Posts Tagged ‘derecho internacional’
Wednesday, December 12th, 2012
This article was first published on September 1, 2012
The situation in Syria (is) unfolding “in front of our eyes”, with the regime deploying fighter jets against the people, in addition to heavy artillery and tanks, (Ahmet DAVUTOĞLU, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, told the Security Council on August 30). “How long are we going to sit and watch while an entire generation is being wiped out by random bombardment and deliberate mass targeting?” he asked. “If we do not act against such a crime against humanity happening in front of our eyes, we become accomplice to the crime,” he warned.
As we wrote following the August 30 meeting of the Security Council,
Everyone wants a ceasefire and an end to the killing. Few seem to have come to grips with the fact that the use of force will be required, outside the framework of the Security Council. There can be little doubt that, within the Security Council itself, there is not going to be any agreement to use force (or even to adopt strong economic sanctions) to bring al-Assad’s barbarism to a halt.
This will have to be done outside the framework of the Security Council. What is needed is for one or more countries, preferably but not necessarily acting as a coalition, to just act to set up the safe zones, and one or more accompanying no-fly zones if that is required as a result of al-Assad’s response.
–U.N. Security Council Meets: More “blah, blah, blah”, and no action—Obama’s debacle in Syria — Update #82 (August 30), August 31, 2012.
Such action should be accompanied by a justification under international law.
That justification should stress that the purpose of the action is to protect the population of Syria against the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The stated purpose of the operation should not be to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad, which is impermissible under international law. On the other hand, it would be permissible if an operation which protected the population against the commission of such crimes also facilitated a process that would bring to account those in Syria who are responsible for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
While such fine distinctions may seem of little significance to those not versed in international law, they are in fact quite important in terms of limiting the precedent that would be set and obtaining support from other countries for such action, if not immediately at least over time.
For further discussion of legal justifications for intervention in Syria, see the following articles by The Trenchant Observer and the sources cited therein:
Continuing massacres in Syria, at Daraya and elsewhere; legal justification for military intervention — Obama’s Debacle in Syria —Update #78 (August 26), August 26, 2012
REPRISE: Humanitarian Intervention in Syria Without Security Council Authorization—Obama’s Debacle in Syria— Update #68 (July 25), July 25, 2012
Military Intervention to establish “no-kill zones” and humanitarian corridors—Syria Update #9 (February 25), February 24, 2012
The critical issue with respect to legal justifications for establishing and defending “safe zones” or “no-kill zones” in Syria, and the establishment of no-fly zones if required, is whether such action would violate Article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) provides:
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
…
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
On the face of it, the use of force to enforce a no-fly zone, or to defend a “safe zone” from assaults by Syria’s army, would involve an action against the “territorial integrity” of Syria. This is the horn of the dilemma.
Read literally, any permanent member of the Security Council could, through the use of its veto, block any military action by any state within the territory of another state, except in the case of an “armed attack”, no matter what the circumstances. In principle, such a veto could block any action by the civilized nations of the world to bring to a halt a war crimes and crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing such as occurred in Kosovo, or even genocide such as that conducted by Adolph Hitler during World War II.
Various interpretations of the Charter have proposed ways out of this logical box. One is the so-called “teleological” interpretation, by which Article 2(4) must be interpreted not literally, but rather in the light of the general purposes of the U.N. Charter and its other principles. Using this approach, one might justify the establishment of “no-kill zones” and “no-fly zones” in Syria.
The problem is that such “teleological” interpretations might open Pandora’s box, allowing multiple interpretations and opportunities for abuse by states intervening for their own purposes, e.g., to overthrow the al-Assad regime, while putting a humanitarian argument forward to justify their actions. Or, to cite another example, Israel and the United States might attempt to justify an attack on Iran to take out or greatly degrade its nuclear enrichment capabilities and what they believe is a secret program aimed at developing nuclear weapons, on the rationale that it is necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Alternatively, Israel and the United States could in principle attempt to justify an attack on Iran as an exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense, an exception to the prohibition in Article 2(4) contained in Article 51 of the Charter, which provides:
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The key words in Article 51 are “if an armed attack occurs”, which has been interpreted as embodying the requirements that the armed attack have occurred or be imminent, immediate and leave no time for other actions. Exercise of the right of self-defense has traditionally been subject to the requirements “immediacy, necessity and proportionality”.
See Flavio Paioletti, “The 21st Century Challenges to Article 51,” e-International Relations, June 30, 2011.
The United States and other nations have not always acted within this tight legal framework. In 1999, for example, the United States and NATO conducted a unilateral bombing campaign against Serbia in a successful effort to get the government to stop its policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Despite its humanitarian purpose, no legal justification was advanced by the U.S. Department of State for the action.
In Iraq, the United States sought to justify its 2003 invasion of that country both on the basis of previous Security Council resolutions and on the basis of the “right” advanced by the Bush administration to “pre-emptive self defense”.
The concern of states and legal scholars from around the world is that by allowing “teleological” interpretations of Article 2(4) or expansive interpretations of what constitutes “an armed attack” creating a right of individual and collective self-defense, such interpretations would open the door to increasingly expansive assertions of the right to use force across international frontiers. It is significant that in the case of Kosovo, no legal justification was offered.
So, we are left with the legal regime brilliantly defined by the founders of the United Nations to establish rules and mechanisms to effectively regulate the international use of force, on the one hand, and the fact that as the populations of more and more countries seek to demand respect for their fundamental human rights, and the right to participate in government, existing dictorships may resort to the appalling use of terror and crimes against humanity and war crimes in defending their hold on power, as has happened recently in Libya and Syria.
Unlike domestic laws and the constitution in the U.S., the United Nations Charter and other international agreements are subject to rules of strict interpretation, as established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This makes sense, as nations are generally extremely wary of ceding authority to international institutions, and rules of strict interpretation are necessary in order to secure participation in international treaties. While the United Nations Charter is something of a special case, since very few countries would consider withdrawal from the organization, acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice remains voluntary, a fact which underlines the continuing importance of rules of strict interpretation.
Caught in this logical box, are we to stand idly by as tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of human beings are slaughtered, whenever a permanent member of the Security Council exercises a veto?
The United Nations Charter is 67 years old. It has survived the Korean war, the war in Vietnam, the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan (1980), the Balkan wars, genocide in Rwanda and the Sudan, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The fundamental question is whether states should: (1) simply act outside the charter when they feel compelled to do so for humanitarian reasons (e.g., Kosovo); (2) justify their actions on legal grounds, preferably as taken with the support of regional organizations (e.g., NATO) or a broad coalition of nations; or (3) do nothing in the face of acts of barbarism such as those being committed in Syria.
In the case of Kosovo, Russia brought a resolution to a vote in the Security Council which condemned the bombing of Serbia, but the resolution was defeated 12-3.
Perhaps that is as close to 100% compliance with the Charter norms as we can get in the world today.
The ultimate choice is between undertaking effective action that will halt the atrocities in Syria, or sticking with our current policies.
In the case of the U.S., the current policy is carefully calibrated to comply with the requirements on the use of force laid down by the International Court of Justice in 1986 in the Nicaragua case. In that case, the Court held that direction and control of rebel groups was required in order for assistance to rebel groups to constitute an armed attack, thereby triggering a right of individual or collective self defense.
