Posts Tagged ‘Afghanistan elections’
Saturday, July 9th, 2011
Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief for Asia Times Online, was assassinated in Pakistan at the time of or shortly after his disappearance on May 29, reportedly on the orders of top-level officials of the Pakistan intelligence agency.
See Editorial, “A Pakistani Journalist’s Murder,” The New York Times, July 7, 2011
Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistan’s Spies Tied to Slaying of a Journalist,” New York Times, July 4, 2011
“Pakistan ‘sanctioned’ killing of journalist, says US commander: Islamabad hits back at claim by Admiral Mike Mullen over murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, The Guardian, July 8, 2011
The Observer has previously referred to Shahzad’s reports on alleged behind-the-scenes deals between the Obama administration and the Pakistan military. The first was for the U.S. to withdraw its support of Abdullah Abdullah in negotiations for a unity government or at least the holding of a second-round election, in the stand-off that resulted from the massive fraud in the Afghanistan presidential elections held on August 20, 2009. The U.S. basically cast Abdullah aside, and backed Karzai as the legitimate winner in the elections, reportedly in exchange for Pakistani support in facilitating negotiations with the Taliban.
The second and related move by Hamid Karzai, believed to be at the insistence of Pakistan, was to fire the intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, and the interior minister, Hanif Atmar, who were viewed as too close to India and therefore hostile to Pakistan. Both were fomer members of the Northern Alliance, the force which with the United States toppled the Taliban government in 2001.
See The Trenchant Observer, “Intelligence Matters: In Afghanistan, Karzai Ousts Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and Intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh,” June 6, 2010
Now, perhaps partly as an unintended consequence of the humiliation of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies by President Obama, who loudly touted the fact that the United States took out Bin Laden without the foreknowledge or participation of Pakistani officials, a leading reporter on the inner workings of the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies has been murdered. According to American officials, the assassination was approved at very high levels of the Pakistan military and security agencies.
The Observer must observe, in passing, that Obama’s public humiliation of Pakistani military and intelligence officials was utterly unnecessary, and represented a novice’s mistake for a practitioner of foreign policy. In international affairs, it is important to allow your enemies, as well as your (questionable) allies and friends, to save face, and not to push them too hard into a corner. Doing so subjects them to intense internal political and other pressures and sharply limits their freedom of action in adopting policies that you may want them to follow.
Obama, in effect, stressed that the operation against Bin Laden violated the sovereignty of Pakistan, when he might easily have left that issue shrouded in ambiguity. His mistake was to publicly declaim that the Bin Laden operation was carried out without Pakistani knowldge. That wasn’t necessary. On the other hand, it was entirely appropriate to raise the issue of how Bin Laden had lived near Islamabad in Abbottabad, the very same town where the Pakistani “West Point” is located, without being detected. These were legitimate questions. The public humiliation was a grave mistake.
Since the Bin Laden killing, U.S.-Pakistan military and intelligence relations have taken a sharp turn for the worse.
We are left with a situation where we are faced with a nuclear-weapons state, which continues to support Taliban and other insurgent forces operating in Afghanistan, while our own ability to conduct anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations from within and against targets in Pakistan territory has been greatly curtailed.
The assassination of Shazad closed one of the few windows open to the world to follow and understand the machinations underway within Pakistani military and intelligence circles.
It also serves as a useful reminder that the United States has gained very little from its apparent deal with Pakistan by withdrawing its support for Abdullah in 2009, and acquiescing in the firing of Saleh and Atmar.
The much-touted negotiations with the Taliban have come to nothing, and hold very little promoise of ever producing tangible results. We are no further along in this regard, in fact, than we were two years ago. The illusions fed by the flawed assumption of the possibility of a political settlement with the Taliban remain as far from the reality on the ground and the realm of real-world possibilities as they were then. The difference is that now President Obama, with his recent speech on the the path forward in Afghanistan, has adopted a posture of publicly relying on those illusions.
The consequences in Afghanistan are likely to be harsh. Moreover, we now face a much larger problem in Pakistan than even that faced in Afghanistan itself, which we have yet to devise a successful strategy to address.
The effects of the loss of Special Ambassador to Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador, Richard Holbrooke, who died suddenly in December, 2010, have been devastating.
On July 9, 2011, the United States faces a one-time ally in Pakistan which looks much more like a hostile state that 1) will block a peaceful resolution of the war in Afghanistan on terms acceptable to the West and the international community; 2) itself has become a great center of Islamic radicalism and the spawning of terrorist behavior; and 3) poses an ultiimate risk to the United States and other nations due to its possession of nuclear weapons.
If a country like Pakistan can decide, at the highest military and intelligence levels, to assassinate a journalist whose reports reveal messy facts they would prefer to remain hidden, how can the United States continue to proceed as if it were an ally?
The Trenchant Observer
www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
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Links to some of the Observer’s articles dealing with Syed Saleem Shahzad and the issues he raised, and excerpts from these articles, are reporduced below.
NEWS TO NOTE: Pakistani sources report progress in back-channel talks with Taliban, September 18, 2010
See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban soften as talks gain speed,” Asia Times On-Line (www.atimes.com), September 15, 2010.
“Pakistan Desire to “Mediate” with Taliban Consistent with Earlier Reports of Deal to Support Karzai in Election Settlement,”
February 10th, 2010
NEWS TO NOTE Deal by U.S. with Pakistan Military to Undercut Abdullah in Final Discussions?
