halt more than a year of bloodshed in Syria, President Obama will push for the departure of President Bashar al-Assad under a proposal modeled on the transition in another strife-torn Arab country, Yemen.

The plan calls for a negotiated political settlement that would satisfy Syrian opposition groups but that could leave remnants of Mr. Assad’s government in place. Its goal is the kind of transition under way in Yemen, where after months of violent unrest, President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to step down and hand control to his vice president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, in a deal arranged by Yemen’s Arab neighbors. Mr. Hadi, though later elected in an uncontested vote, is viewed as a transitional leader.

The success of the plan hinges on Russia, one of Mr. Assad’s staunchest allies, which has strongly opposed his removal.

–Helen Cooper and Mark Landler, “U.S. Hopes Assad Can Be Eased Out With Russia’s Aid,” New York Times, May 27, 2012.

President Obama, administration officials said,

will press the proposal with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia next month at their first meeting since Mr. Putin returned to his old post on May 7. Thomas E. Donilon, Mr. Obama’s national security adviser, raised the plan with Mr. Putin in Moscow three weeks ago.

Donilon, who is not a seasoned diplomat, apparently did not impress Putin, judging by the latter’s cancellation of his participation in the G-8 summit at Camp David on May 18-19.

The biggest problem with the Yemen model, several experts said, is that Yemen and Syria are starkly different countries. In Yemen, Mr. Saleh kept his grip on power for three decades by reconciling competing interests through a complex system of patronage. When his authority collapsed, there was a vice president, Mr. Hadi, who was able to assert enough control over Yemen’s splintered security forces to make him a credible transitional leader.

In Syria, by contrast, Mr. Assad oversees a security state in which his minority Alawite sect fears that if his family is ousted, it will face annihilation at the hands of the Sunni majority. That has kept the government remarkably cohesive, cut down on military defections and left Mr. Assad in a less vulnerable position than Mr. Saleh. Even if he leaves, American officials conceded, there is no obvious candidate to replace him.

The sheer incompetence of this White House on foreign policy matters is stunning.

Paradoxically, among a number of news commentators within the Washington bubble, Obama is viewed as doing pretty well on foreign policy, particularly since taking out Osama Bin Laden. None of these commentators are foreign policy experts with any experience, however. Further, Democratic foreign policy experts have largely held their silence, probably out of concern that criticism could help the Republicans in the November elections. Moreover, Obama has since his first days in office charmed the press, and many reporters and commentators are simply unwilling to criticize the administration on foreign policy issues in any fundamental way.

Significantly, the Washington Post, which is the one newspaper read by most government officials in Washington, has simply failed to cover Syria with a reporter, usually being content to just run the AP wire story. What contributions they do make are limited in the main to stories providing information by administration officials, named and unnamed.

The Editorial Board, on the other hand, has written some clear-minded editorials on Syria. The disconnect betwee the Editorial Board and the reporting side of the newspaper is hard to understand, especially in view of the Post’s illustrious history.

Despite the reputed “successfulness” of the administration’s foreign policy leadership–which analytically does not stretch beyond the fact that it has not become an issue which hurts the Obama in the presidential race, the utter lack of serousness of Preident Obama and the White House on Syria is exposed for all to see in today’s New York Times article by Cooper and Landler.

Washington’s response to Moscow’s callous support of al-Assad as he killed thousands of people through war crimes and crimes against humanity is on a par with Éduoard Daladier’s and Neville Chamberlain’s betrayal of Czechoslovakia in October, 1938, when they signed “the Munich Pact”.

One of the first betrayals on Syria was with Turkey:

Secretary Clinton caught her Turkish counterpart off guard during their meeting in Washington last month. Clinton reportedly told Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu that the Obama Administration “preferred going through the Russians” in an attempt to achieve a political solution being shopped by the UN/Arab League’s Special Syrian Envoy Kofi Annan.
–Amb. Marc Ginsberg, “Syria Is Obama’s Srebrenica,” Huffington Post (The Blog), March 28, 2012 .

On the U.S. decision to sell out its regional allies and to work through Russia instead, see

The Trenchant Observer, “The emperor has no clothes”: Foreign policy without a moral core—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #19 (March 29), March 29, 2012.

The Trenchant Observer, “Into the Abyss: Washington’s Fecklessness, Syria’s Fate—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #20 (March 30), March 30, 2012.

The reader is invited to read the Observer’s recent articles on Syria, and to draw his or her own conclusions as to whether Obama, Donilon, Clinton and the rest of the administration’s foreign policy team are conducting a competent foreign policy, first of all in Syria, but also everywhere else.