If the decision is made to establish safe zones and associated no-fly zones (if necessary), a final choice is whether to provide some legal justification for such action, or to follow the example of the United States in the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, and offer none.
While the choice here is not entirely clear, a strong argument can be made for advancing a highly restrictive legal justification, narrowly tailored to the circumstances in the Syrian case, together with the support of a regional body such as NATO, and undertaken only as a provisional measure of protection until such time as the Security Council can act effectively to protect the population of Syria from the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Russia may bring a resolution condemning such action in the Security Council. Assuming the resolution is defeated by a healthy margin, as occurred in the case of Kosovo, this may be the closest to compliance with the Charter as is possible today.
The Trenchant Observer
Tags: Article 2, Article 2(4), Artículo 2 párrafo 4, Assad, bachar al-assad, Bashar al-Assad, Carta das Nacões Unidas, Carta de las Naciones Unidas, Charte des Nations Unies, China, derecho internacional, direito internacional, droit international, e-International Relations, Flavio Paioletti, humanitarian intervention, il uman il-mutahida, International Law, intervenção militar, Intervention militaire, interventionsverbot, justificação jurídica, justificación jurídica, justificacion juridique, Legal Justications for military intervention in Syria, Legal Justififcation, Militarintervention, military intervention, paragraphe 4, progibición, prohibicão, prohibition of the use of force, Russia, Siria, surria, Syien, syria, Syrie, U.N. Charter, United States, uso de forza, uso de fuerza, Völkerrecht
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Saturday, September 1st, 2012
The situation in Syria (is) unfolding “in front of our eyes”, with the regime deploying fighter jets against the people, in addition to heavy artillery and tanks, (Ahmet DAVUTOĞLU, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, told the Security Council on August 30). “How long are we going to sit and watch while an entire generation is being wiped out by random bombardment and deliberate mass targeting?” he asked. “If we do not act against such a crime against humanity happening in front of our eyes, we become accomplice to the crime,” he warned.
As we wrote following the August 30 meeting of the Security Council,
Everyone wants a ceasefire and an end to the killing. Few seem to have come to grips with the fact that the use of force will be required, outside the framework of the Security Council. There can be little doubt that, within the Security Council itself, there is not going to be any agreement to use force (or even to adopt strong economic sanctions) to bring al-Assad’s barbarism to a halt.
This will have to be done outside the framework of the Security Council. What is needed is for one or more countries, preferably but not necessarily acting as a coalition, to just act to set up the safe zones, and one or more accompanying no-fly zones if that is required as a result of al-Assad’s response.
–U.N. Security Council Meets: More “blah, blah, blah”, and no action—Obama’s debacle in Syria — Update #82 (August 30), August 31, 2012.
Such action should be accompanied by a justification under international law.
That justification should stress that the purpose of the action is to protect the population of Syria against the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The stated purpose of the operation should not be to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad, which is impermissible under international law. On the other hand, it would be permissible if an operation which protected the population against the commission of such crimes also facilitated a process that would bring to account those in Syria who are responsible for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
While such fine distinctions may seem of little significance to those not versed in international law, they are in fact quite important in terms of limiting the precedent that would be set and obtaining support from other countries for such action, if not immediately at least over time.
For further discussion of legal justifications for intervention in Syria, see the following articles by The Trenchant Observer and the sources cited therein:
Continuing massacres in Syria, at Daraya and elsewhere; legal justification for military intervention — Obama’s Debacle in Syria —Update #78 (August 26), August 26, 2012
REPRISE: Humanitarian Intervention in Syria Without Security Council Authorization—Obama’s Debacle in Syria— Update #68 (July 25), July 25, 2012
Military Intervention to establish “no-kill zones” and humanitarian corridors—Syria Update #9 (February 25), February 24, 2012
The critical issue with respect to legal justifications for establishing and defending “safe zones” or “no-kill zones” in Syria, and the establishment of no-fly zones if required, is whether such action would violate Article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) provides:
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
…
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
On the face of it, the use of force to enforce a no-fly zone, or to defend a “safe zone” from assaults by Syria’s army, would involve an action against the “territorial integrity” of Syria. This is the horn of the dilemma.
Read literally, any permanent member of the Security Council could, through the use of its veto, block any military action by any state within the territory of another state, except in the case of an “armed attack”, no matter what the circumstances. In principle, such a veto could block any action by the civilized nations of the world to bring to a halt a war crimes and crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing such as occurred in Kosovo, or even genocide such as that conducted by Adolph Hitler during World War II.
Various interpretations of the Charter have proposed ways out of this logical box. One is the so-called “teleological” interpretation, by which Article 2(4) must be interpreted not literally, but rather in the light of the general purposes of the U.N. Charter and its other principles. Using this approach, one might justify the establishment of “no-kill zones” and “no-fly zones” in Syria.
The problem is that such “teleological” interpretations might open Pandora’s box, allowing multiple interpretations and opportunities for abuse by states intervening for their own purposes, e.g., to overthrow the al-Assad regime, while putting a humanitarian argument forward to justify their actions. Or, to cite another example, Israel and the United States might attempt to justify an attack on Iran to take out or greatly degrade its nuclear enrichment capabilities and what they believe is a secret program aimed at developing nuclear weapons, on the rationale that it is necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Alternatively, Israel and the United States could in principle attempt to justify an attack on Iran as an exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defense, an exception to the prohibition in Article 2(4) contained in Article 51 of the Charter, which provides:
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The key words in Article 51 are “if an armed attack occurs”, which has been interpreted as embodying the requirements that the armed attack have occurred or be imminent, immediate and leave no time for other actions. Exercise of the right of self-defense has traditionally been subject to the requirements “immediacy, necessity and proportionality”.
See Flavio Paioletti, “The 21st Century Challenges to Article 51,” e-International Relations, June 30, 2011.
The United States and other nations have not always acted within this tight legal framework. In 1999, for example, the United States and NATO conducted a unilateral bombing campaign against Serbia in a successful effort to get the government to stop its policy of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Despite its humanitarian purpose, no legal justification was advanced by the U.S. Department of State for the action.
In Iraq, the United States sought to justify its 2003 invasion of that country both on the basis of previous Security Council resolutions and on the basis of the “right” advanced by the Bush administration to “pre-emptive self defense”.
The concern of states and legal scholars from around the world is that by allowing “teleological” interpretations of Article 2(4) or expansive interpretations of what constitutes “an armed attack” creating a right of individual and collective self-defense, such interpretations would open the door to increasingly expansive assertions of the right to use force across international frontiers. It is significant that in the case of Kosovo, no legal justification was offered.
So, we are left with the legal regime brilliantly defined by the founders of the United Nations to establish rules and mechanisms to effectively regulate the international use of force, on the one hand, and the fact that as the populations of more and more countries seek to demand respect for their funamental human rights, and the right to participate in government, existing dictorships may resort to the appalling use of terror and crimes against humanity and war crimes in defending their hold on power, as has happened recently in Libya and Syria.
Unlike domestic laws and the constitution in the U.S., the United Nations Charter and other international agreements are subject to rules of strict interpretation, as established in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This makes sense, as nations are generally extremely wary of ceding authority to international institutions, and rules of strict interpretation are necessary in order to secure participation in international treaties. While the United Nations Charter is something of a special case, since very few countries would consider withdrawal from the organization, acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice remains voluntary, a fact which underlines the continuing importance of rules of strict interpretation.
