Posts Tagged ‘corrupt-istan’

Battle over electoral fraud in Afghanistan (updated July 7, 2014)

Sunday, July 6th, 2014

This is probably the last chance for the United States, NATO, and other ISAF countries to avoid losing the Afghan war.

To succeed in averting a collapse in legitimacy, they must fully and with great candor discuss openly the alleged fraud at each voting table, and absolutely insist on a full recount of all votes in dispute–voting station by voting station, with full representation of all parties concerned.

Hamid Karzai was “awarded” the presidency of Afghanistan in 2009 as the result of 1) massive fraud in the first-round election, reportedly organized by him and his supporters; 2) enormous international pressures which led to a very partial and skewed recount which, though it did not reveal the full extent of the fraud, reduced Karzai’s “official” vote count sufficiently to require a second-round runoff with Abdullah Abdullah; and 3) Abdullah’s withdrawal from the run-off, when his demands for reform of the electoral bodies were not met, and also apparently after having been subjected to great pressure from the United States.

In the first-round elections held in April of this year, Abdullah emerged with 45% of the votes as opposed to his opponent, Ashraf Ghani, who received just under 32% of the vote.

In the second-round election held recently, as the vote count proceeded, Abdullah denounced what he alleged was a massive fraud then underway being orchestrated by Ghani and Karzai acting in collusion with electoral officials. The chief electoral official, Ziaulhaq Amarkhil, was forced to resign after Abdullah released tapes allegedly showing him and other officials issuing instructions for ballot stuffing.

Much is at stake in whether Abdullah succeeds in gaining a full elimination of fraudulent votes before results are announced. It is no exaggeration to say that the legitimacy and cohesion of the government which emerges from the vote count may determine the chances for the United States’ and ISAF nations’ project in Afghanistan to avoid either a Taliban takeover or a civil war, or a combination of the two.

President Obama seems totally removed from this process, recalling his tightly-managed Afghanistan policy review in 2009, when the ongoing fraud in that year’s election was apparently not even discussed by those involved in the policy review.

This is probably the last chance for the United States, NATO, and other ISAF countries to avoid losing the Afghan war.

To succeed in averting a collapse in legitimacy, they must fully and with great candor discuss openly the alleged fraud at each voting table, and absolutely insist on a full recount of all votes in dispute–voting station by voting station, with full representation of all parties concerned.

In 2009 the United States and its allies took the easier path, accepting Karzai’s refusal to reform the electoral commission and the electoral complaints commission before a second-round run-off, and pressuring Abdullah to withdraw.

This looks like another massively fraudulent election, with the U.S., its allies and the U.N. Mission in Afganistan looking the other way.

Ghani’s numbers do not pass the smell test.

See Margherita Stancati (Kabul), “Afghan Candidate Boycotts Count of Votes; Abdullah, a Karzai Rival, Alleges Fraud in Presidential Runoff, Citing Outsize Turnout in Opponent’s Areas of Support,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2014 (Updated 7:40 p.m. ET). Stancati reported,

“Yusuf Nuristani, chairman of the IEC , which organized the election and is counting the votes, said Saturday’s turnout was up from 6.6 million in the first round. While turnout was largely the same or lower in much of the country, the IEC’s initial tallies indicated a dramatic surge —in the areas of eastern Afghanistan that are Mr. Ghani’s base.

“In the eastern province of Khost, for example, initial IEC tallies showed that more than 400,000 voters cast ballots on Saturday, up from 113,000 in the first round.

“According to the 2012-13 data compiled by Afghanistan’s central statistics office, Khost’s entire population is 549,000—and, given Afghanistan’s demographic structure, at least one-third of them are children.

“In the nearby province of Paktika, 390,000 voters cast their ballots on Saturday, up from 180,000. The province’s population is 414,000.”

See also, “Afghanistan Presidential Election: Abdullah Calls for Halt to Vote-Counting Alleging Fraud by the Electoral Commission,” The Trenchant Observer, June 18, 2014.

Without the acceptance by Abdullah’s supporters of the election results, any future Ghani-Karzai government will have the same weaknesses as the current government of Karzai. Karzai will continue to manipulate the tribal and warlord alliances to keep Ghani and the current political elite in power in Kabul. Ghani will owe his survival to Karzai. But without the continuing presence of the U.S. military in significant numbers to hold things together, such a Karzai-Ghani strategy is not likely to succeed.

Whatever illusions the Americans may have about getting rid of Karzai, while keeping the present political elite of “Corrupt-istan” in power as Karzai pulls the strings from behind the scenes, are likely to evaporate as the new government loses the support of Abdullah’s voters and the Northern Alliance.

Without their support, it is difficult to see how a new government might hold together and succeed in maintaining the allegiance of its soldiers.