In the Observer’s opinion, this team is “the gang who couldn’t shoot straight”. For example, the Sixth Summit of the Americas, held in Cartagena, Colombia on April 14-15, was totally overshadowed by the prostitution scandal involving members of the Secret Serivce and the U.S. military. Little press attention was given to the substance of the meeting, the most important of the year with the leaders of the Latin American countries.

See Brian Ellsworth (Cartagena, Colombia), “Despite Obama charm, Americas summit boosts U.S. isolation,” April 16, 1012.

Now, on the Syrian question, by following a path of “working through the Russians”, the Obama administration has given up its last shred of moral legitimacy in the Middle East. Between al-Assad, Russia, China, and Iran, on the one hand, and the people of Syria, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, on the other, and in the face of immense human suffering and the ongoing commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the al-Assad regime, the United States is pursuing a strategy of “working through the Russians.”

Obama is incompetent as a foreign policy leader. Former Ambassador Marc Ginsberg is to be congratulated for his moral courage in speaking out on the question of Syria, in a clear voice.

What the United States needs, desperately, is for other foreign policy experts–and national leaders–to speak out with equal clarity, be they aligned with the Democratic Party in the United States, with the Republicans, or from other countries that are friends of the United States.

In the meantime, the international community would do well to look elsewhere than to the United States for leadership on the Syrian question.

See The Trenchant Observer, “At least 70 killed nationwide; massacre of 50 in Houla; U.N. International Commission on Syria Update—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update # 43 (May 25),” May 25, 2012.

The Trenchant Observer, “Chief of UN Observers confirms massacre at Houla; NGOs report 35 children and total of 110 killed—Obama’s Debacle in Syria — Update #44 (May 26),” May 26, 2012.

The Trenchant Observer

The United Nations Security Council adopted on April 25 Resolution 2100 establishing a U.N. peackeeping force in Mali, effective July 1, 2013. The Security Council’s Press Release (SC/10987) summariezes the resolution and the statements of the delegates, and also contains the text of the resolution. The Press release, except for the resolution (reproduced in full beow), follows:

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

Security Council
6952nd Meeting (AM)

Security Council Establishes Peacekeeping Force for Mali Effective 1 July, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2100 (2013)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Will Have Up to 11,200 Troops, 1,440 Police, Take over for African-Led Mission (AFISMA)

The Security Council today unanimously approved the creation of a 12,600 member peacekeeping force in the West African nation of Mali, strongly condemning the January offensive by armed groups towards the south and stressing that terrorism could only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach to isolate the terrorist threat.

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by 1 July 2013, and thereby transfer the functions of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) — set up by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in September — to the new entity. The Secretary-General was requested to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into its activities and to appoint a Special Representative for Mali and Head of Mission to assume overall authority for the coordination of United Nations activities.

By the terms of resolution 2100 (2013), MINUSMA would comprise up to 11,200 military personnel, including reserve battalions able to deploy rapidly within the country, as required, and 1,440 police personnel. The Council called on Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment.

In terms of mandate, the Council authorized MINUSMA to use all necessary means, in support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize key population centres, especially in the north, deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas. It would support Mali’s transitional authorities to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country, and support both national and international efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector.

By other terms, French troops were authorized to use all necessary means to intervene in support of MINUSMA when under “imminent and serious threat” and upon the request of the Secretary-General, with the Council deciding to review that role within six months of its commencement.

The seven-part mandate also included responsibilities to support the implementation of Mali’s transitional road map — adopted in January to restore democracy and stability — as well as for the protection of civilians and United Nations personnel, and promotion and protection of human rights. In the area of national and international justice, MINUSMA would support the efforts of the transitional authorities to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, taking into account their referral of the situation in Mali since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court.

Demanding that all rebel armed groups set aside their arms and cease hostilities immediately, the Council urged all such parties who had cut all ties with terrorist groups — such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Ansar Eddine — and who recognized, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, to engage “expeditiously” in an inclusive negotiation process, facilitated by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Mali once appointed.

Further by the text, the Council urged transitional authorities to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections “as soon as technically possible”, welcoming the commitment to organize presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative polls on 21 July 2013.

After adoption, the representative of the Russian Federation said he had voted in favour of the text, mindful of stepping up assistance to overcome a complex crisis in Mali. The main responsibility for resolving existing problems lay with Malians. The Mission’s tasks must aim exclusively at providing assistance. Following the Council’s approval of the intervention brigade for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), today’s decision was “of alarm”, as what had once been considered an exception, was now a standing practice — one with unpredictable consequences for the safety of United Nations personnel and the Mission’s legal status.