Caught in this logical box, are we to stand idly by as tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of human beings are slaughtered, whenever a permanent member of the Security Council exercises a veto?
The United Nations Charter is 67 years old. It has survived the Korean war, the war in Vietnam, the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan (1980), the Balkan wars, genocide in Rwanda and the Sudan, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The fundamental question is whether states should: (1) simply act outside the charter when they feel compelled to do so for humanitarian reasons (e.g., Kosovo); (2) justify their actions on legal grounds, preferably as taken with the support of regional organizations (e.g., NATO) or a broad coalition of nations; or (3) do nothing in the face of acts of barbarism such as those being committed in Syria.
In the case of Kosovo, Russia brought a resolution to a vote in the Security Council which condemned the bombing of Serbia, but the resolution was defeated 12-3.
Perhaps that is as close to 100% compliance with the Charter norms as we can get in the world today.
The ultimate choice is between undertaking effective action that will halt the atrocities in Syria, or sticking with our current policies.
In the case of the U.S., the current policy is carefully calibrated to comply with the requirements on the use of force laid down by the International Court of Justice in 1986 in the Nicaragua case. In that case, the Court held that direction and control of rebel groups was required in order for assistance to rebel groups to constitute an armed attack, thereby triggering a right of individual or collective self defense.
If the decision is made to establish safe zones and associated no-fly zones (if necessary), a final choice is whether to provide some legal justification for such action, or to follow the example of the United States in the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, and offer none.
While the choice here is not entirely clear, a strong argument can be made for advancing a highly restrictive legal justification, narrowly tailored to the circumstances in the Syrian case, together with the support of a regional body such as NATO, and undertaken only as a provisional measure of protection until such time as the Security Council can act effectively to protect the population of Syria from the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Russia may bring a resolution condemning such action in the Security Council. Assuming the resolution is defeated by a healthy margin, as occurred in the case of Kosovo, this may be the closest to compliance with the Charter as is possible today.
The Trenchant Observer
Tags: Article 2, Artículo 2 párrafo 4, Assad, bachar al-assad, Bashar al-Assad, Carta das Nacões Unidas, Carta de las Naciones Unidas, Charte des Nations Unies, China, derecho internacional, direito internacional, droit international, e-International Relations, Flavio Paioletti, humanitarian intervention, il uman il-mutahida, International Law, intervenção militar, Intervention militaire, interventionsverbot, justificação jurídica, justificación jurídica, justificacion juridique, Legal Justications for military intervention in Syria, Legal Justififcation, Militarintervention, military intervention, paragraphe 4, progibición, prohibicão, prohibition of the use of force, Russia, Siria, surria, Syien, syria, Syrie, U.N. Charter, United States, uso de forza, uso de fuerza, Völkerrecht
Posted in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Barack Obama, Brazil, China, Crimes Against Humanity, Dictatorship, Egypt, extrajudicial execution, France, Germany, Guatemala, History, human rights, India, internal supporters of human rights, International Law, Iran, Iraq, Israel, kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Mossad, NATO, Nuclear Proliferation, Qatar, Russia, sanctions, Saudi Arabia, self-defense, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, State Department, State Department Legal Adviser, syria, Togo, Tunisia, U.N. Charter, U.N. Convention Against Torture, U.N. Security Council, U.N. Torture Convention, U.S. Intervention, U.S. Military, united arab emirates, United Kingdom, United States, use of force, war crimes | Comments Off
Tuesday, January 24th, 2012
En la sesión de hoy, 24 de enero, el Tribunal Supremo escuchó los argumentos de la fiscalía, la defensa, e de los querrellantes en torno a las cuestiones prévias, que se deben dilucidarse antes de entrar en el fondo del juicio contra Baltasar Garzón por prevaricación relacionado con “el caso de la memoria histórica”.
Dos de las cuestiones prévias podrían llevar al sobreseimiento de este caso. La primera es la acusación de que Luciano Varela, el juez quien instruyó la causa, violó las más básicas normas de la imparcialidad judicial cuando en lugar de rechazar una demanda viciada e incompleta, ayudó a los querellantes corregir sus defectos. Los detalles alegados de como lo hizo parecen ser escandalosos.
La segunda cuestión prévia se gira alrededor de la doctrina Botín del mismo Tribunal Suprema, segón la cual el Tribunal no debe conocer una causa que no cuenta con el apoyo de la fiscalía.
Al oír los argumentos, el Tribunal Supremo suspendió el proceso por una semana mientras llegue a las decisiones correspondientes sobre las cuestiones prévias. De aceptar cualquiera de las dos, el caso se clausurá, dejando a Garzón a la espera de la decisión del Tribunal Supremo en el caso de “las escuchas Gürtel”.
Para los últimos reportajes, véase, por ejemplo:
Julio M. Lázaro, “El fiscal y Garzón exigen la nulidad de la “insólita” instrucción de Varela: Durísimo informe de la fiscalía contra la acusación admitida a Manos Limpias,” El País, 24 de enero de 2012.
Lázaro cita al fiscal Luís Navajas, quien declaró lo siguiente:
“En mis 36 años como fiscal, jamás había visto una resolución parecida, ni en el fondo ni en la forma”, dijo sobre las indicaciones de Varela. Para el fiscal, fue una decisión “absolutamente insólita e insostenible” y la consecuencia fue “transmutar una acusación que no se sostenía” y sobre la que el juez del Supremo coadyuvó “a reconstruir lo que era absolutamente irreconstruíble”.
Véase tambíen,
N. Villanueva, “El fiscal defiende a Garzón y pide que la «memoria histórica» se zanje sin juicio: Arremete contra el instructor, Luciano Varela, por sentar al juez en el banquillo: algo «insólito e insostenible»,” ABC.es, 25 de enero de 2012.
Un comentario por Luis García Montero–quien es poeta, no jurista–sobre el significado más amplio de los casos contra Garzón, que él compara al caso Dreyfuss en Francia al fines del siglo 19, habla de la extrema partidarización de las justicia en España. Además comenta:
Hay situaciones que simbolizan el malestar de una época y, más allá de su significado particular, ponen el dedo en la llaga de un momento histórico. Así ocurrió a finales del sigo XIX con el juicio seguido en Francia contra el capitán Alfred Dreyfus. La falsa acusación de espionaje y la condena a la isla del Diablo tuvo el apoyo decidido del nacionalismo violento y los poderes antisemitas, pero provocó la indignación de una parte de la sociedad, el sector más democrático y concienciado. El caso Dreyfus resumía las contradicciones y las mentiras de la Tercera República francesa.
Ocurrió lo mismo con los debates provocados en España a partir de 1921 por el Desastre de Annual. La tragedia y su polémica pusieron al descubierto no ya las corrupciones dentro de la monarquía de Alfonso XIII, sino la corrupción misma de un régimen fundado en la manipulación de la voluntad popular y en la distancia entre la España oficial y la España real.
Los juicios contra Baltasar Garzón representan un acontecimiento parecido….
….
Aquí no se discute si Baltasar Garzón es simpático o antipático, si resolvió bien o mal en un caso del pasado o si nos parecen oportunos los jueces estrella. Se discute si actuó como prevaricador en las instrucciones del caso Gürtel o en la causa contra los crímenes del franquismo. La opinión de numerosos juristas nacionales e internacionales defiende las interpretaciones del juez Garzón. Esa es la prueba evidente de que no existe delito de prevaricación, sino una forma posible de interpretar la ley.