November 11th, 2009
Tags: 2009 elections, Abdullah, Abdullah Abdullah, Afghanistan, Afghanistan elections, Al Qaeda, Amrullah Saleh, back-channel talks, backchannel talks, Barack Obama, CIA, editorial, electoral fraud, Eric Schmitt, Hamid Karzai, Hanif Atmar, humiliation, Jane Perlez, Mike Mullen, New York Times, Northern Alliance, nuclear weapons state, Pakistan, Pakistani military, Richard Holbrooke, Saudi Arabia, Syed Saleem Shahzad, Taliban, U.A.E., U.S. Military, UAE, united arab emirates
Posted in Afghanistan, Barack Obama, CIA, elections, Hamid Karzai, International Law, NATO, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Taliban, U.S Foreign Relations, U.S. Military, United States | No Comments »
Wednesday, October 13th, 2010
Once again, on the eve of a major meeting of U.S. and NATO foreign and defense ministers on October 14, the “Magician” in his green cape with a wide-sweeping gesture says, “Look over there!” And everyone takes their eyes off the ball, to be entralled once again by the Magician’s magic.
This magic causes them to forget nine years of dealing with the Magician, the rational and analytical factors that are relevant to the situation on the ground, and strategic thinking on how to manage and overcome the obstacles those realities pose, including the goals to be pursued.
The latest gesture is really a series of actions, including the recent formation of a peace negotiation council and culminating in the well-timed news report, based on an interview with a NATO official, on background, announcing that ISAF is facilitating preliminary discussions–not negotiations–aimed at reconciliation of the Taliban and reintegration of their members into Afghan society.
The NATO official confirmed that “there has been outreach by very senior members of the Taliban to the highest levels of the Afghan government.” But the official cautioned that these have been only preliminary discussions about reintegrating insurgent fighters and reconciling with the militant movement’s leadership.
Even so, the official said, prospect of a cease-fire and peace pact as a path to ending the war, now nine years old, is deemed sufficiently tantalizing that personnel from NATO nations in Afghanistan “have indeed facilitated to various degrees the contacts (emphasis added).
…
The NATO official…spoke in advance of a NATO meeting in Brussels on Thursday that will include alliance ministers of foreign affairs and of defense. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates are scheduled to attend.
Thursday’s meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers comes a month before an alliance summit in Lisbon to discuss strategy in Afghanistan.
–Thom Shanker, “NATO Helping Afghan-Taliban Talks, Official Says,” New York Times, Oct. 13, 2010
In January, at the London Afghanistan International Donors Conference, Hamid Karzai used a similar ploy with great success. There, he moved attention to excitement about reconciliation with the Taliban, away from the massive electoral fraud in the August 2009 presidential elections which he had just overseen (the climactic moments of which came in early November, 2010), and away from the continuing and massive corruption in Afghanistan, from the top down.
The Allies fell for it, and ignored the electoral fraud for all intents and purposes. Now, as another massive electoral fraud is underway, the allies talk of the “magic” solution of negotiating a deal with the Taliban and exiting the country, which is, in the words of the NATO official quoted above, “sufficiently tantalizing” to lead NATO to facilitate safe passage of Taliban members to Kabul.
But there are hard fracts on the ground. The Taliban has the momentum, and according to most reprts is gaining ground. Good governance, according to U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is the sine qua non , i.e., absolute prerequisite, for any success against the Taliban.
So, here is the agenda which should form a central focus of discussions among leaders of the NATO countries and also among the more broadly-based donors conferences to be held in the future:
1. What is Hamid Karzai doing to build good governance–i.e., constitutional government and the rule of law–in Afghanistan?
2. Will he reverse the blocking of the two anti-corruption bodies that had been established, and allow prosecution of high-ranking officials in his government for graft or other corrupt activities?
3. What is he doing to ensure that the counting of votes in the September 18 national assembly elections is conducted fairly, and that all complaints of electoral fraud be fully investigated with their results being reflected in the vote totals?
4. What is he doing to establish good governmence and the provision of government services in the Kandahar region, as the U.S. moves to clear the Taliban from the area?
These are not, of course, the only questions that need to be taken up in allied discussions. However, they require a central, serious and sustained focus, both at meetings and in ongoing discussions between coalition officials.
If a central requirement for Taliban reconciliation and reintegration is that they accept the Afghan constitution, the allies should also insist that Hamid Karzai accept the Afghan constitution and the rule of law, even when it comes to the prosecution of his cronies.
Will it hapen? I wouldn’t hold my breath.
Karzai has “rolled” President Obama on the corruption issue, and there now appears to be little inclination to hold him to account. In fact, with the dismissal of the deputy attorney general in charge of the anti-corrupion efforts, the whole allied anti-corruption policy is in a shambles.
Let the leaders of the allies and the donors group focus on that, not the Magician’s latest ploy. Without good governance, which by definition appears to be impossible in a lawless state, the U.S. and its allies are not likely to prevail in Afghanistan.
General David Petraeus is quoted by Bob Woodward in his new book, Obama’s Wars, as saying, “I understand the government is a criminal syndicate.” (p. 220).
