Posts Tagged ‘cbs news’

CBS News and PBS: Network of Edward R. Murrow and Walter Cronkite, and PBS, give al-Assad megaphone for propaganda to oppose Obama—ON MONDAY!

Sunday, September 8th, 2013

What we should be seeing now, both on American television and television abroad, are programs which put in perspective the looming question of whether the U.S. and its allies should use force to stop Bashar al-Assad from using chemical weapons and further committing war crimes and crimes against humanity (e.g. bombing or using artillery against civilian neighborhoods). These programs should be putting before the public the factual record of what has occurred in Syria since 2011, in all its bloody detail.

Instead, the coverage is like the coverage of a horse-race: Will Obama receive authorization for military action or not, which Senators and House Members are leaning this way or that way, and what do they have to say?

There is very little coverage of what has actually happened in Syria. This may be based on the premise that it has all been reported before. But the brutal fact about public memory in the age of mass media in 2013, when people don’t read the newspapers much any more, is that people don’t remember what they may have seen on TV a year or two ago, or a month ago. All of the past, all of the facts, are lost in the media in what may be termed “the infinite expansion of the present moment.”

So, we now hear that Charlie Rose has interviewed Bashar al-Assad, and CBS is going to broadcast excerpts from the interview on CBS News on Monday morning, and evening, across all of CBS’ news platforms, and PBS will broadcast the full interview in a special edition of the Charlie Rose Program on Monday night at 9:00 p.m.

For those who live outside of the Washington-New York media and political bubble, like the Trenchant Observer, some developments are so jaw-dropping that one must pinch oneself in the arm to make sure what one is seeing is not just a bad nightmare.

Now, Charlie Rose and CBS News have sounded the death knell for any idea that CBS or Charlie Rose is engaged in objective news reporting, as opposed to the immoral chase of ratings at whatever the cost—the moral cost, the cost to national security, the cost to the democratic process itself, which depends on an informed citizenry and the votes of their elected representatives.

Bashar al-Assad, in the interview, denies that his government was behind the chemical weapons attack on Ghouta on August 21, 2012.

Charlie Rose, who used to have a fairly interesting interview program on PBS, has long since evidenced the lack of preparation necessary to ask difficult questions, as his ambition has led him to also serve as an anchor on the CBS Morning News. His programs are now characterized by interventions which aim to show he knows everyone and everything, while allowing his speakers to say whatever they want without any sharp questioning, particularly any sharp questioning that would require preparation and a deep knowledge of the facts.

CBS News has itself entered the fray now, giving a voice to Syrian propaganda at a critical moment which may affect the Congressional vote on whether or not to authorize military action against Syria.

We can all see now that CBS’ News’ analysis is worthless, or sidelined by commercial considerations which manifest in essence a disloyalty to the United States, which amounts to the same thing.

What were they thinking?

Has CBS News formed no judgments as to what has been going on in Syria in the last two and a half years? Have they reached no conclusions regarding who has been responsible for the commission on a massive scale of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including the use of chemical weapons?

Do they understand they are placing al-Assad on a platform of moral equivalency to the President of the United States by broadcasting the interview with him on Monday, the very day President Obama is seeking to make the case to the American people for military action in Syria, and one night before he formally addresses the nation on the subject?

This is one of the most most shameful spectacles in the history of CBS News, which as we all know has become but a shadow of its former self.

How can outstanding correspondents such as Bob Schieffer and Lara Logan continue to work for such a company, which is now willing to offer its airwaves for the propaganda of one of the greatest war criminals of this or the last century?

I can imagine that CBS News—the 2013 version and not the Edward R. Murrow or the Walter Cronkite version—would broadcast an interview with Adolf Hitler denying the existence of Auschwitz and the gassing of the Jews, as Allied forces closed in on Berlin in 1945.

The promotional ads might sound something like this:

“On the one hand, we have the reports of intelligence and military officials who have confirmed the existence of the gas chambers at Auschwitz, and how they were used. On the other hand, German Leader Adolf Hitler denies these allegations, maintaining that they are fabrications of the Allied Powers’ propaganda machine.

Now, here, we present an interview with Mr. Hitler taped earlier today. You can listen to his arguments, and you yourself can decide which side has the stronger case.”