…
¿Qué ocurre entonces? El Poder Judicial español descansa en la misma inercia bipartidista que el juego político. No participar de la disciplina de los unos o los otros, como caras de un sistema de control, significa quedarse a la intemperie. El bipartidismo –yo coloco a los míos y tú a los tuyos– ha generado familias de poder que se autoalimentan y actúan de acuerdo con sus rencores profesionales.
…
Aunque la Fiscalía y los mandos policiales avalan sus actuaciones contra una trama vergonzosa de corruptos, Baltasar Garzón parece condenado. El descrédito nacional e internacional de la Justicia española es un síntoma. Vivimos en un reino degradado, con una memoria y unas instituciones degradadas. La prevaricación es nuestra propia realidad. Somos una mentira. Damos risa.
–Luis García Montero, “Dreyfus, Annual y Garzón,” Blog “La realidad y el sueño”, Público.es (blogs), 22 de enero de 2012.
El Observador Incisivo
(The Trenchant Observer)
observer@trenchantobserver.com
www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
Véase otros artículos de Observador Incisivo sobre el Caso Garzón, entre ellos los siguientes:
The legal essence of the cases of “prevaricación” against Baltasar Garzón
January 20, 2012
Complaint before U.N. Special Rapporteur alleges U.S. judicial interference in Garzón torture cases in Spain
January 19, 2012
The Baltasar Garzón Case: In Spain, justice itself is on trial
January 17, 2012
¡Que pena para España! Los casos contra Garzón llegan al juicio
16 de enero de 2012
Tribunal Supremo de Justicia rechaza apelación de Garzón para ordenar pruebas; quedan pendientes otros recursos
21 de setiembre de 2010
Tags: 446.3, 447, abc, abc.es, acoso, Acoso al juez garzon, actuación de Luis Varela, acusación, Al Jazeera, Alicia Moreno, Amy Goodman, Àngeles Vázquez, apelación, appeal, Argentina, Art 446, Article 446, Article 446.3, Article 447, Artículo, Audiencia nacional, auto, auto de juez Varela, Baltasar Garzón, carlos yárnoz, cases against Garzón, caso contra garzon, Caso de la memoria hisorica, Caso Gurtel, casos contra Garzón, champion, Chile, clausura, Código Penal, congarzon.com, Craig Whitlock, Criminal Chamber, Cristina Almeida, cuestiones prévias, de la justicia, Democracy Now, derecho internacional, derechos humanos, doctrina botin, Dreyfus, editorial, El Observador Incisivo, El País, Ely Ould Dah, enjuiciamiento, errores de Varela, España, european court of human rights, European judge, Falange Española de las JONS, Fiscal Luis Navajas, fiscalía, France, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, Gürtel Network, honor profesional, human rights, imagen, insólita, insostenible, instrucción, intentional judicial error, intento de golpe de 1981, International Human Rights, International Law, January 17, Javier Chinchón, Jesús Duva, Joaquín Ruiz Infante, José Yoldi, Juan Carlos Algañaz, Juan Saavedra, judiciary, juez, juicio penal, Julio M. Lázaro, jurisdicción universal, Justicia, kangaroo court, La realidad y el sueño, Le Monde, Llamamiento, llamiento, Luciano Varela, Luis garcia montero, Luis Navajas, Lydia Vicente, magistrado, Manifiesto de apoyo, Manos Limpias, Margarita Robles, Mariano Rajoy, N. Villanueva, Natalia Junquera, New York Times, observador incisivo, obstruction of justice, order, order of prosecution, Pablo Varas, Partido Popular, Pere Ríos, perfect storm, photo, Pinochet, Poder Judicial, posición jurídica, prevaricación, prevaricato, private criminal action, prosecution, publico.es, querella, querellantes, símbolo, sobreseimiento, Spain, Spanish, stain, Struugle for democracy in spain, Supreme Court, The Economist, Themis, tortura, Torture, travesty, Trenchant Observer, Tribuanl Supremo, TV, U.S. angle, United Kingdom, universal jurisdiction, Valencia, Washington Post, Wikileaks cables, wiretapping, www.congarzon.com, ¡Que pena!
Posted in Argentina, Baltasar Garzón, Barack Obama, CIA, History, human rights, International Law, Spain, State Department, Torture, U.N. Convention Against Torture, U.N. Torture Convention, United States | No Comments »
Friday, January 20th, 2012
The most essential legal aspect of two of the cases against Baltasar Garzón, the case relating to the Gürtel network wiretaps (las escuchas Gürtel) and the case relating to “historical memory”, is often obscured by a focus on whether Garzón made the right decisions in these cases, or not.
That aspect is the nature of the judicial error he is accused of committing. It is not unusual for judges to reach decisions that prove to be erroneous when reversed on appeal by a higher court. This is the normal way control of legality and of the actions of judges is maintained.
But what is involved in the Gürtel network case and the “historical memory” case is something altogether different. These cases involve private criminal actions brought by the accused in the Gürtel case and by two right-wing groups in the “historical memory” case. Those who disagree with the judge’s previous decisions are now having their day in court–against the judge–in criminal actions which they themselves have brought.
The nature of the charge is signficant: prevaricación, willful decision against justice.
As the Spanish Supreme Court proceeds to deliberate and issue a decision in the Gürtel network case, after three days of an oral trial at the Court, it is useful to closely reread the texts of Articles 446 and 447 of the Spanish Criminal Code, which are the provisions the criminal action against Garzón are based on. Then, after analyzing carefully the text of the law, the reader can decide whether prevaricación has been committed or is being committed in the case, and by whom.
The following analysis is reproduced from The Trenchant Observer, “Garzon’s Accusers are Accused: Abuse of Judicial Power in Garzón Case is Stain on Spanish Judiciary, “The Trenchant Observer, April 13, 2010.
…
With respect to the case against Garzón, it is not an overstatement to say that the entire Judiciary in Spain is on trial.
It is difficult to comprehend how the Supreme Court of Spain has rejected earlier appeals by Garzón to halt the proceedings. Judge Varela, according to reports in El País, has jumped the gun by characterizing the facts in dispute as constituting the more serious of two possible crimes which the alleged facts could even conceivably have constituted.
The first crime is that of Intentional Unjust Decision (Prevaricación) under Article 446.3 of the Spanish Criminal Code, which provides:
Article 446
The Judge or Magistrate who, knowingly, shall issue a decision or resolution that is unjust shall be punished:
1) With sentence of from one to four years imprisonment in the case of an unjust judgment against the accused in a criminal case for a felony when the sentence has not yet been executed, and with one and a half times the same sentence if the judgment has been executed. In both cases there will be imposed the additional punishment of absolute disqualification for a period of 10 to 20 years.
2) With the sentence of a fine of six to 12 months (wages) and special disqualification from public employment or office for a period of six to 12 years, in the case of an unjust judgment issued against a defendant in the case of a midemeanor (falta),
3) With the sentence of a fine of 12 to 24 months (wages) and special disqualification from public employment or office for a period of 10 to 20 years, when he issues any other decision or resolution that is unjust.