He went on to say that the Secretary-General’s report underscored the need for a clear division between peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement activities, and that MINUSMA did not provide for offensive operations. In the resolution’s preamble, the unacceptability of such actions was reaffirmed. Blue helmets should not be used to arrest those accused of having carried out war crimes. It was clear that a military solution did not exist and that the Mission must be backed by tangible political processes.

Tiéman Hubert Coulibaly, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Mali, said today’s adoption was an important step in efforts to stem activities of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Mujahideen and other groups, as well as ensure peace and stability throughout the territory. The resolution would transfer functions from the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the new United Nations Stabilization Mission.

For its part, Mali was fully prepared to welcome the Mission, which could stabilize main urban centres in the north, restore State authority, protect civilians, and promote and protect human rights and humanitarian assistance. Thanks to AFISMA, the Malian security forces and others, progress had been made in taking back main cities in the north and centre of the country. Small cells of armed rebels continued to threaten Mali’s stability and territorial integrity, as well as stability in the region. He welcomed the international commitment to deter the return of armed groups. Those groups must lay down their arms, cease hostilities, and recognize Mali’s territorial integrity.

He went on to stress that there could be no sustainable development without peace and stability, appealing for better coordination of the international response to Mali’s short-, medium- and long-term needs, especially in the areas of security, governance and humanitarian action. He hoped that the International Conference of Donors, on 15 May, would help achieve results, urging international and regional organizations to join the “wave of solidarity”.

For its part, the transitional Government was implementing the road map by taking steps for the holding of fair, free, transparent elections and the start of an inter-Malian dialogue, he said, which included the creation of a Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission comprised of 30 commissioners representing the country’s diversity. He reiterated the pledge to cooperate with the Council and play its role in the implementation of the resolution, thanking France, in particular, for helping Mali end the terrorist offensive, as well as ECOWAS, the European Union, the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and all bilateral and multilateral partners, and neighbouring countries for their help in dealing with the crisis.

Tété António, Permanent Observer for the African Union, spoke on behalf of Pierre Buyoya, African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel Region, recalling that the African Union and ECOWAS had been focused on the crisis in Mali from the start. Efforts now would focus on assisting Malian authorities in restoring its national unity, territorial integrity and constitutional order in a peaceful climate marked by national reconciliation.

To do that, the two organizations had outlined a strategy, he said, comprised of a political process and, if necessary, military action. The dialogue process was based on the belief that every possible peaceful way must be used before resorting to military action. It was incumbent on the African Union to take steps for possible military intervention. The attack on Konna in January provided a reason to support such an approach, as it undermined dialogue efforts ongoing with some armed groups. As such, it was normal to back an initiative for transforming AFISMA into a United Nations mission. He was pleased that some of his concerns regarding the draft version had been taken into account in the final version.

Against that backdrop, he urged that the central political roles of the African Union and ECOWAS be recognized in their cooperation with the United Nations Mission. They would keep a strong presence in Bamako. In addition, he hoped that consultations — which had been a hallmark of all joint actions taken thus far — would continue, inter alia, in taking major decisions, the selection of military and civilian leaders, and in the coordination between MINUSMA, French forces and the Malian army through the appointment of liaison officers. The transformation of AFISMA was an example of the partnership between the African Union and the United Nations, which he hoped would lead to a lasting solution to the crisis Mali.

The meeting began at 10:13 a.m. and adjourned at 10:33 a.m.

Full Text of Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2100 (2013) reads as follows:

25 United Nations S/RES/2100 (2013)
Security Council Distr.: General
25 April 2013
12-24771 (E)
*1224771*
Resolution 2100 (2013)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6952nd meeting, on
25 April 2013

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2056 (2012), 2071 (2012) and 2085 (2012), its
Presidential Statements of 26 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/7) and 4 April 2012
(S/PRST/2012/9) as well as its Press Statements of 22 March 2012, 9 April 2012,
18 June 2012, 10 August 2012, 21 September 2012, 11 December 2012 and 10 January 2013 on Mali,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial
integrity of Mali,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the
parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Condemning strongly the offensive launched on 10 January 2013 by terrorist,
extremist and armed groups towards the south of Mali and stressing that terrorism
can only be defeated by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the
active participation and collaboration of all States, and regional and international
organizations to impede, impair, and isolate the terrorist threat, and reaffirming that terrorism could not and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilization,