This action is so offensive that Charlie Rose, and CBS News, can now count on the permanent loss of this viewer. In fact, a boycott of the Charlie Rose program and of CBS News would not be a bad idea for others to consider.

And let us bear in mind, to understand how utterly immoral the Washington political-media complex has become, that the brother of Ben Rhodes, one of Obama’s top foreign policy advisers, is the President of CBS News.

Instead of presenting documentaries on what has occurred during the last two and a half years of the civil conflict in Syria, and citing the UN and other reports which have documented in great detail the barbarism and atrocities committed by the al-Assad regime, CBS News and the Charlie Rose Program on PBS give us…SYRIAN PROPAGANDA!

The head of CBS News, and everyone else responsible for this atrocious decision, should be immediately sacked. Charlie Rose should depart CBS News. And PBS should drop the Charlie Rose program forthwith.

What is involved is the nation’s security, at a delicate moment in which the electorate is uninformed, or trying to second guess the decisions of the commander in chief as to what specific military means and objectives should be pursued to safeguard the vital national interests of the country.

Here, the timing is everything, and reveals the utter lack of moral bearings of Charlie Rose and CBS News alike.

The Trenchant Observer

Intelligence Matters: U.S. Dependence on Intelligence From Wali Karzai Shapes Kandahar Strategy

Thursday, May 27th, 2010


“La guerre, c’est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires.”

“War is too serious a matter to just be handed over to some military men.”

–Georges Clemenceau


U.S. and ISAF forces appear to be almost totally dependant on Afghan intelligence in Kandahar, and in particular on intelligence form Wali Karzai who reportedly controls the flow of intelligence information in the region to allied troops. This dependence, together with President Obama’s short and externally-imposed deadlines, has reportedly reshaped military strategy in the province. This represents a shift from the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy developed by David Petraeus and others.

See Gareth Porter, “McChrystal Strategy Shifts to Raids – and Wali Karzai” , IPS (Inter Press Service News Agency), May 24, 2010.

See also earlier articles by The Observer, including:

Intelligence Matters: CIA Capabilities in Afghanistan
March 21, 2010

Intelligence Matters: Khost, The Flynn Report, and a Few Hypotheses
March 17, 2010

Understanding Obama’s Dilemma: Key Articles on Taliban Advances, CIA Role, Karzai’s Brother, Magnitude of U.S. and U.N. Failures
November 13th, 2009

The Trenchant Observer

Comments are invited.

Opera Buffa in Kabul — Karzai Threatens to Join the Taliban

Monday, April 5th, 2010

Farsical But Sinister

Robert H. Reid of AP summarizes the farsical but sinister events of the last week in the ever stranger opera buffa of Hamid Karzai:

Karzai has long chaffed under what he considers excessive international pressure. Those complaints escalated Thursday when he lashed out against the U.N. and the international community, accusing them of perpetrating a “vast fraud” in last year’s presidential polls as part of a conspiracy to deny him re-election or tarnish his victory – accusations the U.S. and the United Nations have denied.

Two days later, Karzai told a group of parliament members that if foreign interference in his government continues, the Taliban would become a legitimate resistance – one that he might even join, according to several lawmakers present.

“He said that ‘if I come under foreign pressure, I might join the Taliban,'” said Farooq Marenai, who represents the eastern province of Nangarhar. “He said rebellion” against a legitimate Afghan government “would change to resistance” against foreign occupation.

Two other parliament members gave the same account but asked that their names not be published to avoid problems with Karzai.

Robert H. Reid, “AP Analysis: Karzai remarks risk US-Afghan rift,” Associated Press, April 5, 2010

Defense of Honor

When will someone stand up and shout, “The emperor has no clothes!”

It could do U.S.-Afghan relations a lot of good if Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, or President Obama himself, were to take Karzai’s wild assertions, and rebut each of them with well-documented facts, point by point.

Washington needs to understand the cultural meaning and context in Afghanistan of what Karzai is doing to the United States.

Obama might start, closer to home, by studying Michael Dukakis’ 1988 response to a question about what he would do if his wife was raped and murdered, and the impact on his candidacy of his cold and analytical response.