American, ISAF and other coalition soldiers should not be asked to risk their lives to maintain in power “a criminal syndicate” headed by Hamid Karzai. The central task for decisionmakers, in the U.S. as in allied countries, is to move the government of Afghanistan toward observing the rule of law. That appears to be the only path to establishing good governance.
The alternative, in theory but not really on the ground, is to fall for the Magician’s ploys about reconciliation and reintegration of the Taliban, and just hope the whole problem of Afghanistan and Pakistan will simply go away.
We should bear in mind that even the negotiated withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam took five years of negotiations in Paris (1968-1973). In that case, the consequences for the U.S. of withdrawing from Vietnam and the ensuing defeat of the South Vietnamese government in 1975 were very minor, when compared to what would happen in South Asia if a negotiated peace with the Taliban led subsequently to the fall of the Afghan governmet to the Taliban.
The Magician’s ploy is “tantalizing”, particularly to those with no memory or who see no way out of the morass in Afghanistan. But all concerned should keep their eyes on the ball, the realities on the ground, and discuss in earnest a strategy that can overcome them.
Since the U.S. strategy appears to be in disarray, perhaps NATO foreign and defense ministers can come up with some useful ideas, particularly with respect to the establishment of “good governance” and the rule of law, including effective prosecution of individiuals at the top of the power structure in Afghanistan.
The Trenchant Observer
www.trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Comments are invited.
Tags: Afghan elections, Afghanistan, Afghanistan donors conference, Afghanistan elections, Afghanistan policy, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Ahmed Karzai, ahmed wali karzai, army, ball game, Barack Obama, Battle of the Bulge, Bob Woodward, Brussels, CIA, coin manual, COIN strategy, counterinsurgency manual, D-Day, David Petraeus, Defense Ministers, departure, departure of karzai, direct military action in Pakistan, drone attacks, early departure, early departure of Karzai, electoral fraud, eye on the ball, eyes on the ball, fine intellectual distinctions, floods, Foreign Ministers, Greg Miller, Hamid Karzai, Hilary Clinton, Hilary Rodam Clinton, international donors conference, joint chiefs, Karl Eikenberry, Lisbon summit, London Donors Conference, Meeting, Meeting of Foreign and defense Ministers, NATO, New York Times, NSC, Obsama's Wars, October 14, Pakistan military, Pakistan people, Pakistan politics, Peace Council. Carlotta Gall, policymaking, Richard Holbrooke, Robert Gates, Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, sovereignty, special operations, special ops, spin out of control, spinning out of contro, Stanley McChrystal, State Department, targeted assassinations, targeted killings, the magician, the nuclear ball, Thom Shanker, U.S., U.S. army, United States, Washington Post, World War II
Posted in Afghanistan, Canada, elections, France, Germany, Hamid Karzai, International Law, Quetta Shura, Taliban, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Military, United Kingdom, United States | No Comments »
Sunday, October 3rd, 2010
“The current near-term strategy appears to be to try to kill enough of the Taliban’s leaders to force them to negotiate a settlement on terms acceptable to Hamid Karzai.”
“This war will not be won, or defeat avoided, by fine intellectual distinctions.”
“What Obama needs to do is to take the bull by the horns, and start exploring options for the early departure of Hamid Karzai. This will be a monumentally challenging task. So was D-Day in World War II.”
Current U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
The bad news from Afghanistan, and about U.S. policy making in Washington, is coming in at a dizzying pace.
Hardly had we recovered from the Wikileaks disclosures, when Bob Woodward’s Obama’s Wars threw a sharp spotlight on the nature and quality of deicision making in the White House.
At such a juncture, it is useful to reflect for a moment on our strategy in Afghanistan.
The United States developed during the course of the war in Iraq the ability to combine real-time intelligence with targeted killings and special operations. Some military and civilian leaders appear to have concluded that this capability turned the war in Iraq around. They underestimate or forget the significance of other factors such as genuine elections and a real government partner in achieving the turnaround there.
In Afghanistan, U.S. military and civilian policymakers have bought into the seductive allure of this extraordinary targeted killing capability, falling into the trap of rejecting the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine (embodied in David Petraeus’ COIN army manual).
The leitmotif of the Army’s COIN doctrine is that such conflicts are won by protecting the people and gaining their support as a result of providing them with security. This takes a long time.
As now revealed in Bob Woodward’s description of Obama’s drawn-out policy review of last summer and fall, the president has wanted desperately to get out of Afghanistan.
However, he has not come up with a strategy to do so. Somewhat disastrously, he has partially rejected the military’s advice, giving them a deadline of July, 2011 to start handing control over to he Afghans and withdrawing troops. This sent the wrong signal to everyone in the region.
It was, and is, an impossible assignment. The deadline does not allow for even a limited COIN strategy that could show results by the announced December policy review deadline.
Whether because of the strategy review and deadline, or because McChrystal with his background in special operations was a firm believer in that form of counterinsurgency warfare, U.S. strategy in Aghanistan shifted radically away from trying to secure and hold territory and population centers, particularly after the failure of the Marja campaign earlier this year.
The current near-term strategy appears to be to try to kill enough of the Taliban’s leaders to force them to negotiate a settlement on terms acceptable to Hamid Karzai.
What happens in the long-delayed Kandahar campaign, and whether it is possible to hold the region while leaving Ahmed Karzai in place, will reveal whether there may still be a COIN component of an evolving strategy now that David Petraeus is in command.