Welcoming the swift action by the French forces, at the request of the
transitional authorities of Mali, to stop the offensive of terrorist, extremist and
armed groups towards the south of Mali and commending the efforts to restore the
territorial integrity of Mali by the Malian Defence and Security Forces, with the
support of French forces and the troops of the African-led International Support
Mission in Mali (AFISMA),

Stressing the need to work expeditiously toward the restoration of democratic governance and constitutional order, including through the holding of free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections and emphasizing the importance for the transitional authorities of Mali to move swiftly in a process of inclusive dialogue and active engagement with Malian political groups, including those who have previously advocated independence, are prepared to cease hostilities, have cut off all ties with terrorist organizations and who recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and
humanitarian crisis in the Sahel region and over the insecurity which hinders
humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of armed groups, terrorist and
criminal networks, and their activities, the presence of landmines as well as the
continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens
the peace, security, and stability of States in this region,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure
the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety of civilians receiving
assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Mali and
stressing the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of
need,

Condemning strongly all abuses and violations of human rights and violations
of international humanitarian law, including those involving extrajudicial
executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, and sexual and gender-based violence,
forced amputations, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children,
attacks against schools and hospitals, forced displacements, and destruction of
cultural and historical heritage, committed in Mali by any group or individuals,
noting, especially, widespread abuses of human rights by terrorist, extremist and
armed groups in the north of Mali, condemning strongly the reports of retaliatory
attacks, including those based on ethnicity and those allegedly perpetrated by
members of the Malian Defence and Security Forces against civilians, and calling
upon all parties to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with
their obligations under applicable international law,
Reiterating, in this regard, that all perpetrators of such acts must be held
accountable and that some of such acts referred to in the paragraph above may
amount to crimes under the Rome Statute and taking note that the transitional
authorities of Mali referred the situation in Mali since January 2012 to the
International Criminal Court on 13 July 2012 and that the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court opened, on 16 January 2013, an investigation into
alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012,

Taking note of the listing of Ansar Eddine and its leader Iyad Ag Ghali,
recalling the listing of Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and
the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), on the Al-Qaida
sanctions list established by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and
1989 (2011) and reiterating its readiness, under the above-mentioned regime, to
sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who do not cut off all ties to Al-Qaida and associated groups, including AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar
Eddine, in accordance with the established listing criteria,

Expressing its continued concern over the serious threats posed by
transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, and its increasing links, in some
cases, with terrorism, and strongly condemning the incidents of kidnapping and
hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, noting
the increase in such kidnappings in the Sahel region, and underscoring the urgent
need to address these issues,

Expressing its determination to combat kidnapping and hostage-taking in the
Sahel region, in accordance with applicable international law and, in this regard,
noting the publication of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) “Algiers
Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of
Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists”,

Commending the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU), as well as the Secretary-
General, for their intensive efforts to solve the crisis in Mali, welcoming the
establishment by the AU, ECOWAS, the EU and the United Nations of a Joint Task
Force for Mali in Addis Ababa, encouraging them to maintain coordination in
support of the stabilization of the situation in Mali, including the national political dialogue and electoral process, noting that the requirement to report as requested in paragraph 10 of resolution 2085 (2012) was not fulfilled and looking forward to the submission of those reports,

Commending the efforts of African countries to contribute forces to AFISMA,
as authorized by resolution 2085 (2012), welcoming the deployment of AFISMA in
Mali and also commending Member States and regional and international
organizations that support this deployment in Mali,

Commending the contributions pledged at the Donors conference organized by
the AU in Addis Ababa on 29 January 2013 in support of AFISMA and the Malian
Defence and Security Forces, welcoming actual contributions already made and the
AU pledge to contribute through the AU’s assessed contributions, urging all donors
to translate their pledges into actual contributions and calling upon other Member
States and regional and international organizations to also contribute generously,

Encouraging international coordination to consolidate political and security
progress in Mali, and in this regard, regular meetings of the Support and Follow-Up
Group on the Situation in Mali, established by the AU Peace and Security Council
on 20 March 2012, and co-chaired by the AU, ECOWAS, EU and the United
Nations and attended by other international partners, and welcoming the conclusions
of the 5 February 2013 and 19 April 2013 meetings of the Follow-Up Group,

Taking note of the letter, dated 25 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-
General by the transitional authorities of Mali, which requests the deployment of a
United Nations operation to stabilize and restore the authority and the sovereignty
of the Malian State throughout its national territory,

