Intelligence Matters: U.S. Dependence on Intelligence From Wali Karzai Shapes Kandahar Strategy
Quotation “La guerre, c’est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires.” “War is too serious a matter to just be handed over…
Quotation “La guerre, c’est une chose trop grave pour la confier à des militaires.” “War is too serious a matter to just be handed over…
Robert Baer’s GQ article on the attack on the CIA base in Khost province and what it suggests about the capabilities of the CIA has…
Our intelligence in Afghanistan doesn’t seem to be very good. Publication of the Flynn report in January, 2010 revealed very serious shortcomings in U.S. military…
On November 17, 2009, “Frontline” (U.S. Public Television, PBS) presented a documentary on the demonstrations in Iran following the elections on June 12, 2009. The…
–From the White House and Presdent Obama following Abdullah’s withdrawal and declaration of Karzai as President of Afghanistan –From demonstrators in Tehran on November 4,…
Please comment below, or privately by e-mail to observer@trenchantobserver.com The Observer
The situation in Afghanistan is desperate. As President Obama and his advisers debate how many additional troops to send to Afghanistan—at this time…the debate…does not address the diplomatic and political failures which have led to our current predicament….If their critical nature and root causes are not grasped and addressed, the dispatch of additional troops to Afghanistan will not reverse a deteriorating situation, just as the dispatch of additional troops in 2008 and earlier this year failed to halt the advances of the Taliban.
One overriding fact remains. Our diplomacy in Afghanistan has not been successful. It has failed. It has failed in a catastrophic way.
Following catastrophic diplomatic and political failures, we may need a new diplomatic team in Kabul, better decision-making structures and personnel at State, more vigorous Congressional oversight, and a whole rethink of whether the “aid and development” element of our strategy in Afghanistan, as currently implemented, makes any sense given our experience on the ground. Certainly we need to bear in mind that our counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq, to the extent it has been successful, has depended in critical part on free elections and the development of a legitimate government that could gain the support of the population. Finally, we should never lose sight of the fact that what we do about the election fraud in Afghanistan will have profound repercussions in Iran, and beyond.