The War-Fighting Role of the CIA
Now we learn that the military is providing drones and other equipment to the CIA, which has assumed a war-fighting role, presumably because of their ability to locate human targets for drone and special operations attacks.
It should not come as a surprise that with the CIA and special ops forces directing the assault on the Taliban in their Pakistani sanctuaries, considerations of international law have been jettisoned almost entirely.
The Washington Post reports that the CIA (through employees and contractors, we know from other sources), has taken a lead role in the drone attacks. As non-military personnel, these individuals do not appear to be protected by the provisions of the law of war or humanitarian law that might otherwise apply, even under the Bush and Obama Administrations’ extraordinarily broad interpretations of those provisions.
Karzai’s Peace Council
Earlier this week Carlotta Gall of the New York Times reported that President Hamid Karzai had created (out of thin air) a large body to negotiate peace and reconciliation with the Taliban, in total diregard of the Afghan Constitution. She communicated this plan to her readers without so much as mentioning the September 18 elections and the massive fraud that is currently underway.
Keeping our Eyes on the Ball
So, we are trying to kill and intimidate the Taliban to the conference table, at a time when many if not most reports indicate they are gaining momentum against the fatally corrupt government of Hamid Karzai. We are ignoring the impact on the population of Pakistan, and even its military, of repeatedly taking direct military action within the territory of that sovereign state–regardless of whatever “consent” may have been given by the military or even the civilian government.
With a short-sighted focus on exiting Afghanistan as soon as possible, we seem oblivious to the very great risks that our drone attacks may have an impact in Pakistan which, together with the impact of the recent floods, could cause politics in that country to spin out of control.
The president appears to have his eyes on the wrong ball, which is Afghanistan. It is simply not realistic to assume that we can withdraw from that country in the short term, without producing disastrous consequences.
We need to keep our eyes on the nuclear ball, which is in Pakistan. Aghanistan will not achieve stability if efforts to achieve it destablize Pakistan, which is the real ball game in this part of the world.
It is also time to take the war-fighting role away from the CIA, and to leave conduct of this war to the military, under the direction of the commander-in-chief.
On questions of stategy, Obama quite properly will and should have the final word. He would be well-advised, however, to listen most carefully to the civilian and military experts with direct responsibilities and/or experience on the ground, and to ignore the fine intellectual distinctions others around him throw out–such as finding a “more spphisticated” way of fighting corruption in the country.
This war will not be won, or defeat avoided, by fine intellectual distinctions.
What Obama needs to do is to take the bull by the horns, and start exploring options for the early departure of Hamid Karzai. This will be a monumentally challenging task. So was D-Day in World War II.
The Trenchant Observer
www.trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Comments are invited.
Tags: Afghan elections, Afghanistan, Afghanistan elections, Afghanistan policy, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Ahmed Karzai, ahmed wali karzai, army, Barack Obama, Battle of the Bulge, Bob Woodward, CIA, COIN manua, COIN strategy, counterinsurgency manual, D-Day, David Petraeus, departure, departure of karzai, direct military action in Pakistan, drone attacks, early departure, early departure of Karzai, electoral fraud, eye on the ball, eyes on the ball, fine intellectual distinctions, Greg Miller, Hamid Karzai, joint chiefs, Karl Eikenberry, New York Tiimes, NSC, Obsama's Wars, Pakistan military, Pakistan people, Pakistan politics, Peace Council. Carlotta Gall, policymaking, Richard Holbrooke, sovereignty, special operations, special ops, spining out of control, Stanley McChrystal, State Department, targeted assassinations, targeted killings, the nuclear ball, the worng ball the ballgame, U.S., U.S. army, United States, Washington Post, World War II
Posted in Afghanistan, Barack Obama, CIA, elections, Intelligence, International Law, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Taliban, targeted assassinations, targeted killings, U.S. Military, use of force | 1 Comment »
Saturday, September 4th, 2010
For updates on the elections, see Afghan2010.com
Reading the newspapers and watching television news reports in the United States, one would be hard pressed to have any idea of what is going on in the run-up to the National Assembly elections in Afghanistan to be held on September 18, 2010.
These elections are not part of the U.S. and NATO narrative for Afghanistan. It is almost as if corruption is expected and approved in advance.
The fact that U.S. media have given such little attention to the election compaign hints at how dependent the media are on getting their information from allied officials, even if it is information critical of U.S. policy.
The revelations about CIA payments to many, many high officials in the Afghan government reflect courageous journalism, but somehow no one seems to be making the connection between the corruption by the CIA of top Afghan officials and the holding of parliamentary elections in Afghanistan.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the background to the elections, including what happened in the August 2009 presidential elections and their aftermath, it may be useful to review the following articles by the Observer on different aspects of U.S. and allied policy toward Afghanistan, Afghan elections, and the democratic project in that country.