In Afghanistan, what Karzai has said about the United States and its allies is shameful. To pretend otherwise, to be reasonable in understanding his “idiosyncracies”, to accept the canard that he needs to strengthen his domestic support, to brush it off with diplomatic language, risks losing the hard-won respect we have earned among the population over nine hard years of war.

In a word, when attacked in a shameful way by Karzai, the United States needs to defend its honor, at least in words if not in deeds.

For excerpts and descriptions of Karzai’s remarks, see the following:

Mandy Clark, CBS News broadcast story, April 2, 2010

Jonathan Partow, “White House troubled by Afghan leader’s remarks,” Washington Post, April 5, 2010

Plan B

It is time, long past time in fact, to start developing Plan B. As unpalatable as that conclusion may be, the alternatives are going to be much worse.

It is useful to recall that Karzai did not win the first round in the presidential elections held on August 20, 2009, and that Abdullah, his opponent, withdrew from the second round only in the face of a refusal by Karzai to take meaningful measures to avoid a repetition of the fraud in the runoff.

Karzai is not the legitimate, elected president of Afghanistan, and the U.S. saying that he is–while ignoring the imminent fraud in the second round–does not make him the legitimate, elected president of Afghanistan.

As The Observer wrote on March 30,

U.S. officials need to carefully review the history of their interaction with Karzai over the last eight years, and reread what Ambassador Karl Eikenberry had to say about him and his government in his cables of November 6 and November 9, 2009.

For only when the Americans and their allies have disabused themselves of their last illusions about Karzai, and stifled their last unjustified hopes that he might reform, will they begin to have the clarity of vision that they will need to extricate themselves from their present predicament.

We cannot get to the goal of a legitimate government accepted by the population, which can defeat the Taliban or even avoid defeat at their hands, with the Karzai brothers.

We had better start thinking through the implications that flow from that one simple and brutal fact, and the adjustments to strategy and operations that will be required.

In the past, when our analysis led us to an inescapable but “unacceptable” conclusion, we have resorted to further analysis, allowing things to drift and to deteriorate further.

We must not repeat that mistake. The hour is late, and much more can still be lost.

The Trenchant Observer

Comments are invited, in any language. If in a language other than English, please provide an English translation. A Google translation will be sufficient.

Intelligence Matters: CIA Capabilities in Afghanistan

Saturday, March 20th, 2010

Robert Baer’s GQ article on the attack on the CIA base in Khost province and what it suggests about the capabilities of the CIA has drawn wide attention. At the same time, revelations about the CIA’s use of outside civilian contractors to collect information on individuals to be targeted for killing by predator attacks and other methods, has raised very serious questions.

Given common news management practices in Washington, it would not be surprising if CIA Director Leon Panetta’s granting of an interview on March 17, 2010, in which he praised the successes of the CIA in attacking Al Quaeda and the Taliban, was a response by individuals and/or an organization who felt under attack, and very much wanted to distract attention from consideration of the very serious criticisms contained in the articles cited, and others.

Be that as it may, it is essential that the substantive criticisms that are contained in or flow from Baer’s article and others remain clearly in view, and receive sustained and critical attention from the press, policymakers including civilian and mlitary leaders responsible for our actions in Afghanistan, and citizens of the U.S. and other countries contributing to the effort in Aghanistan.

To recapitulate but a few of the criticims, it has been reported that

1. The CIA has been stretched too thin and lacks the trained and experienced operatives it needs to operate effectively in Afghanistan;

2. The Agency’s intelligence on Afghanistan has become subordinated to that of military intelligence as a result of several factors, including:

a) the fact that the number of military intelligence officials vastly exceeds the number of CIA officials in Afghanistan;

b) the frequent and short rotations of CIA officials (of e.g., three months in the field at a time) do not permit the development of the local knowledge and expertise that is required to provide valuable human intelligence on the situation throughout the country;

c) General McChrystal’s having secured the appointment of a friend as CIA station chief in Kabul, after the Agency’s own choice (an individual who had worked with Richard Holbrooke in the Balkans) was blocked by Holbrooke;

Regarding the appointment of the CIA Kabul Station chief and the nature and quality of CIA intelligence in Afghanistan, Matthew Cole of ABC News reports:

The current and former intelligence officials say that putting a paramilitary officer in charge on the Afghan base highlights the CIA’s evolving role. The CIA’s historic wartime role was collecting information in order to shape overall strategy. Now the agency has been relegated to a supporting role, supplying tactical intelligence to help the military. The military determines the strategy.