Taking note of the letter, dated 26 March 2013, addressed to the Secretary-
General by the President of the ECOWAS Commission requesting the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization mission and taking
note of the communiqué, dated 7 March 2013, of the AU Peace and Security
Council, as well as the attached letter dated 7 March 2013 and addressed to the
Secretary-General by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, expressing AU
support for the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization
operation in Mali,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/189), dated
26 March 2013, on the situation in Mali, including recommendations and options for
establishing a United Nations stabilization operation in Mali, Emphasizing that the transitional authorities of Mali have primary responsibility for resolving the interlinked challenges facing their country and protecting all their citizens and that any sustainable solution to the crisis in Mali should be Malian-owned, including a political process, also emphasizing that the cooperation among the countries of the region will be crucial for lasting peace and stability in Mali,

Encouraging the international community to provide broad support to resolve
the crisis in Mali through coordinated actions for immediate and long-term needs,
encompassing security, governance, development and humanitarian issues, looking
forward to the high-level international donors’ conference in Brussels on 15 May
2013 to support the development of Mali, commending the contributions already
made toward the 2013 Consolidated Appeal for Mali and urging all Member States
and other donors to contribute generously for humanitarian operations,

Determining that the situation in Mali constitutes a threat to international
peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Commends the initial measures taken so far to restore constitutional order
and national unity in Mali, including the adoption by the Malian National Assembly,
on 29 January 2013, of a transitional road map, welcomes the establishment of the
Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission on 6 March 2013 and the appointment of
its Commissioners and calls on the Commission to commence its work as soon as
possible, and further calls on the transitional authorities of Mali to continue
urgently to take discernible steps towards consolidating stability, enhancing a
culture of democratic governance, and facilitating inclusive political dialogue to
bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohesion, which
should lead to political progress in this regard as early as possible;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, in close coordination with the AU and
ECOWAS, to support all dimensions of the transitional road map, with a view to its
swift implementation, including the work of the Dialogue and Reconciliation
Commission;

3. Urges the transitional authorities of Mali to hold free, fair, transparent
and inclusive presidential and legislative elections as soon as technically possible,
welcomes the stated commitment of the transitional authorities of Mali to organize
presidential elections on 7 July 2013 and legislative elections on 21 July 2013,
stresses the importance of ensuring an environment conducive to the holding of
elections, in particular a secure environment prior to, during and following the
electoral period, equitable access to State-controlled media and provision for all
eligible persons, including internally displaced persons and refugees, to participate
in the electoral process and calls upon Member States, regional and international
organizations, as requested by the transitional authorities of Mali, to provide support to the electoral process, including through financial resources, electoral observation capacity and related technical assistance;

4. Demands that all rebel armed groups in Mali put aside their arms and cease hostilities immediately and urges all such parties in Mali who have cut off all
ties with terrorist organizations such as AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and associated terrorist groups and who recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, and the transitional authorities of Mali to engage expeditiously in an inclusive negotiation process, facilitated by the Secretary-General, in particular through his Special Representative for Mali when
appointed as referred to in paragraph 11 below, in close collaboration with the AU,
ECOWAS and the EU Special Representative for the Sahel;

5. Calls upon the international community, through the Support and Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali, to meet regularly in Mali and, as may be required, outside Mali, to assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement the transitional road map and monitor the progress made in this regard and to continue contributing to the promotion of lasting peace, stability, and reconciliation in Mali, requests the Secretary-General to facilitate the convening of the Support and Follow-Up Group on the Situation in Mali and stresses the importance of continued coordination between the United Nations, the AU and ECOWAS in the promotion of lasting peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Mali;

6. Demands that no member of the Malian Defence and Security Forces shall undermine and obstruct the implementation of the transitional road map or the efforts of the international community to foster political and security progress in Mali, stresses the importance of Malian civilian control and oversight of the Malian Defence and Security Forces and expresses its readiness to consider appropriate measures, as necessary, against those who take action that undermines the peace, stability, and security, including those who prevent the implementation of constitutional order;

7. Decides to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), requests the Secretary-General to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into MIN USMA, with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the discharge of UNOM’s mandated tasks, as of the date of adoption of this resolution, further decides that the authority be transferred from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013 at which point MINUSMA shall commence the implementation of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 below, for an initial period of 12 months and requests the Secretary-General to include in MINUSMA, in close coordination with the AU and ECOWAS, AFISMA military and police personnel appropriate to United Nations standards;