See the following articles, in particular:
“The Magician” enthralls donors once again, in Kabul,
July 22, 2010
The New York Times’ Bob Herbert on dire Afghanistan situation and “the courage to leave”
June 11, 1010
Intelligence Matters: U.S. Dependence on Intelligence From Wali Karzai Shapes Kandahar Strategy
May 27, 2010
Obama Snubs Abdullah During Latter’s Trip to Washington
May 22, 2010
Opera Buffa in Kabul — Karzai Threatens to Join the Taliban
April 5, 2010
News to Note: Lower House of Afghan National Assembly Rejects Karzai’s Electoral Coup
March 31, 2010
Thomas L. Friedman on Karzai; Hard Options
March 31, 2010
Afghanistan: Obama Begins to Grasp the Reality of Karzai
March 30, 2010
Afghanistan: U.N. SRSG de Mistura Describes U.N. Electoral Role; What Are Allied Forces Fighting For?
March 27, 2010
Intelligence Matters: Khost, The Flynn Report, and a Few Hypotheses
March 17, 2010
Afghanistan: Controversy Over Live TV Coverage of Attacks, Deafening Silence on Karzai’s Electoral Coup
March 13, 2010
U.S.-Pak Military Deal: Quetta Shura Arrests, Karzai’s Electoral Coup, and the Rule of Law
February 24th, 2010
REVISED February 25, 2010
Karzai’s Electoral Coup, 1000 U.S. Military Deaths and… “What Is It, Again, That We Are Fighting for in Afghanistan?”
February 24, 2010
Pakistan Desire to “Mediate” with Taliban Consistent with Earlier Reports of Deal to Support Karzai in Election Settlement
February 10th, 2010
KARZAI’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL IN AFGHANISTAN—THE REAL EXTENT OF THE ELECTORAL FRAUD, ABDULLAH’S CHANCES, AND WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE
October 16th, 2009
COULD U.N. TAKE CONTROL OF AFGHAN ELECTIONS TO STOP SECOND ROUND FRAUD?
October 28, 2009
We should watch very carefully what happens before, during and after the September 18 elections for the National Assembly.
For while the Americans appear to have lost interest in the democratic project in Afghanistan, with NATO and the United Nations following in their wake, in the long run it may turn out that the only force that can organize the people of Afghanistan against the nationalism, lack of corruption, and religious fervor of the Taliban is a belief in democracy and the rule of law. These could potentially become goals worth fighting for. It might be worth trying, if not now at least after everything else has been tried.
It is hard to see how deals with corrupt power centers, whether at the national or at the local level, could survive once allied forces have left the country. To try to build a peace on this foundation seems, to this observer, like trying to build a castle in the desert on constantly shifting sands.
The Trenchant Observer
Tags: Afghan elections, Afghanistan elections, de Mistura, election observers, Electoral Complaints Commission, Independent Electoral Commission, national assembly elections, parliamentery elections, September 18 elections, U.S. policy, UNAMA
Posted in U.S Foreign Relations | No Comments »
Thursday, July 29th, 2010
Originally Published March 26, 2010
In his first press conference, Staffan de Mistura, the new Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), described what he and the United Nations are doing to facilitate “credible and inclusive” National Assembly elections to be held on September 18, 2010.
“Let’s be frank. We are not in Switzerland, we are in Afghanistan, so the elections are still likely to be imperfect, not perfect, but they need to be credible and inclusive for the sake of Afghans’ feelings that they are really part of it,” de Mistura told reporters.
Translation: We are going to try to make the National Assembly elections appear “credible”, although Hamid Karzai will control the outcome through his majority of three appointed Afghan members on the Electoral Complaints Commission. We are not going to raise a stink over his blatant rewriting of the electoral law in violation of the Constitution.
Before Karzai’s electoral coup, that law provided for a majority of three “internationals” on the ECC, in order to guarantee elections that were free and fair by internatiional standards. Such elections were in fact held in 2004 and 2005.
The idea behind this provision was that there would be at least a majority of international members who would be free from the influence and intimidation that Aghan members were likely to be subjected to.
The Afghan parliament approved this law. Karzai, in a sleight of hand, overrode the law with a decree issued in February while the National Assembly was in recess, which with twisted legal logic he now maintains cannot be overturned by the Assembly due to another constitutional provision that states the electoral law cannot be changed within a year before elections.
In other words, Karzai can change the law by decree but the National Assembly cannot overturn his decree-law by their own law because the Constitution forbids changes to the electoral law within a year prior to elections.
That defies constitutional logic.
A critical question is whether the goal of “credible” elections, as ultimately determined by an Electoral Complaints Commission appointed by Karzai, is good enough.
Is it good enough for the men and women from U.S. and allied forces, as well as Afghans, who have given their lives in the battle for a democratic state governed by law in Afghanistan? Is it good enough for those who fight today, including the Afghan army and police?
Such a state would protect the rights of women, among other things. The idea of negotiating a withdrawal in which the country is handed back to the control of the warlords is, after eight years of war, appalling.
What is going on here is that the United Nations and its representatives are speaking as if their task were simply to assist in the development of Afghan electoral institutions, without regard to the corruption of those institutions by Afghan officials at the very top of the power structure. They view their task as a technical one. The questions of fraud and the validity of the results are for the Afghans to decide.
Meanwhile, Allied soldiers fight and die, if not for a democratic future for the people of Afghanistan, then for what? To return the country, and the women of Afghanistan, to the power of the warlords throughout the country? To men like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar?
If free elections have been critical to the success to date in Iraq, why are they not critical in Afghanistan?
These are some of the questions the Observer can not get out of his head.
What do you think?
The Trenchant Observer
www.trenchantobserver.com
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
Comments are invited, in any language. If in a language other than English, please provide an English translation. A Google translation will be sufficient.