“The CIA is supposed to be a check on the military and their intelligence, not their hand maiden,” said Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer. “This is a sign of things to come, where the military dominates intelligence.”

The problem with this shift, the officials say, is that both the military and the CIA are focusing on short-term, tactical intelligence, and ignoring the long view. The shortfall in intelligence collection was highlighted last month in a public report by the military’s top intelligence officer that was prepared for a thinktank. In the report, Major General Michael T. Flynn concluded that intelligence collection in Afghanistan was “only marginally relevant to the overall strategy.”

Flynn’s report was as critical of the CIA as of military intelligence. But it is the military that is now shaping intelligence collection in Afghanistan, in part through sheer numeric dominance. Military forces far outnumber the CIA, and the disproportion is growing. According to a current intelligence official, the CIA has roughly 800 personnel in Afghanistan scattered among 14 bases. By next summer, the military expects that it will have nearly 100,000 troops, roughly double its strength in early 2009.

Flynn concluded that the “vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which the US and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade.”
–Matthew Cole, “CIA’S Influence Wanes in Afghanistan War, Say Intelligence Officials,” ABC News/ The Blotter from Brian Ross, March 19, 2010

3) The CIA is extremely dependent on Afghan intelligence services in order to navigate the physical and social spaces within Afghanistan. Such dependance represents a particularly difficult obstacle to be overcome if the U.S. objective of securing Kandahar is to succeed.

TIME magazine reports, for example,

International observers and diplomats in Kabul say Wali Karzai retains close ties with units of the U.S. special forces and the CIA in Kandahar. Last October, the New York Times alleged that Wali Karzai had been on the CIA payroll for the past eight years, a charge he denied when speaking to TIME. “I see these people, I talk to them in security meetings, but I have no control,” he said. But TIME’s sources insist that Wali Karzai in the past has threatened to call down NATO air strikes or arrange night raids by U.S. special forces on tribal elders who defied him. Says a former NATO official: “Most of our intelligence comes directly or indirectly from him. We really didn’t see this dynamic because we were so focused on the enemy.”

Perhps the deeper question is whether the CIA, blinded by its brilliant successes in 2001, has pursued the wrong mission in Afghanistan, becoming an integral part of the killing machine that joins real-time tactical intelligence with the capabilities of predator drones and special operations forces, while neglecting its core mission of providing independent strategic intelligence to the nation’s top decision-makers on what is going on in the country as a whole.

These and other questions about the CIA’s capabilities and management are the critical ones to keep in mind.

The Trenchant Observer

Comments are invited, in any language. If in a language other than English, please provide an English translation. A Google translation will be sufficient.

Intelligence Matters: Khost, The Flynn Report, and a Few Hypotheses

Wednesday, March 17th, 2010

Our intelligence in Afghanistan doesn’t seem to be very good.

Publication of the Flynn report in January, 2010 revealed very serious shortcomings in U.S. military intelligence in the country.

The CIA intelligence on what is going on in Afghanistan–as opposed to real-time intelligence about the whereabouts of individuals to be targeted for predator drone attacks–may in fact be just as weak. 

It is hard to know for sure. 

But certain events provide suggestive clues as to the capabilities of the CIA in the country. The suicide bombing of a CIA forward operating station in Khost province on December 30, 2010 has highlighted serious weaknesses in the field, including a CIA chief who lacked critical experience on the operations side, and the fact that there was no one at the base who spoke the local language, Pashto.

The CIA’s earlier successes in 2001 in coordinating the successful campaign to topple the Taliban regime has left the agency deeply involved in the conduct of military operations, including the selection of targets and coordination of attacks by predator drone aircraft in Afghanistan and apparently Pakistan.

In the meantime, the agency seems to have neglected its core function of collecting intelligence on what is going on in Afghanistan, leaving U.S. decisionmakers highly reliant on Afghan and Pakistani intelligence agencies.