8. Decides that the date referred to in paragraph 7 above and MINUSMA’s
phased deployment shall be subject to a further review by the Council within
60 days of the adoption of this resolution of the security situation in MINUSMA’s
area of responsibility, specifically with respect to the cessation of major combat
operations by international military forces in the immediate vicinity of and/or within MINUSMA’s envisaged area of responsibility and a significant reduction in the
capacity of terrorist forces to pose a major threat to the civilian population and
international personnel in the immediate vicinity of and/or within MINUSMA’s
envisaged area of responsibility, further decides, should the Council consider that
these criteria are not met before 1 July 2013, it shall concurrently adjust the timeline for MINUSMA’s deployment against these criteria;

9. Calls for tangible achievements in the political process in Mali, which
are of critical significance for the successful deployment and activities of
MINUSMA;

10. Reiterates that Member States and regional and international
organizations are urged to continue to provide coordinated support to AFISMA
pursuant to its resolution 2085 (2012), until the transfer of authority from AFISMA
to MINUSMA, including military training, provision of equipment, intelligence and
logistical support, requests the Secretary-General to accelerate the disbursement of
the United Nations Trust Fund established pursuant to its resolution 2085 (2012) to
support AFISMA, and decides that equipment donated or granted to AFISMA, or
where the ownership remains with the donor, shall not be considered contingentowned
equipment;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint expeditiously a Special
Representative for Mali and Head of Mission of MINUSMA, who shall, from the
date of appointment, assume overall authority on the ground for the coordination of
all the activities of the United Nations, and its agencies, funds and programmes, in
Mali and shall use good offices and coordinate efforts of the international
community in order to support the priority elements as defined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3
and 4 above and who shall, from the transfer of authority from AFISMA to
MINUSMA, lead all tasks of the mandate of MINUSMA as defined in paragraph 16
below, and coordinate the overall support of the international community in Mali,
including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and
Security Sector Reform (SSR), further emphasizes that the Special Representative
shall ensure optimal coordination between MINUSMA and the United Nations
Country Team in Mali, in connection with the aspects of their respective mandates;

12. Decides that MINUSMA will comprise up to 11,200 military personnel,
including reserve battalions capable of deploying rapidly within the country as and
when required, and 1,440 police personnel, calls upon Member States to provide
troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment in order to enhance the
capacity of MINUSMA to operate, and discharge its responsibilities, effectively and
requests the Secretary-General to recruit qualified staff, who have the professional
experience and skills appropriate to the tasks defined under applicable competency
areas in paragraphs 16 and 17 below;

13. Welcomes the commitment of the Secretary-General, as outlined in
paragraph 81 of his report (S/2013/189), to take all possible steps, including through the full use of existing authorities and at his discretion, to accelerate the deployment of civilian and military capabilities in Mali, in order to best respond to the Council’s expectations and the needs of the Malian people and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 12 above, to have MINUSMA ready to commence its activities;

14. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps in order to
ensure inter-mission cooperation, notably between MINUSMA and UNMIL and
UNOCI, appropriate transfers of troops and their assets from other United Nations
missions to MINUSMA, subject to the following conditions: (i) the Council’s
information and approval, including on the scope and duration of the transfer,
(ii) the agreement of the troop-contributing countries and (iii) the security situation where these United Nations missions are deployed and without prejudice to the performance of their mandates;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the other United Nations
missions in the region, notably UNMIL and UNOCI, share logistic and
administrative support with MINUSMA, to the extent possible, without prejudicing
their operational capacities with respect to their mandates, in order to maximize the
effectiveness and efficiency of the missions in the West African region, and to report thereon for consideration as appropriate;

16. Decides that the mandate of MINUSMA shall be the following:

(a) Stabilization of key population centres and support for the
reestablishment of State authority throughout the country

(i) In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize the key
population centres, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter
threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those
areas;

(ii) To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish
State administration throughout the country;

(iii) To support national and international efforts towards rebuilding the
Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through technical
assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programmes, as well
as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities and in close
coordination with other bilateral partners, donors and international
organizations engaged in these fields, including the EU;

(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other
support, in mine action and weapons and ammunition management;

(v) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in developing and
implementing programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the dismantling of militias and
self-defence groups, consistent with the objectives of reconciliation and taking
into account the specific needs of demobilized children;

(b) Support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including
the national political dialogue and the electoral process

(i) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement swiftly the
transitional road map towards the full restoration of constitutional order,
democratic governance and national unity in Mali;

(ii) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the
national and local levels, including through local partners as appropriate, in
order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;