Tags: Abubakar Siddique, Afghanistan, Afghanistan elections, afghanistan electoral fraud, Allied forces, Australia, bob baer, cia capabilities, elections, Flynn Report, France, Germany, Kark Eikenberry, Karzai, National Assembly, NATO, NATO troops, negotiations, Netherlands, Newsweek, Patrick Cockburn, peace talks, Poland, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, reconciliation, reintegration, RFE, RFE/RL, Richard Holbrooke, RL, Ron Moreau, Sami Yousafzai, September 18, Special Representative of the Secretary General, SRSG, Staffan de Mistura, Stanley McChrystal, strategy, Tags: 2010, Taliban, The Independent, U.S. troops, UNAMA, United Nations, warlords, women's rights
Posted in U.S Foreign Relations | Comments Off
Friday, March 26th, 2010
In his first press conference, Staffan de Mistura, the new Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), described what he and the United Nations are doing to facilitate “credible and inclusive” National Assembly elections to be held on September 18, 2010.
“Let’s be frank. We are not in Switzerland, we are in Afghanistan, so the elections are still likely to be imperfect, not perfect, but they need to be credible and inclusive for the sake of Afghans’ feelings that they are really part of it,” de Mistura told reporters.
Translation: We are going to try to make the National Assembly elections appear “credible”, although Hamid Karzai will control the outcome through his majority of three appointed Afghan members on the Electoral Complaints Commission. We are not going to raise a stink over his blatant rewriting of the electoral law in violation of the Constitution.
Before Karzai’s electoral coup, that law provided for a majority of three “internationals” on the ECC, in order to guarantee elections that were free and fair by internatiional standards. Such elections were in fact held in 2004 and 2005.
The idea behind this provision was that there would be at least a majority of international members who would be free from the influence and intimidation that Aghan members were likely to be subjected to.
The Afghan parliament approved this law. Karzai, in a sleight of hand, overrode the law with a decree issued in February while the National Assembly was in recess, which with twisted legal logic he now maintains cannot be overturned by the Assembly due to another constitutional provision that states the electoral law cannot be changed within a year before elections.
In other words, Karzai can change the law by decree but the National Assembly cannot overturn his decree-law by their own law because the Constitution forbids changes to the electoral law within a year prior to elections.
That defies constitutional logic.
A critical question is whether the goal of “credible” elections, as ultimately determined by an Electoral Complaints Commission appointed by Karzai, is good enough.
Is it good enough for the men and women from U.S. and allied forces, as well as Afghans, who have given their lives in the battle for a democratic state governed by law in Afghanistan? Is it good enough for those who fight today, including the Afghan army and police?
Such a state would protect the rights of women, among other things. The idea of negotiating a withdrawal in which the country is handed back to the control of the warlords is, after eight years of war, appalling.
What is going on here is that the United Nations and its representatives are speaking as if their task were simply to assist in the development of Afghan electoral institutions, without regard to the corruption of those institutions by Afghan officials at the very top of the power structure. They view their task as a technical one. The questions of fraud and the validity of the results are for the Afghans to decide.
Meanwhile, Allied soldiers fight and die, if not for a democratic future for the people of Afghanistan, then for what? To return the country, and the women of Afghanistan, to the power of the warlords throughout the country? To men like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar?
If free elections have been critical to the success to date in Iraq, why are they not critical in Afghanistan?
These are some of the questions the Observer can not get out of his head.
What do you think?
The Trenchant Observer
www.trenchantobserver.com
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
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Tags: 2010, Abubakar Siddique, Afghanistan, Afghanistan elections, afghanistan electoral fraud, Allied forces, Australia, bob baer, cia capabilities, elections, Flynn Report, France, Germany, Kark Eikenberry, Karzai, National Assembly, NATO, NATO troops, negotiations, Netherlands, Newsweek, Patrick Cockburn, peace talks, Poland, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, reconciliation, reintegration, RFE, RFE/RL, Richard Holbrooke, RL, Ron Moreau, Sami Yousafzai, September 18, Special Representative of the Secretary General, SRSG, Staffan de Mistura, Stanley McChrystal, strategy, Taliban, The Independent, U.S. troops, UNAMA, United Nations, warlords, women's rights
Posted in Afghanistan, elections, Hamid Karzai | Comments Off
Wednesday, February 24th, 2010
“La guerre, c’est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires.”
–Georges Clemenceau
“Une dictature est un pays dans lequel on n’a pas besoin de passer toute une nuit devant son poste pour apprendre le résultat des élections.”
–Georges Clemenceau
***
As the number of U.S. military killed in Afghanistan passes the 1000 mark…
The Observer is wondering about the coordination of U.S. military and civilian policy in Afghanistan. On February 23, 2009, it became known that Afghan President Hamid Karzai had signed a law that gives him sole authority to appoint the five members of the “Independent Electoral Commission” which will be charged with overseeing the upcoming Congressional elections. Also on February 23, Stanley McChrystal, the U.S. commanding general in Afghanistan, appeared by video on Afghan television to personally apologize to the people of Afghanistan for the 27 (or 33) civilian deaths caused by allied error in an air strike on February 21.
Is anyone in charge of U.S. policy in Afghanistan?