The second crime is that of Grossly Negligent Unjust Decision (Prevaricación) under Article 447 of the Criminal Code, which provides:
Article 447
The judge or magistrate who, by gross imprudence or inexcusable ignorance (imprudencia grave o ignorancia inexcusable), shall issue a decision or resolution which is manifestly unjust shall incur the punishment of special disqualification from public employment or office for a period of from two to six years.
Given the clear precedents that exist in international law, including a judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in 2003 upholding the French conviction of Ely Ould Dah of Mauritania for torture despite the fact that he was not present at the trial and despite a law of amnesty in Mauritania, it is difficult to see how the Spanish Supreme Court could reject the appeal of the denial of Garzon’s motion for dismissal, as they in fact did.
Whether Baltasar Garzón’s decisions were correct or not in accordance with Spanish law is a matter for the Spanish courts, and ultimately the European Court of Human Rights, to decide. The European Convention on Human Rights is itself part of Spanish constitutional law.
Appealing the decisions of a judge on legal grounds is a correct and proper way to express disagreement with a decision, within a democratic state governed by law.
Criminally prosecuting the judge who is the author of that decision in an attempt to end his career, is quite something else.
A travesty of justice has already occurred, at two levels: first, the order of prosecution by Judge Luciano Varela, and second, the decision of the Supreme Court to deny Garzon’s appeal of Varela’s denial of his motion for dismissal.
How long this travesty of justice continues will tell us a lot about the Spanish judiciary and the individuals who currently hold the highest judicial offices in Spain.
The idea that a European judge could have his career in effect ended by the machinations of fellow judges against him, for ordering the investigation of where victims of crimes against humanity (forced disappearances and presumed executions) are buried, is a stain on the Spanish Judiciary, which will remain until Garzón is cleared of these charges and any other charges of a similar nature.
Should the Spanish courts persist in failing to rectify this obvious abuse of judicial power, that stain will ultimately be sealed in history with a judgment against Spain by the European Court of Human Rights.
*****
While the analysis above refers to the “historical memory” case, it applies equally to the Gürtel network case, which was tried in the Supreme Court on January 17, 18 and 19, 2012. We are awaiting the decision in that case.
The trial of Garzón for prevaricación in the “historical memory” case begins next week, on January 24.
Stay tuned.
The Trenchant Observer
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
See also The Trenchant Observer, “The Baltasar Garzón Case: In Spain, justice itself is on trial,” January 17, 2012 (updated January 20, 2012).
Tags: 446.3, 447, acoso, apelación, appeal, Argentina, Article 446, Article 446.3, Article 447, Artículo, auto, auto de juez Varela, Baltasar Garzón, campeón, champion, Chile, Clarín, Código Penal, derecho internacional, derechos humanos, editorial, El Observador Incisivo, El País, Ely Ould Dah, enjuiciamiento, España, Europ-ean Court of Human Rights, European judge, France, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, human rights, instrucción, intentional judicial error, International Human Rights, International Law, Juan Carlos Algañaz, Juan Saavedra, judiciary, juez, juicio penal, Julio M. Lázaro, jurisdicción universal, Le Monde, Luciano Varela, magistrado, Manifiesto de apoyo, Margarita Robles, Natalia Junquera, New York Times, order, order of prosecution, Pablo Varas, Pere Ríos, photo, Pinochet, Poder Judicial, prevaricación, prevaricato, private criminal action, prosecution, querella, Spain, Spanish, stain, Supreme Court, The Economist, tortura, Torture, travesty, Tribuanl Supremo, United Kingdom, universal jurisdiction, www.congarzon.com
Posted in Baltasar Garzón, CIA, human rights, Intelligence, International Law, Justice Department, NATO, Spain, State Department, U.N. Convention Against Torture, U.N. Torture Convention, U.S Foreign Relations, U.S. Intervention, United States | No Comments »
Tuesday, September 21st, 2010
El Observador Incisivo
El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de España ha rechazado la apelación del juez Baltasar Garzón del auto de Luciano Varela que denegó su solicitud de presentar pruebas de expertos en el derecho penal y el derecho penal internacional, en el caso de “La Memoria Histórica”.
El estado de ánimo, la intención de Garzón en los momentos de abrir y dictar resoluciones en el caso de la memoria histórico, constituye el elemento primordial del delito de prevaricación del cual está acusado. Las pruebas solicitadas tendrían como objeto demostrar que lo que él creía ser ajustado al derecho español y al derecho penal internacional representaba una creencia razonable.
El hecho de que su creencia era razonable le hace más difícil al promotor comprobar que actuaba contra la justicia “a sabiendas”, esto en el caso del artículo 446 (3). En el caso del Artiículo 447, le haría muy difícil al promotor comprobar que la actuación de Garzón fuera “por imprudencia grave o ignorancia inexcusable” al dictar una “sentencia o resolución manifiestamente injusta.”
Jurídicamente, no se requiere que Garzón tuviera la razón absoluta en el caso del Artículo 446 (3). En el caso del Artículo 447, la resolución dificilmente podría ser “manifiestamente injusta” si otros expertos en la materia creían que era correcta, a menos que existiera jurisprudencia legal obligatoria sobre la cuestión.
El texto del Artículo 446 (3) del Código Penal establece:
TÍTULO XX.
DELITOS CONTRA LA ADMINISTRACIÓN DE JUSTICIA.
CAPÍTULO I.
DE LA PREVARICACIÓN.
Artículo 446.
El Juez o Magistrado que, a sabiendas, dictare sentencia o resolución injusta será castigado:
1. Con la pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años si se trata de sentencia injusta contra el reo en causa criminal por delito y la sentencia no hubiera llegado a ejecutarse, y con la misma pena en su mitad superior y multa de doce a veinticuatro meses si se ha ejecutado. En ambos casos se impondrá, además, la pena de inhabilitación absoluta por tiempo de diez a veinte años.
2. Con la pena de multa de seis a doce meses e inhabilitación especial para empleo o cargo público por tiempo de seis a diez años, si se tratara de una sentencia injusta contra el reo dictada en proceso por falta.
3. Con la pena de multa de doce a veinticuatro meses e inhabilitación especial para empleo o cargo público por tiempo de diez a veinte años, cuando dictara cualquier otra sentencia o resolución injustas.
El Artículo 447 del Códígo confirma que las palabras “a sabiendas” del Artículo 446 es más que “imprudencia grave o ignorancia inexcusable,” lo que está sancionado con inhabilitación especial de hasta seis años. El Artiículo 447 establece lo siguiente:
Artículo 447.
El Juez o Magistrado que por imprudencia grave o ignorancia inexcusable dictara sentencia o resolución manifiestamente injusta incurrirá en la pena de inhabilitación especial para empleo o cargo público por tiempo de dos a seis años.
Véase The Tenchant Observer, “Se acusan a los acusadores de Garzón; el caso Garzón es una mancha en el Poder Judicial
de España,” 14 de Abril de 2010.
Así que, de un golpe, el Supremo deniega a Garzón elementos de prueba contundentes para establecer que era razonable lo que creía requerido por el derecho, y de ahí la falta de mala intención de su parte, en el momento de abrir y actuar en el caso de la memoria histórico.