(iii) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali and communities in the north
of Mali to facilitate progress towards an inclusive national dialogue and
reconciliation process, notably the negotiation process referred to in paragraph
4 above, including by enhancing negotiation capacity and promoting the
participation of civil society, including women’s organizations;

(iv) To support the organization and conduct of inclusive, free, fair and
transparent presidential and legislative elections, including through the
provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective
security arrangements;

(c) Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel

(i) To protect, without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional
authorities of Mali, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,
within its capacities and areas of deployment;

(ii) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed
conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and
Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and
gender-based violence in armed conflict;

(iii) To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and
ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and
associated personnel;

(d) Promotion and protection of human rights

(i) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or
violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law
committed throughout Mali and to contribute to efforts to prevent such
violations and abuses;

(ii) To support, in particular, the full deployment of MINUSMA human rights
observers throughout the country;

(iii) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on
violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations
committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed
conflict;

(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in their efforts to promote
and protect human rights;

(e) Support for humanitarian assistance
In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to contribute to the
creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of
humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the
voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close
coordination with humanitarian actors;

(f) Support for cultural preservation
To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, as necessary and feasible, in
protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration
with UNESCO;

(g) Support for national and international justice
To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the transitional
authorities of Mali, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to
justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali,
taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of the
situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal
Court;

17. Authorizes MINUSMA to use all necessary means, within the limits of its
capacities and areas of deployment, to carry out its mandate as set out in paragraphs
16 (a) (i) and (ii), 16 (c) (i) and (iii), 16 (e), 16 (f) and 16 (g) and requests
MINUSMA’s civilian and military components to coordinate their work with the aim
of supporting the tasks outlined in paragraph 16 above;

18. Authorizes French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas
of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities
of MINUSMA until the end of MINUSMA’s mandate as authorized in this
resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent
and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, further requests France to
report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali and to
coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in
paragraph 34 below and decides to review this mandate within six months after its
commencement;

19. Urges all parties in Mali to cooperate fully with the deployment and
activities of MINUSMA, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom
of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Mali
to enable MINUSMA to carry out fully its mandate;

20. Calls upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the
free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, as
well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and
spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of MINUSMA;

21. Reiterates that the training, consolidation and redeployment of the
Malian Defence and Security Forces is vital to ensure Mali’s long-term security and
stability and to protect the people of Mali and stresses the importance of the Malian
Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing security
throughout the Malian territory;

22. Welcomes the deployment of the European Union Training Mission
(EUTM) in Mali which is providing training and advice for the Malian Defence and
Security Forces towards contributing to strengthening civilian authority and respect
for human rights and calls upon the EU, notably its Special Representative for the
Sahel, to coordinate closely with MINUSMA, and other bilateral partners of Mali
engaged to assist the transitional authorities of Mali in the Security Sector Reform
(SSR);

23. Urges Member States, regional and international organizations to provide
coordinated assistance, expertise and training, including on human rights and
international humanitarian law, especially concerning the protection of women and
children, and capacity-building support to the Malian Defence and Security Forces,
including through the United Nations Trust Fund established pursuant to its
resolution 2085 (2012) for Peace and Security in Mali, and in close coordination
with existing initiatives, in particular EUTM to help restore the authority of the
State of Mali over its entire national territory, to uphold the unity and territorial
integrity of Mali and to reduce the threat posed by terrorist organizations and
associated groups;

24. Reiterates that the transitional authorities of Mali have primary
responsibility to protect civilians in Mali, further recalls its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of
S/RES/2039 (2012) civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security and calls upon MINUSMA and all military forces in Mali to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

25. Requests MINUSMA to take fully into account gender considerations as
a cross cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the transitional authorities of Mali in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels and at an early stage of the stabilization phase, including the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, as well as in the national political dialogue and electoral processes;

26. Requests that MINUSMA take fully into account the need to protect
civilians and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in particular, women, children and displaced persons and civilian objects in the performance of its mandate as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 above, where undertaken jointly with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence
Policy on United Nations Support to non-United Nations Security Forces
(S/2013/110);

27. Urges the transitional authorities of Mali to ensure that all perpetrators of
serious violations and abuses of human rights and serious violations of international
humanitarian law are held accountable and to continue to cooperate with the
International Criminal Court, in accordance with Mali’s obligations under the Rome
Statute;