A strong hypothesis is that the lack of independent intelligence capabilities in Afghanistan has left the United States extremely dependent on the Afghan intelligence agency to navigate through a physical and social space characterized by murky power relationships and changing personalities, in a country whose languages and cultures are poorly understood by U.S. intelligence operatives and analysts.

The extremely close cooperation between the top CIA and Afghan intelligence officials in 2001, which appears to have continued, tends to support this hypothesis. See Henry Crompton interview and Amrullah Saleh interview with Laura Logan on 60 minutes, December 27, 2009.

If this hypothesis is true, it would help to explain why the Obama administration could not bring itself to support free presidential elections in a second round of voting following the August 20 first-round elections in 2009.

At the same time, the concentration of both CIA and military intelligence capabilities in and on areas of the country where fighting with the Taliban is intense may have skewed overall U.S. intelligence on what is going on in the country as a whole.  This may be particularly true in the major cities and towns where, over the medium and longer term, the allegiances of the citizens could have a decisive impact.

Khost: An Instructive Case

On December 30, 2009, a Jordanian double agent entered a CIA field station in Khost province, and detonated his suicide vest killing 7 CIA employees and his handler, a Jordanian intelligence official. Robert Baer, a former CIA agent and operative in the field, has described what occurred.  The following excerpts are indicative of the Agency’s weakened capabilities, as described more fully in the complete article:

The base chief is a covert employee of the CIA; her identity is protected by law. I’ll call her Kathy. She was 45 years old and a divorced mother of three. She’d spent the vast majority of her career at a desk in Northern Virginia, where she studied Al Qaeda for more than a decade…(An) officer who knew her told me that despite her training at the Farm, she was always slotted to be a reports officer, someone who edits reports coming in from the field. She was never intended to meet and debrief informants.

Kathy knew that there was a time when only seasoned field operatives were put in charge of places like Khost. Not only would an operative need to have distinguished himself at the Farm; he would’ve run informants in the field for five years or more before earning such a post. He probably would have done at least one previous tour in a war zone, too. And he would have known the local language, in this case Pashto. Kathy skipped all of this. Imagine a Marine going straight from Parris Island to taking command of a combat battalion in the middle of a war.

On January 10, 2010, CIA director Leon Panetta wrote a Washington Post op-ed in which he disputed that poor tradecraft was a factor in the Khost tragedy. Panetta is wrong.

As the wars dragged on, the CIA’s problems cascaded, leaving an agency with almost no officers with real field experience. Personnel were shifted in and out of assignments for three-month stints, too brief a period to really know a place or do any meaningful work. Over time, these patterns completely undid the old standard that you needed experience to lead. After a year’s tour in a post like Baghdad, an officer could pretty much count on landing a managerial position. Never mind that he’d spent his time locked down in the Green Zone, never getting out or meeting an informant….

Robert Baer, “A Dagger to the CIA,” GQ (Magazine), April 2010

See also Neal Conan’s interview with Baer on NPR’s Talk of the Nation, March 16, 2010.

An Explanation of Failures?

The analysis offered above is preliminary, but offers some explanation of why our policies in Afghanistan–particularly with respect to governance, legitimacy, and the allegiance of the people–have failed so disastrously to date.

General McChrystal’s application of General Petraeus’ and the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine in Afghanistan is severely handicapped by a lack of sufficient troops for a country the size of Texas with a population of 28 million people, and a short time-line for the withdrawal of American forces to begin.

Moreover, hopes that a solution might consist in the reintegration of the Taliban into Afghan society under a government led by Karzai seem premature. It is still too early to predict success for the apparent wager that predator attacks against Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and pressure from the Pakistani military, will bend the insurgents’ will to the point of wanting to negotiate a settlement on terms favorable to Kabul, Islamabad and Washington.

One should hope for the best, but have a clear-eyed view of the other possibilities.

The rapid development and deployment of independent U.S. intelligence capabilities focused on what is going on throughout Afghanistan, and not merely in the South and remote areas of the country where fighting is concentrated, will be critical to whatever success can be achieved in the country.

The Trenchant Observer

Comments are invited, in any language. If in a language other than English, please provide an English translation. A Google translation will be sufficient.