Por lo demás, informa El País,
Es decir, que el tribunal quiere pronunciarse lo justito, porque los cinco magistrados que firman la resolución y que ya han resuelto cuestiones que afectan al fondo del asunto, quieren ser los que juzguen a Garzón por estos hechos. Varios magistrados de otros tribunales y catedráticos no se explican este empecinamiento de estos magistrados de la Sala Segunda en ser ellos los que juzguen a Garzón. Estas fuentes consideran que una eventual condena de Garzón de seguir este procedimiento sería anulado por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos por falta de imparcialidad, ya que el tribunal que instruye no puede juzgar y esta Sala ha resuelto en apelación extremos que afectan al fondo del asunto, por lo que estarían claramente contaminados. Los citados magistrados y catedráticos no comprenden por qué el Supremo no designa a otros magistrados -la Sala la integran 15 jueces- para juzgar el caso y salvar el problema. Pero el caso es que son estos los que van a juzgar a Garzón.
–José Yoldi, “El Supremo rechaza las pruebas pedidas por Garzón para su defensa,” El País, el 8 de setiembre de 2010
Quedan pendientes, en tanto, otros recursos de Garzón relacionados al caso de la memoria histórico. Estos inclyen recursos de nulidad de las actuaciones, a los cuales no ha respondido el Supremo Tribunal de Justicia no obstante el largo tiempo transcurrido. Informa El País:
La Sala Segunda del Supremo llevaba cuatro meses sin resolver nada en este asunto desde que el juez instructor, Luciano Varela, notificó siete resoluciones en un mismo día.
Dos de los recursos fueron de nulidad de actuaciones planteados por el abogado de Baltasar Garzón, Gonzalo Martínez Fresneda, y a los que se adhirió el fiscal con un escrito con notoria contundencia. El letrado denunciaba que Varela había instruido a los querellantes Manos Limpias sobre la forma en la que tenían que presentar su escrito de acusación. Aunque retiraron varias páginas que habían sido literalmente copiadas de un auto de Varela, éste les indicó qué aspectos tenían que incluir en su escrito, lo que suponía una vulneración del principio de igualdad de armas en el proceso, ya que ayudaba a una de las partes en contra de otra.
El fiscal se adhirió a los recursos de apelación planteados por la defensa de Garzón en términos muy duros.
–El País, 8 de setiembre de 2010
Véase también “Garzón, más cerca de un juicio injusto,”
Nuevatribuna.es, 21 de setiembre de 2010.
Parece casi seguro, ahora, que los magistrados de la sala segunda penal del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia que denegaron las pruebas solicitadas por Garzón (Juan Saavedra, Adolfo Prego, Joaquín Jiménez, Francisco Monterde y Juan Ramón Berdugo), y que han tardado tanto en fallar sobre los demás recursos de Garzón, pasarán a la historia como actores principales en este caso increíble.
No es una exageración afirmar que este caso riesga de convertirse en algo como el caso Dreyfus de España, pero ya a la altura del año 2010 del siglo veintiuno.
Es lamentable que un judicatura altamente politizada no aprecie el importe histórico de lo que está haciendo. Bien que llegara a absolver a Garzón, en última instancia, el daño a la credibilidad del Poder Judicial español y a la sociedad española ya se habrá producido.
Es una pena.
El Observador Incisivo
(The Trenchant Observer)
Véase también www.congarzón.com.
Tags: 446.3, 447, acoso, apelación, appeal, Argentina, Article 446, Article 446.3, Article 447, Artículo, Artículo 44, Articulo 446.3, Artículo 447, auto, auto de juez Varela, Baltasar Garzón, campeón, champion, Chile, Clarín, Código Penal, congarzon.com, convención euroea de derechos humanos, convenio europeo de derechos humanos, derecho internacional, derechos humanos, editorial, El Observador Incisivo, El País, Ely Ould Dah, enjuiciamiento, España, Europ-ean Court of Human Rights, European judge, France, fundamento jurídco, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, human rights, instrucción, intentional judicial error, International Human Rights, International Law, José Yoldi, Juan Carlos Algañaz, Juan Saavedra, judiciary, juez, juicio penal, Julio M. Lázaro, jurisdicción universal, Le Monde, legal argument, Luciano Varela, magistrado, Manifiesto de apoyo, Margarita Robles, Natalia Junquera, New York Times, order, order of prosecution, Pablo Varas, Pere Ríos, photo, Pinochet, Poder Judicial, prevaricación, prevaricato, private criminal action, prosecution, querella, recurso, recurso de apelación, Spain, Spanish, stain, Supreme Court, The Economist, tortura, Torture, travesty, Tribuanl Supremo, tribunal europeo de derechos humanos, United Kingdom, universal jurisdiction
Posted in U.S Foreign Relations | 1 Comment »
Thursday, June 24th, 2010
El Observador Incisivo
El escrito del abogado solicita el archivo de la causa por los crímenes del franquismo, como pide la fiscalía
El abogado de Baltasar Garzón, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, ha pedido al Tribunal Supremo la absolución del juez en la causa abierta contra él por investigar los crímenes del franquismo. En el escrito de defensa presentado ayer, el letrado solicita la aplicación de la doctrina Botín, es decir, que no se abra juicio oral a instancias de la acusación popular, que ejercen Manos Limpias y la asociación Libertad e Identidad, ya que la fiscalía ha pedido el archivo de la causa.
–El País, 18 de junio de 2010
Véase también: el escrito de la defensa del juez Garzón.
Véase igualmente:
Manifiesto de Apoyo al Juez Garzón
www.congarzon.com
The Trenchant Observer (El Observador Incisivo), Análisis profundizado de los errores de Varela en el “Caso Garzón”, 20 de mayo de 2010, que contiene además una lista de artículos anteriores por el Observador.
El Observador Incisivo
(The Trenchant Observer)
observer@trenchantobserver.com
“trenchantobserv” en Twitter
Los comentarios son invitados.
Tags: 446.3, 447, acoso, Andrés Márquez Aranda, Antonio Casado, apelación, appeal, Argentina, Article 446, Article 446.3, Article 447, Artículo, auto, auto de juez Varela, Baltasar Garzón, blogs.diariosur.es, boutique legal, campeón, Carlos Jiménez Villarejo, champion, Chile, Clarín, Código Penal, congarzon.com, convención euroea de derechos humanos, convenio europeo de derechos humanos, derecho internacional, derechos humanos, diario sur, editorial, El Observador Incisivo, El País, Ely Ould Dah, enjuiciamiento, España, Europ-ean Court of Human Rights, Europa Press, European judge, fiscalía, fondo, France, fundamento jurídco, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, human rights, imparcial, indefensión del querellado, instrucción, intentional judicial error, International Human Rights, International Law, Javier Pérez Royo, José Yoldi, Juan Carlos Algañaz, Juan Saavedra, judiciary, juez, juicio justo, juicio penal, Julio M. Lázaro, jurídico, jurisdicción universal, Le Monde, legal argument, Luciano Varela, magistrado, Manifiesto de apoyo, Margarita Robles, ministerio fiscal, modelo de juez, Natalia Junquera, New York Times, observador incisivo, order, order of prosecution, Pablo Varas, parcialidad, Pere Ríos, photo, Pinochet, Poder Judicial, prevaricación, prevaricato, private criminal action, prosecution, QTR, querella, recurso, recurso de apelación, Spain, Spanish, stain, Supreme Court, The Economist, tortura, Torture, travesty, Trenchant Observer, Tribuanl Supremo, tribunal europeo de derechos humanos, United Kingdom, universal jurisdiction
Posted in Baltasar Garzón, Crimes Against Humanity, human rights, International Law, Spain | Comments Off
Thursday, May 20th, 2010
El Observador Incisivo
Un excelente artículo, publicado en El País del 19 de mayo de 2010, revisa la historia procesal del “Caso Garzón”, citando los múltiples errores del juez Luciano Varela en sus actuaciones con relación a la querella contra Garzón. Para los que se interesan en el fondo jurídico del caso, el artículo es de lectura obligatoria. Véase:
Andrés Márquez Aranda y Carlos Jiménez Villarejo, “A Garzón se le está negando un juicio justo,” El País, 19 de mayo de 2010
(Subtítulo) En este asunto, Varela incumple el modelo de juez constitucional, neutral e imparcial. Como señala la fiscalía, tramita el proceso atendiendo y favoreciendo a las acusaciones, con manifiesta indefensión del querellado.