See “U.S. National Intelligence Estimate points to dire future in Afghanistan,” The Trenchant Observer, January 8, 2014.

Obama may walk away from Afghanistan the same way he walked away from Iraq in 2011.

Yet it is hard to see how the Democrats, after losing the two wars that have been the focus of Americans’ attention since 2001 and 2003, respectively, could hold back the tide of a Republican sweep of Congress and the presidency in 2016, with Republicans running on a strong national security platform.

To repeat: What Obama and the U.S. do in the next several weeks to ensure a full and accurate vote count in Afghanistan, and what they have to say about it publicly, are likely to have a decisive impact on the success or lack thereof of the Afghanistan project that has been underway since 2001.

See

(1) Adam Ahmed, “Afghanistan Election Dispute Draws More Calls for Vote Audit,” New York Times, July 6, 2014.

(2) “Afghanistan Presidential Election: Abdullah Calls for Halt to Vote-Counting Alleging Fraud by the Electoral Commission, The Trenchant Observer, June 18, 2014.

(3) “Leading Afghan presidential candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, narrowly escapes assassination in Kabul,” The Trenchant Observer, June 6, 2014.

(4) “KARZAI’S FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL IN AFGHANISTAN—THE REAL EXTENT OF THE ELECTORAL FRAUD, ABDULLAH’S CHANCES, AND WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE,” The Trenchant Observer, October 16, 2009.

For deeper insights into the present crisis, consider the following articles and their implications:

(5) “Obama Snubs Abdullah During Latter’s Trip to Washington,” The Trenchant Observer, May 22, 2010.

(6) “The real problem with U.S. policy toward Afghanistan: Hamid Karzai and the CIA,” The Trenchant Observer, November 26, 2013.

The Trenchant Observer

Corrupt-istan Update: Karzai’s Brazen Defiance

Thursday, November 11th, 2010

Karzai blocks anti-corruption efforts

After Hamid Karzai intervened to thwart the investigation and arrest of some of his top officials, including Mohammed Zia Salehi, a top security adviser, President Obama held several meetings with his top National Security staff.  Karzai had blocked the work of two special anti-corruption units that had been established with the support and close assistance of U.S. officials, and fired Deputy Attorney General Fazel Ahmad Faqiryar, who had overseen their activities.

At the close of one meeting on September 14, at the peak of the crisis caused by Karzai’s actions, Obama gave instructions to the relevant agencies to go back and come up with “more sophisticated options”.  See Mark Mazzetti and Rod Norland, “U.S. Debates Karzai’s Place in Fighting Corruption,” New York Times, September 14, 2010.

These reportedly included a strategy to go after small-scale corruption by Afghan officials, while ignoring the massive corruption led by Karzai and his associates at the top levels of the Afghan government. See The Trenchant Observer, “Fighting corruption and other challenges in Dexter Filkins’ Corrupt-istan,” September 18, 2010.

Bags of cash from Iran

Since that time, it has been reported that Iran has for several years routinely shipped millions of dollars in cash to high officials in the Afghan government. See Dexter Filkins, “Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful,” New York Times, October 23, 2010.

At a news conference on October 25, Karzai confirmed these cash payments from Iran, stating,

“They do give us bags of money — yes, yes, it is done,” Mr. Karzai said, responding to questions about a report in The New York Times on Sunday that Iran sends regular cash payments to his chief of staff, Umar Daudzai. “We are grateful to the Iranians for this.”

“Patriotism has a price,” he said.

To be sure, earlier reports revealed that the C.I.A. had been making payments to a large number of Afghan officials for years.

Lies and Insults: The Security Contractors Issue

What was perhaps more shocking were other statements made by Karzai at the October 25 news conference. Again, without evidence, he charged American security contractors with being behind a large number of attacks on the Afghan population, insisting on a December deadline for the withdrawal of foreign security contractors–with important exceptions. The latter include, presumably, his own security detail.

During an often hostile news conference, Mr. Karzai also accused the United States of financing the “killing” of Afghans by paying private security contractors to guard construction projects and convoys in Afghanistan. He has declined to postpone a December deadline he set for ending the use of private security forces despite urgent pleas from Western organizations, including development organizations, that need protection here.

The private security companies, many of which are paid for by the United States, are spreading chaos and unjustly killing Afghan civilians, Mr. Karzai said.

“The money dealing with the private security companies starts in the hallways of the U.S. government,” he said. “Then they send the money for killing here.”

Under a decree he issued in August, all private security firms must stop operations by Dec. 17. The United States and other Western governments here say they accept the ban, and they are trying to switch to the use of the Afghan police and soldiers to protect their military convoys…

They have asked for additional time to make the change, especially for civilian development organizations (which) say they will not be able to continue work without security for employees…

The Afghan president said security companies were responsible for a litany of bloody crimes against the country’s people. “When this money comes to Afghanistan, it causes insecurity in Afghan homes and causes the killing of Afghan children and causes explosions and terrorism in Afghanistan,” Mr. Karzai said.