28. Calls upon the transitional authorities of Mali, with the assistance of
MINUSMA, consistent with paragraph 16 above, and international partners, to
address the issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials and the United Nations
Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in order to ensure the safe
and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of small arms and
light weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked or
illicitly held weapons and further stresses the importance of the full implementation
of its resolution 2017 (2011);

29. Urges Sahel and Maghreb States to enhance interregional cooperation
and coordination in order to develop inclusive and effective strategies to combat in a comprehensive and integrated manner the activities of terrorist groups, namely
AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Eddine, and prevent the expansion of those groups as
well as to limit the proliferation of all arms and transnational organized crime and,
in this regard, takes note of the outcome of the Conference organized by CTED and
CTITF in Rabat on the Cooperation on Border Control in the Sahel and the
Maghreb;

30. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of MINUSMA
with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and
to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur;

31. Requests MINUSMA, within its capabilities, its areas of deployment and
without prejudice to its mandate, to assist the Committee pursuant to resolutions
S/RES/2039 (2012), 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2083 (2012);

32. Requests the Secretary-General to consider the environmental impacts of
the operations of MINUSMA when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context,
encourages MINUSMA to manage them, as appropriate and in accordance with
applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and
regulations, and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites;

33. Requests the Secretary-General and the transitional authorities of Mali to
conclude, within 30 days of the adoption this resolution, a status-of-forces
agreement with regards to MINUSMA, taking into consideration General Assembly
resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnel and decides that pending the conclusion
of such an agreement, the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990
(A/45/594), shall apply provisionally;

34. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of
the situation in Mali and the implementation of the mandate of MINUSMA, to
report to the Council within 45 days of the adoption of this resolution, specifically
with regards to paragraph 8 and 9 above, and then every three months from 1 July
2013 and to include in his reports to the Council updates on the security situation,
the priority political elements as defined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above on the
implementation of the transitional road map, relevant information on the progress,
promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law as
well as a review of the troop level, force generation and deployment of all
MINUSMA’s constituent elements;

35. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.April 2013
Security Council

Links

U.N. Security Council Press Release summarizing the resolution and statements of the dlegates regarding their votes is found here.

The official text of Resolution 2100 is found here.

The Trenchant Observer

He stated, according to Der Spiegel, “I beg on my knees for Serbia to be forgiven for this crime committed in Srebrenice.”

Der Spiegel noted that the 1995 Srebrenice massacre is considered to be the gravest war crime committed in Europe since World War II.

“Serbien: Präsident entschuldigt sich für Srebrenica-Massaker,” Der Spiegel, 25 April 2013 (14:38 h).

Is this relevant to the present? Consider the following:

How many Srebrenice’s have been committed in Syria in the last two years?

What will future presidents of Syria, Russia, China, and Iran be able to say when they beg for forgiveness for the war crimes and crimes against humanity they either directly committed or actively supported?

And what will a future American president say to his countrymen, and to the world, about what his country did to halt these war crimes, which were on a scale far exceeding that of the 8,000 boys and men massacred at Srebrenice?

The Trenchant Observer

The apogee of all of this red line talk was when Benjamin Netanyahu, at the United Nations, drew a crude picture of a bomb with an arbitrary red line to show the point beyond which Iran can’t continue down the path to making a nuclear bomb without Israel attacking it militarily.

All this talk of red lines is silly because it is unilateral, arbitrary, and lacks any claim of legitimacy.

It’s the way some leaders might have spoken to leaders in other countries in the 19th century or earlier.

Now, things have changed. We have a United Nations Charter and well-developed rules of international law governing the use of force.

Statesmen today talk to each other in the language of international law, not the playground threats of children who don’t know yet much about rules and law and the limits society places on their behavior.

Statesmen don’t talk that way, but regrettably some national leaders still do.

All the talk about Obama’s “red lines” in Syria and whether they have been crossed constitutes one big RED HERRING.

The questions we ought to be discussing, instead of chasing the Red Herring, include the following:

1. Does the present situation in Syria, including al-Assad’s barbarism (e.g., war crimes and crimes against humanity on a massive scale), negatively affect the vital national interests of the United States, or those of its allies?

2. If so, what must be done, both alone and in conjunction with others, to defend those vital national interests?

3. How are those interests likely to be affected if no effective action is taken to halt al-Assad’s barbarism?

4. Does the United States have a vital national interest in preventing and halting the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and widespread violations of fundamental human rights on a massive scale?

5. If the United States is going to act, “If not now, when?”

These are the questions people should be talking about, and not Obama’s baby talk about red lines and arguments about whether they have been crossed.

The Trenchant Observer