(Andrés Márquez Aranda fue presidente del TSJ de Andalucía y Carlos Jiménez Villarejo fiscal jefe Anticorrupción.)
Veáse también los artículos siguientes:
Manifiesto de Apoyo al Juez Garzón
www.congarzon.com
Los artículos y comentarios sobre el “Caso Garzón” ya publicados por El Observador Incisvo (The Trenchant Observer) se listan a continuación:
Prix René Cassin; Auto de Varela de apertura de juicio contra Garzón; Intervenciones de parte de la Fiscalía
18 de mayo de 2010
Más reportajes y comentarios sobre el fondo jurídico del ‘Caso Garzón’
2 de mayo de 2010
Sobre el fondo jurídico del caso de prevaricación contra Baltasar Garzón
16 de abril de 2010
Se acusan a los acusadores de Garzón; el caso Garzón es una mancha en el Poder Judicial de España
14 de abril de 2010
Garzon’s Accusers are Accused: Abuse of Judicial Power in Garzón Case is Stain on Spanish Judiciary
April 13, 2010
Reportajes y Comentarios Sobre el Caso de Baltasar Garzón
12 de abril de 2010
In Spain, Judge Baltasar Garzón, Champion of Human Rights, is Prosecuted
April 11, 2010
En España, Enjuician al Juez Baltasar Garzón, Campeón de los Derechos Humanos
10 de abril de 2010
El Observador Incisivo
(The Trenchant Observer)
www.trenchantobserver.com
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
Se invitan los comentarios y críticas.
Tags: 446.3, 447, acoso, Andrés Márquez Aranda, Antonio Casado, apelación, appeal, Argentina, Article 446, Article 446.3, Article 447, Artículo, auto, auto de juez Varela, Baltasar Garzón, blogs.diariosur.es, boutique legal, campeón, Carlos Jiménez Villarejo, champion, Chile, Clarín, Código Penal, congarzon.com, convención euroea de derechos humanos, convenio europeo de derechos humanos, derecho internacional, derechos humanos, diario sur, editorial, El Observador Incisivo, El País, Ely Ould Dah, enjuiciamiento, España, Europ-ean Court of Human Rights, Europa Press, European judge, fiscalía, fondo, France, fundamento jurídco, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, human rights, imparcial, indefensión del querellado, instrucción, intentional judicial error, International Human Rights, International Law, Javier Pérez Royo, José Yoldi, Juan Carlos Algañaz, Juan Saavedra, judiciary, juez, juicio justo, juicio penal, Julio M. Lázaro, jurídico, jurisdicción universal, Le Monde, legal argument, Luciano Varela, magistrado, Manifiesto de apoyo, Margarita Robles, ministerio fiscal, modelo de juez, Natalia Junquera, New York Times, observador incisivo, order, order of prosecution, Pablo Varas, parcialidad, Pere Ríos, photo, Pinochet, Poder Judicial, prevaricación, prevaricato, private criminal action, prosecution, QTR, querella, recurso, recurso de apelación, Spain, Spanish, stain, Supreme Court, The Economist, tortura, Torture, travesty, Trenchant Observer, Tribuanl Supremo, tribunal europeo de derechos humanos, United Kingdom, universal jurisdiction
Posted in Baltasar Garzón, Crimes Against Humanity, History, human rights, International Law, Spain, Torture | 2 Comments »
Wednesday, May 19th, 2010

Photo AFP/Olivier Laban-Matteile -- juge espagnol baltasar garzon à sciences-po à Paris
El Observador Incisivo
Documentos y reportajes de especial interés con respecto al fondo jurídico del Caso Garzón incluyen los siguientes:
AFP, “Le juge Garzon à Paris: ‘la justice s’imposera,”” L’Express, le 17 mai 2010
Auto de Varela de Apertura de Juicio en el Caso Garzón, 11 de mayo de 2010
Texto de la intervención de la Fiscalía en el caso Garzón, 10 de mayo de 2010
Julio M. Lázaro, “La Fiscalía del Supremo pide la absolución de Garzón tras la apertura de juicio,” El País, 17 de mayo de 2010.
“Le juge Garzon réveille les plaies de l’Espagne,” (Edito), Le Monde, le 15 mai 2010
Véase el Manifiesto de apoyo al juez Garzón, con su análisis jurídico y otros links a artículos de interés, en el sitio siguiente:
Manifiesto de Apoyo al Juez Garzón
www.congarzon.com
Los artículos y comentarios ya publicados por El Observador Incisvo (The Trenchant Observer) se listan a continuación:
Más reportajes y comentarios sobre el fondo jurídico del ‘Caso Garzón’
2 de mayo de 2010
Sobre el fondo jurídico del caso de prevaricación contra Baltasar Garzón
16 de abril de 2010
Se acusan a los acusadores de Garzón; el caso Garzón es una mancha en el Poder Judicial de España
14 de abril de 2010
Garzon’s Accusers are Accused: Abuse of Judicial Power in Garzón Case is Stain on Spanish Judiciary
April 13, 2010
Reportajes y Comentarios Sobre el Caso de Baltasar Garzón
12 de abril de 2010
In Spain, Judge Baltasar Garzón, Champion of Human Rights, is Prosecuted
April 11, 2010
En España, Enjuician al Juez Baltasar Garzón, Campeón de los Derechos Humanos
10 de abril de 2010
El Observador Incisivo
(The Trenchant Observer)
www.trenchantobserver.com
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
Se invitan los comentarios y críticas.
Tags: 446.3, 447, acoso, Antonio Casado, apelación, appeal, Argentina, Article 446, Article 446.3, Article 447, Artículo, auto, auto de juez Varela, Baltasar Garzón, blogs.diariosur.es, boutique legal, campeón, champion, Chile, Clarín, Código Penal, congarzon.com, convención euroea de derechos humanos, convenio europeo de derechos humanos, derecho internacional, derechos humanos, diario sur, editorial, El Observador Incisivo, El País, Ely Ould Dah, enjuiciamiento, España, Europ-ean Court of Human Rights, Europa Press, European judge, fiscalía, fondo, France, fundamento jurídco, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, human rights, instrucción, intentional judicial error, International Human Rights, International Law, Javier Pérez Royo, José Yoldi, Juan Carlos Algañaz, Juan Saavedra, judiciary, juez, juicio penal, Julio M. Lázaro, jurídico, jurisdicción universal, Le Monde, legal argument, Luciano Varela, magistrado, Manifiesto de apoyo, Margarita Robles, ministerio fiscal, Natalia Junquera, New York Times, order, order of prosecution, Pablo Varas, Pere Ríos, photo, Pinochet, Poder Judicial, prevaricación, prevaricato, private criminal action, prosecution, QTR, querella, recurso, recurso de apelación, Spain, Spanish, stain, Supreme Court, The Economist, tortura, Torture, travesty, Tribuanl Supremo, tribunal europeo de derechos humanos, United Kingdom, universal jurisdiction
Posted in Baltasar Garzón, Crimes Against Humanity, History, human rights, International Law, Torture | 1 Comment »
Sunday, May 2nd, 2010
Un conocido juez antiterrorista en Francia ha afirmado que la actuación judicial con respecto a las querellas contra el juez Baltasar Garzón, por parte de una magistratura politizada como la que existe en España, jamás podría occurrir en Francia.