Has anyone given thought to what the impact might be on an Afghan audience of the U.S. military commander in Afghanistan apologizing to the Aghan nation on the very same day it was widely reported that Karzai had carried out an electoral coup, preparing the way for the next electoral fraud?
They should.
It would be useful also if they would review the record of Hamid Karzai, and the role of the Independent Electoral Commission in the run-up to, during, and after the first-round presidential elections on August 20, 2009.
The United States, NATO and the United Nations appear to be surrendering their greatest weapon in the struggle for Afghanistan, their last plausible ground on which to argue that their war and development efforts in Afghanistan are aimed at furthering democratic government and the protection of international human rights. In a mind-boggling statement, a UN spokesperson said the following:
“We hope that this decree is in line with the Constitution and with what Parliament and civil society has called for regarding reforms of the electoral system,” UN spokesperson Martin Nesirky told reporters. –UN News Centre, “UN studying proposed Afghan electoral decree,” February 24, 2010
Are they destroying the foundations in Afghanistan for the only ideology, that of democracy and international human rights, that might effectively counter the ideology of jihad? Couldn’t this ideology be a real force in the struggle for the allegiance of the population of Afghanistan, and, in particular, the 44.5 % of the population that is 14 years old or younger?
Without this ideology to counter that of the jihadists and also Pashtun nationalism, the troops and the people are being called upon to fight to support Hamid Karzai and his colleagues in government, and “to diminish” the influence of the Taliban.
That is hardly a fair ideological match.
The question remains, “What will motivate the army and the police to put their lives on the line in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan?”
The Trenchant Observer
www.trenchantobserver.com
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
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Comments are invited, in any language. If in a language other than English, please provide an English translation. A Google translation will be sufficient.
ADDENDUM: Elections for representatives at the district level will apparently not be held in 2010. Such elections would permit the formation of a genuine opposition in the Assembly, backed by popular support, a development promised in the electoral law but which Karzai appears to have been unwilling to accept.
Tags: Abdullah, Afghanistan, Afghanistan elections, afghanistan electoral fraud, Barack Obama, c'est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires, Georges Clemenceau, International Human Rights, International Law, Kai Eide, Karl Eikenberry, Karzai, La guerre, Martin Nesirky, Stanley McCrystal, UN News Centre, UNAMA, Une dictature est un pays dans lequel, United States Foreign Relations
Posted in Abdullah, Afghanistan, Dictatorship, elections, Hamid Karzai, human rights, Pakistan, Pakistan military, Quetta Shura, U.S. Military | 1 Comment »
Wednesday, February 10th, 2010
The New York Times reported on February 10 the following:
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistan has told the United States it wants a central role in resolving the Afghan war and has offered to mediate with Taliban factions who use its territory and have long served as its allies, American and Pakistani officials said.
…
Pakistan’s army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, made clear Pakistan’s willingness to mediate at a meeting late last month at NATO headquarters with top American military officials,… (including) the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen; the head of Central Command, Gen. David H. Petraeus; and the commander of American and allied troops in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the official said….The national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, visits Islamabad, this week.
…
What the Pakistanis can offer is their influence over the Taliban network of Jalaluddin and Siraj Haqqani…
In return for trying to rein in the Haqqanis, Pakistan will be looking for a friendly Afghanistan and for ways to stem the growing Indian presence there, Pakistani and American officials said.
…
Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Is Said to Pursue Role in U.S.-Afghan Talks,” The New York Times, February 10, 2010
This report is consistent with the news report quoted here on November 11, 2009, describing a deal between Secretary of State Clinton and the Pakistani military in which the latter would “mediate” with the Taliban in exchange for the U.S. ending its negotiations with Abdullah aimed at forming a unity government, in order to avoid the need for a second-round presidential election in Afghanistan. As we reported,
NEWS TO NOTE Deal by U.S. with Pakistan Military to Undercut Abdullah in Final Discussions?
Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief of Asia Times Online, reported in the Asia Times Online on November 6, 2009 that, during her recent trip to Pakistan and prior to the cancellation of the second round elections in Afghanistan, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton had reached a deal with the Pakistan military to withdraw support for negotiations with Abdullah in exchange for active mediation by the Pakistan military in approaches to the Taliban.
Despite its obvious significance, the story seems to have received little coverage in the U.S. media.
The Trenchant Observer, November 11, 2009
The Pakistani military reportedly viewed Abdullah as too friendly to India. The Obama administration appears to have concluded that it could not disentangle itself from the Karzai government by upholding the principle of free presidential elections, and that Pakistani mediation with the Taliban offered a more hopful way for the United States to exit Afghanistan than the alternative of insisting on a second round of elections or forging a unity government.
The Trenchant Observer
www.trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Comments and debate are invited, in any language. If in a language other than English, please provide an English translation. A Google translation into English will be sufficient.
Tags: Abdullah, Abdullah Abdullah, Afghanistan, Afghanistan elections, approaches to Taliban, Asia Times Online, David H. Petraeus, Galbraith, Haqqani, International Human Rights, International Law, Jalaluddin, James Jones, Karzai, Kayani, mediation with Taliban, Mike Mullen, National Security Council, Pakistan military, Richard Holbrooke, South Asia Online, Stanley McCrystal, Syed Saleem Shahzad, Taliban, U.S.-Pakistan deal on Taliban, United States Foreign Relations
Posted in Afghanistan, CIA, Dictatorship, elections, human rights, Pakistan, Pakistan military, United States | 2 Comments »
Friday, November 13th, 2009
The situation in Afghanistan is desperate. (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Washington Post, September 14, 2009).