He leveled several accusations against Western interests in Afghanistan and the news media, even going so far as to say that the security companies were interchangeable with the Taliban.

“In fact we don’t know how many of the explosions are the fault of the Taliban and how much by them,” said Mr. Karzai, referring to the security companies.

–Dexter Filkins and Alissa J. Rubin, “Afghan Leader Admits His Office Gets Cash from Iran,” New York Times, October 25, 2010.

Several days later, the ban on private security contractors was pushed back at least two months, allowing time for further consultations.

Three additional aspects of the security contractors issue are important, but have received relatively little attention in the press. First, if the ban on private security contractors stands, the billions of U.S. dollars now spent on providing personal security for U.S. civilian workers and contractors would presumably be funneled through the Afghan government. This would provide enormous and new sources of revenue to Afghan officials through graft and corruption, while enabling Karzai to strengthen his hold on power through his patronage networks.

Second, and more critical in terms of the U.S. military campaign and strategy, transferring this security function to Afghans would draw police and army personnel away from the urgent task of holding territory that has been cleared of the Taliban.

A final point is that Afghan army and police officials, many of whom are illiterate, are hardly likely to be able to provide the sophisticated security protection they would be replacing. As a result, the civilian side of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan could collapse.

“Sophisticated Options”: Charges Against Salehi Dropped; “Radio Silence” on New and Ongoing Electoral Fraud

Four Republican senators visited Kabul on November 10, concerned about corruption in the Karzai government.  The New York Times reports,

Senator John McCain, an Arizona Republican and former presidential candidate, said the members of the delegation planned to forcefully raise the issue of corruption with Mr. Karzai. “We will bring up a couple of recent events that are very disturbing,” Mr. McCain said. He did not elaborate, but on Monday, Afghan officials said that corruption charges had been dropped against a Karzai aide, Mohammed Zia Salehi.

Mr. Karzai had intervened to have Mr. Salehi released from prison after he was arrested by an antigraft unit in late July. The case was embarrassing to the Americans, however, as it emerged that Mr. Salehi had been on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The contours of the more “sophisticated options” adopted by the Obama administration now appear clear. These “more sophisticated options” seem to consist of not undertaking any anti-corruption activities that might get Karzai upset.

They also appear to include maintaining a “radio silence” regarding the massive fraud in the National Assembly elections held on September 18. One of Karzai’s ministers, Ismail Khan, was allegedly caught on tape directing part of the fraud. The tape has been played on Afghan television.

Nonetheless, the U.S. and its allies have been unwilling to question the election results.

A protracted political fight over the legitimacy of the elections is something U.S. and NATO officials are trying to avoid. As they prepare to make their case for progress in the Afghan war at a summit in Lisbon and a December review in the United States, they have said the allegations lack evidence.
–Joshua Partlow, Audio files raise new questions about Afghan elections,”Washington Post, November 11, 2010.

A Primary Obstacle to “Good Governance” in Afghanistan

It is apparent that a primary obstacle to providing the “good governance” required to avoid a collapse of the government in Afghanistan is Hamid Karzai. Bearing in mind that he assumed the office of president only as the result of massive fraud which he himself apparently orchestrated, he cannot properly be viewed as the elected and legitimate president of Afghanistan.

It is time for the U.S. to start developing a Plan B, which would involve the early departure of Hamid Karzai from Afghanistan. As noted earlier,

What Obama needs to do is to take the bull by the horns, and start exploring options for the early departure of Hamid Karzai. This will be a monumentally challenging task. So was D-Day in World War II.

A starting point might be for the U.S. Congress to pass a law providing that no U.S. funds or personnel could be used to fund Hamid Karzai’s security detail. This prohibition could be lifted only when restrictions by the Afghan government on the use of private security contractors in Afghanistan had been revoked.

When someone like Karzai persistently directs lies and insults against you, while you are funding the very security that enables him to stay in power, you must either stand up and burst the bonds of a dependent and abusive relationship, or suffer the consequences of being a wimp.

In this case, the consequences of being a wimp are likely to be the continued loss of American and Allied lives and treasure, to no avail, and eventually the collapse of the Afghan government.

See, e.g.,

Dexter Filkins and Sharifullah Sahak, “Afghan Police Unit Defects to Taliban, Leaving Burning Station Behind,” The New York Times, November 1, 2010.

Greg Miller, “U.S. military campaign to topple resilient Taliban hasn’t succeeded, The Washington Post, October 27, 2010.

The Trenchant Observer

www.trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com

Comments are invited.