José Yoldi, “El juez antiterrorista francés muestra su claro apoyo a Garzón,” El País, el 2 de mayo de 2010
Sobre la distorsión de lo que es el delito de prevaricación en el ‘Caso Garzón’, véase
Javier Pérez Royo,”Delito Imposible,” El País, el 17 de abril de 2010
Un excelente resumen de las actuaciones y argumentos jurídicos en el caso Garzón se encuentra en el siguiente artículo, que a la vez contiene muchos links a fuentes primarias y otras:
“La causa contra Garzón por la investigación del franquismo;
El juez se enfrenta a una posible inhabilitación de hasta 20 años por supuesta prevaricación,” El País, el 28 de abril de 2010
La actuación de la fiscalía se describe en el siguiente artículo:
“La fiscalía apela a la coherencia jurídica de Varela para evitar que Garzón se siente en el banquillo,” El País, 22 de abril de 2010
Un ex-presidente de las Salas Segunda y Quinta del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia defiende el principio de que las críticas contra las actuaciones de la magistratura no son antidemocráticas, en el sigiente artículo:
Jose Jiménez Villarejo, “Tribuna (Columna), ‘Caso Garzón’: las críticas no son excesivas, El País, el 29 de abril de 2010
Véase también el Manifiesto de apoyo al juez Garzón, con su análisis jurídico y otros links a artículos de interés, en el sitio siguiente:
Manifiesto de Apoyo al Juez Garzón
www.congarzon.com
Los artículos y comentarios ya publicados por El Observador Incisvo (The Trenchant Observer) se listan a continuación:
Sobre el fondo jurídico del caso de prevaricación contra Baltasar Garzón
16 de abril de 2010
Se acusan a los acusadores de Garzón; el caso Garzón es una mancha en el Poder Judicial de España
14 de abril de 2010
Garzon’s Accusers are Accused: Abuse of Judicial Power in Garzón Case is Stain on Spanish Judiciary
April 13, 2010
Reportajes y Comentarios Sobre el Caso de Baltasar Garzón
12 de abril de 2010
In Spain, Judge Baltasar Garzón, Champion of Human Rights, is Prosecuted
April 11, 2010
En España, Enjuician al Juez Baltasar Garzón, Campeón de los Derechos Humanos
10 de abril de 2010
El Observador Incisivo
(The Trenchant Observer)
www.trenchantobserver.com
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
Se invitan los comentarios y críticas.
Nota: El Observador continúa en sus vacaciones.
Tags: 446.3, 447, acoso, Antonio Casado, apelación, appeal, Argentina, Article 446, Article 446.3, Article 447, Artículo, auto, auto de juez Varela, Baltasar Garzón, blogs.diariosur.es, boutique legal, campeón, champion, Chile, Clarín, Código Penal, congarzon.com, convención euroea de derechos humanos, convenio europeo de derechos humanos, derecho internacional, derechos humanos, diario sur, editorial, El Observador Incisivo, El País, Ely Ould Dah, enjuiciamiento, España, Europ-ean Court of Human Rights, Europa Press, European judge, fiscalía, fondo, France, fundamento jurídco, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, human rights, instrucción, intentional judicial error, International Human Rights, International Law, Javier Pérez Royo, José Yoldi, Juan Carlos Algañaz, Juan Saavedra, judiciary, juez, juicio penal, Julio M. Lázaro, jurídico, jurisdicción universal, Le Monde, legal argument, Luciano Varela, magistrado, Manifiesto de apoyo, Margarita Robles, ministerio fiscal, Natalia Junquera, New York Times, order, order of prosecution, Pablo Varas, Pere Ríos, photo, Pinochet, Poder Judicial, prevaricación, prevaricato, private criminal action, prosecution, QTR, querella, recurso, recurso de apelación, Spain, Spanish, stain, Supreme Court, The Economist, tortura, Torture, travesty, Tribuanl Supremo, tribunal europeo de derechos humanos, United Kingdom, universal jurisdiction
Posted in Baltasar Garzón, Crimes Against Humanity, human rights, International Law, Spain, Torture | 3 Comments »
Thursday, April 15th, 2010
El Observador Incisivo
Artículos y comentarios sobre los apectos jurídicos de la querella contra Juez Baltasar Garzón, con respecto a hechos de la guerra civil, se listan a continuación:
Antonio Casado, “El juez y la prevaricación,” EUROPA PRESS / OTR, 13 de abril de 2010
Boutique Legal, “Baltasar Garzón: prevaricación y competencia,” SUR.es
(blogs.diariosur.es), 15 de abril de 2010
“Prevaricación, in Case Law — Spain” (Jurisprudencia española), vLEX Spain
Manifiesto de Apoyo al Juez Garzón
www.congarzon.com
Se acusan a los acusadores de Garzón; el caso Garzón es una mancha en el Poder Judicial de España, The Trenchant Observer,
14 de abril de 2010
El Observador Incisivo
(The Trenchant Observer)
www.trenchantobserver.com
E-mail: observer@trenchantobserver.com
Twitter: www.twitter.com/trenchantobserv
Comments are invited, in any language. If in a language other than English, please provide an English translation. A Google translation will be sufficient.
Tags: 446.3, 447, acoso, Antonio Casado, apelación, appeal, Argentina, Article 446, Article 446.3, Article 447, Artículo, auto, auto de juez Varela, Baltasar Garzón, blogs.diariosur.es, boutique legal, campeón, champion, Chile, Clarín, Código Penal, congarzon.com, convención euroea de derechos humanos, convenio europeo de derechos humanos, derecho internacional, derechos humanos, diario sur, editorial, El Observador Incisivo, El País, Ely Ould Dah, enjuiciamiento, España, Europ-ean Court of Human Rights, Europa Press, European judge, fondo, France, fundamento jurídco, Gonzalo Martínez-Fresneda, human rights, instrucción, intentional judicial error, International Human Rights, International Law, Juan Carlos Algañaz, Juan Saavedra, judiciary, juez, juicio penal, Julio M. Lázaro, jurídico, jurisdicción universal, Le Monde, legal argument, Luciano Varela, magistrado, Manifiesto de apoyo, Margarita Robles, Natalia Junquera, New York Times, order, order of prosecution, Pablo Varas, Pere Ríos, photo, Pinochet, Poder Judicial, prevaricación, prevaricato, private criminal action, prosecution, QTR, querella, recurso, recurso de apelación, Spain, Spanish, stain, Supreme Court, The Economist, tortura, Torture, travesty, Tribuanl Supremo, tribunal europeo de derechos humanos, United Kingdom, universal jurisdiction
Posted in U.S Foreign Relations | 3 Comments »