The U.S. tilt toward Karzai during the electoral process may be related to CIA ties to his brother and operations in Kandahar and the South. (See Dexter Filkins, Mark Mazzetti and James Risen, New York Times, October 27, 2009)
Reports of a U.S. deal with the Pakistani military to withdraw from negotiations with Karzai and Abdullah in exchange for Pakistan military mediation with the Taliban remain unrebutted, and should be fully investigated by U.S. and Western media. (Syed Saleem Shahzad, Pakistan bureau chief, Asia Times Online, November 6, 2009)
A sharply critical analysis of U.S. policy, by a leading regional expert, details the catastrophic nature of U.S. and U.N. diplomatic failures in Afghanistan to date. (Chibli Mallat, Law Page Editor, The Daily Star, November 12, 2009)
Tags: Abdullah, Afghanistan, Afghanistan diplomatic failure, Afghanistan elections, afghanistan electoral fraud, Asia Times Online, Chibli Mallat, Dexter Filkins, Galbraith, James Risen, Kai Eide, Karl Eikenberry, Karzai, Mark Mazzetti, Obama's Dilemma, Peter Galbraith, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Richard Holbrooke, Stanley McCrystal, The Daily Star, UNAMA, Understanding Obama's Dilemma, United Nations, United States Foreign Relations
Posted in U.S Foreign Relations | Comments Off
Wednesday, November 11th, 2009
Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistan Bureau Chief of Asia Times Online, reported in the Asia Times Online on November 6, 2009 that, during her recent trip to Pakistan and prior to the cancellation of the second round elections in Afghanistan, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton had reached a deal with the Pakistan military to withdraw support for negotiations with Abdullah in exchange for active mediation by the Pakistan military in approaches to the Taliban.
Despite its obvious significance, the story seems to have received little coverage in the U.S. media.
Excerpts follow:
US puts its faith in Pakistan’s military
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
ISLAMABAD – Abdullah Abdullah, who this week withdrew from the presidential election runoff in Afghanistan, thereby handing victory to the incumbent, Hamid Karzai, did so under pressure from the United States, Asia Times Online has learned.
In exchange for the pullout of the non-Pashtun Abdullah, Pakistan’s military has agreed to actively mediate between Washington and the Taliban over a reconciliation plan that will allow the US to exit from Afghanistan, as it is doing in Iraq, with a semblance of success.
A senior Pakistani diplomat involved in backchannel negotiations on Pakistan, Afghanistan and US relations told Asia Times Online on the condition of anonymity that the deal over Abdullah, whom Islamabad considers to be pro-India, was made during the three-day visit to Pakistan last week of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
Apart from other senior officials, Clinton met with the chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani, and the director general of Inter-Services Intelligence, Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha. It was agreed that all US-led negotiations with Abdullah, which included offering him the position of chief executive officer of Afghanistan, would stop, and Karzai would get full backing for a second five-year term.
It was also acknowledged that Washington’s political leadership, like the Pentagon, now accepts that the Taliban-led insurgency in Afghanistan is best tackled with contact between the Pakistan armed forces and the Taliban, and not by the political governments of the region.
Clinton’s visit came at a crucial time as Pakistan is engaged in a battle against the Pakistani Taliban and other militants; if it fails, there will be a cascading effect in the whole region and a sure defeat of American interests in Afghanistan.
In this context, Clinton supported Pakistan’s vision of Afghanistan, that Abdullah’s participation as a major player in the government would be detrimental to the cause of dialogue with the Taliban. Clinton also played a major role in India’s decision to pull out its forces from the Pakistan-India border near Kashmir. This allows the Pakistan army to concentrate on its fight against al-Qaeda in the Pakistani tribal areas. The army assured Clinton it would broaden this fight in the coming months.
…
Now, given the latest cooperation between Washington and General Headquarters Rawalpindi, the next step is to further erode Zardari’s power by passing some of it to parliament, or even forcing his departure from office.
Very much as the US watched on while Musharraf departed, Washington is ready to see Zardari sidelined. This is in the realization that the army is the last hope for Pakistan to deliver the goods in the Afghan conflict.
The full article can be found at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KK06Df02.html
Why have the U.S. media not pursued the allegations in this account, and either confirmed or rebutted the assertions of fact that it contains? It appears highly relevant to an understanding of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.
Comments and discussion are invited.
The Trenchant Observer
www.trenchantobserver.com
observer@trenchantobserver.com
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UPDATE: See Saeed Shah, “Pakistan seeks to recast its role in Afghan war,” The Globe and Mail, November 19, 2009, which is consistent with the above article by Syed Saleem Shahzad, although it makes no mention of a quid pro quo for U.S. withdrawal of support for negotiations with Abdullah.
Tags: Abdullah, Afghanistan, Afghanistan elections, approaches to Taliban, Galbraith, Karzai, Pakistan military mediation for U.S. with Taliban, Richard Holbrooke, South Asia Online, U.S.-Pakistan deal on Taliban, United States Foreign Relations
Posted in U.S Foreign Relations | 3 Comments »